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CHAPTER I
Confronting the Challenges of Regional Governance
In the face of function-specific and fragmented approaches to regional
governance in America, how might regionalism be re-created so that it can deal
more effectively with the social and economic challenges of contemporary
metropolitan life?(Bollens, 1997: 14)

Regional governance is the deliberate effort of multiple actors to achieve common
goals in interjurisdictional settings (Foster and Barnes, 2011). It is an intersectoral and
interfunctional endeavor intended to solve a regional problem or seize a regional
opportunity (Foster and Barnes, 2011). This endeavor, involving both governmental and
nongovernmental entities, requires that a diverse group of actors interact with each other
despite the differences in their motivations. Regional collaborative efforts are typically
justified as necessary to achieve economies of scale, address externalities, redraw urban
sprawl, manage adverse environmental impacts, reduce income disparity, and minimize
duplication of policies and services (Lee, Feiock and Lee, 2011). Unfortunately, regional
collaboration is not easy to achieve. A host of political, economic and ideological factors
obstruct regional collective action. These include concerns for local autonomy, distrust
among governing units, clash of interests among various stakeholder groups consisting of
governmental and nongovernmental actors, and power and resource asymmetries between
pro-sprawl and anti-sprawl forces (Norris, 2001; Visser, 2002). Despite these
impediments, local jurisdictions continue to pursue regional collaboration.
In the past few decades, several approaches to regional collaboration have
emerged. These approaches can be broadly grouped as the metropolitan government,
public choice and new regionalism (NR) approaches.1 Approaches to regional
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collaboration can also be more elaborately classified as done by David Walker (1987) in
his classic 17-level typology of regional service delivery approaches. Walker’s typology
(1987) includes relatively easy interventions (informal cooperation, private contracting),
modestly difficult interventions (functional transfers, annexation, multipurpose special
districts), and very difficult interventions (structural change through consolidations or
two-tier federations). For several decades now, the literature on regional governance has
been informed by the debate on the relative advantages/disadvantages of employing
various approaches to addressing regional issues. Given the political and practical
difficulties in adopting metropolitan government based approaches, attention has shifted
to public choice and new regionalism approaches. In particular, new regionalism
approaches have been widely explored in the past two decades (Foster and Barnes, 2011).
One of the prime advantages of new regionalism approaches is that they permit
voluntary participants to achieve their common goals in a self-organizing manner.2
Participants can themselves create and amend rules for collaborative action. They can
also “design levels of flexibility and enforcement that are appropriate for the concerns of
the participants” (Lee, Feiock and Lee, 2011: 2). These characteristics in turn help
enhance the legitimacy of proposed policy actions among participants. However, the
consensus and flexibility, characteristic of new regionalism approaches, tend to increase
decision costs (Feiock, 2004). This may be why cooperation is often limited to less
contentious issues such as provision of infrastructure and utility services. Meanwhile,
issues that are seen as threats to community lifestyle such as affordable housing, balanced
distribution of fiscal resources and development benefits across the region, public welfare
and health, and equitable access to education and other social and economic opportunities
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have remained unresolved (Williams, 1971; Bollens, 1997; Visser, 2002; LeRoux and
Carr, 2010). More simply put, existing approaches are conducive to accomplish “things”
regionalism, rather than “people” regionalism (Bollens, 1997).
Perhaps the greatest challenge to new regionalism efforts has been persuading
local governments and their residents to accept changes in governance that may alter
existing patterns of power and resource distribution in the regions. Critics of new
regionalism see NR approaches as severely limited in their ability to achieve such
acceptance (Frisken and Norris, 2001). NR approaches do not deal with processes for
achieving policy consensus. Instead, they simply present tools or instruments suitable for
services or planning cooperation that are easy to achieve. That is, whether it is
agreements for interlocal cooperation, or regional partnerships like planning councils,
planning organizations, councils of governments, or special purpose districts, what a new
regionalism approach provides is a mechanism for functional cooperation. These kinds of
mechanisms are best suited to address tame problems involving distributive services. But
such approaches struggle when it comes to achieving policy consensus in defining and
resolving highly contentious, redistributive, or “wicked” (Rittel and Webber, 1973)
regional problems.
Political fragmentation essentially perpetuates a narrow self interest that
undermines collective regional interest. Consequently, policy development and
coordination, in the case of highly contentious regional problems, are extremely difficult
to achieve. For example, even if it is the case that central cities and suburbs are
economically interdependent, and that the economic health of the suburbs is dependent
upon the economic health of central cities (Rusk, 1995), few policy actors, if any, believe
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or act on these premises (Norris and Stenberg, 2001). Unfortunately, most regional
problems turn out to involve redistributive issues--either related to power or resources.
“In fragmented governmental settings, the dice are institutionally loaded against policies
designed to enhance desegregated housing location, the matching of fiscal resources and
fiscal needs, and the effective management of growth and economic development”
(Lowery, 2000: 73). These issues typically tend to generate substantial opposition from
stakeholder groups (Norris, 2001). Furthermore, because cooperation on these issues is
voluntary, “[a]ny single unit can scuttle decisions made and policies adopted for the good
of the overall territory” (Norris, 2001: 567). If policy consensus is extremely difficult to
establish in regional redistributive issues, it is largely unattainable in the case of wicked
problems.
A wicked problem is so complex and intricate that even defining and
understanding it become a challenge. When there is no consensus on the nature of the
problem, automatically there is no consensus on solutions for addressing it (Rittel and
Webber, 1973).3 To make matters worse, wicked problems typically involve multiple
stakeholder groups that suffer from conflicting preferences and values, contradictory risk
perceptions, and inadequate information. For example, let us consider the problem of
crime. Is it due to insufficient police personnel, inadequate funds for providing quality
service, rise in the number of criminals, rise in crime rate in neighboring jurisdictions,
inadequate laws, increased freedom to own guns, rise in unemployment, improper
parenting, unregulated/under regulated media, some combination of these factors, or all
of them? Each of these problem definitions offers a different kind of policy solution for
attacking crime. Each of those solutions has a different implication for different groups of
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actors. Provision of most regional societal goods possesses the characteristics of a zerosum game wherein the gains of one participant are balanced by the losses of other
participants (Rittel and Weber, 1973). As a result, when the stakeholder population of a
problem becomes increasingly pluralistic, inter-group differences translate into intergroup rivalry, making it extremely hard to reach consensus (Rittel and Weber, 1973).
What is required to address chronic redistributive and wicked regional problems
is a procedure or practice that will initiate and sustain meaningful dialogues on the
problem at hand. These dialogues should mature into legitimate policy discourses that
can eventually develop consensus in terms of understanding the true meaning and scope
of that problem. This consensus should in turn be used to assess various courses of policy
action and eventually, to identify potential solutions to the said problem. What existing
self-organizing NR approaches lack is a prescription for developing this kind of hard-toachieve policy consensus; a deliberative-analytical process involving multiple
stakeholders that will, in due course, lead to policy development and coordination. In that
case, how can we address this critical limitation inherent in these self-organizing regional
solutions?

Significance/Objectives of this Research
An epistemic community is a network of recognized experts with authoritative
claim to policy relevant knowledge within a specific domain. Members of the network
will include professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds in governmental
and nongovernmental organizations. These professionals have a shared set of normative
and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity and a common

6
policy enterprise (Haas, 1992a). Typically, such epistemic communities (ECs) contribute
to debates related to issues within the policy domain of their expertise. They recommend
policies, identify potential points for possible negotiation, diffuse new ideas and
strategies, and help in the implementation of selected alternatives (e.g., Haas, 1989;
1992a; 1992b; Adler and Haas, 1992; Thomas, 1997; Mani, 2006, Kutchesfahani, 2010).
Epistemic or knowledge communities have been shown to achieve policy consensus as
well as facilitate policy development and implementation across complex and contentious
public problems in international settings characterized by autonomous actors. Problems
confronting US local governments are not vastly different from problems confronting
nation states. Externalities, environmental impacts, selective access to goods and services
due to income disparity, and duplication of policies and services are all common issues in
global and regional governance. Moreover, like global governance, regional governance
is

also

characterized

by

autonomous

actors

from

both

governmental

and

nongovernmental organizations. And in both settings, efforts to solve collective problems
take place in the presence of significant political fragmentation. Given these similarities, I

believe that if epistemic communities have been useful in resolving complicated
problems at the transnational level, they certainly can do the same in regional settings. So
I propose that at the regional level, epistemic communities are a means for policy
development on technically complex and politically difficult issues in situations of
substantial governmental fragmentation. I supplement my proposal with empirical
analysis that assesses how the epistemic communities concept works at the regional level
to facilitate policy development in a highly sensitive and complex policy domain. First, I
identify the existence of epistemic community/communities in the state of Michigan, in
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the particularly difficult policy area of municipal finance reform. I then proceed to
examine the composition, the interaction patterns, the motivations for interactions, the
policy beliefs, the policy promotion forums, and the liaisons of the epistemic
communities I have identified.
Importantly, this research contributes directly to arguments about the utility of
new regionalism approaches to metropolitan governance, particularly to the notion that
regional solutions to difficult problems are unlikely to emerge through self-organizing
approaches. The knowledge producing activities and the consensus driven processes of
epistemic communities have the potential to overcome the problems that impede existing
self-organizing NR approaches. That is, the involvement of epistemic communities can
facilitate the development of consensus on policy solutions to problems that are highly
complex, contentious and inextricably interrelated with other issues.
Epistemic communities are perhaps the most important actors in policy
development in highly complex and technical policy areas (Haas, 1992a). Nowadays,
decision makers find it extremely difficult to keep pace with the steadily swelling river of
information pertaining to different issue areas (Sundström, 2000). They need help in
condensing available information into manageable portions. They also need help in
decoding technical jargon into language a nonexpert can understand. These requirements
open up new avenues of influence and the experts who are involved in the processes of
editing and data interpretation tend to impact policy decisions and choices made.
Viewing man as an information-seeker, means that information-providers can
have a significant influence on his attitudes and, ultimately, on his behaviour.
Because of his active nature, he will try to procure the best, i.e. most trustworthy
and relevant, information, which he can then evaluate. He will therefore lend his
ear to various experts [who] can help him make educated assessments of the
decision-specific situation at hand (Sundström, 2000: 3, 4).
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In addition to issue complexity and technicity, issue uncertainty and crisis
situations also tend to accentuate the importance of epistemic communities (Haas,
1992a).
The concept of uncertainty is [very] important…for two reasons.
First, in the face of uncertainty, and more so in the wake of a shock or crisis,
many of the conditions facilitating a focus on power are absent. It is difficult for
leaders to identify their potential political allies and to be sure of what
strategies are most likely to help them retain power. And, second, poorly
understood conditions may create enough turbulence that established operating
procedures may break down, making institutions unworkable. Neither
power nor institutional cues to behavior will be available, and new patterns of
action may ensue. Under conditions of uncertainty, then, decision makers have a
variety of incentives and reasons for consulting epistemic communities (Haas,
1992a: 14-15).
Epistemic communities have played important roles in framing the collective
debate and in fostering transnational cooperation in conditions and policy areas
characterized by autonomous policy actors, contentious/sensitive policy issues,
knowledge deficits and bounded rationality (e.g., Haas, 1989; Adler and Haas, 1992).
“Without the help of experts, [governments] risk making choices that not only ignore the
interlinkages with other issues, but also highly discount the uncertain future” (Haas,
1992a: 13). Both national and transnational networks of experts have fostered
institutional and policy learning by promoting new principled and causal beliefs which
eventually produced new values and strategic prescriptions. Without these communities,
policy cooperation among autonomous nation-states across several contentious policy
domains such as nuclear arms nonproliferation, banning chlorofluorocarbons, cleaning up
the Mediterranean Sea, etc. may not have been accomplished (Adler, 1992; Haas, 1989;
1992b).
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The epistemic communities concept, originally developed in the international
relations literature, is generally credited to Peter Haas (1989; 1992a). Mathew Holden Jr.
(1964) and H. George Frederickson (1999) have utilized the epistemic communities
concept to explain cooperation in metropolitan areas. However, both these scholars have
been focused on explaining how bureaucrats develop interjurisdictional ties among
themselves to facilitate regional, functional cooperation. Consequently, neither of them
fully explains nor utilizes the potential of the epistemic communities framework (ECF).
This dissertation, while building on the initial efforts of these scholars, imports the
framework in its entirety from the IR field and explains how it could be effectively
applied to solve a variety of longstanding regional problems.
At this juncture, it is vital to note that the concept of professionalism is not new to
the field of urban politics. Awareness about the background, experience and training of
municipal officials was first created by the Progressive era reformers. The quest for
scientific management, administrative efficiency, politically neutral administration and
higher service ethics have helped professionalize urban bureaucracies. Today, decades
later, the utility of professional expertise for managing public problems is widely
recognized. Professionalization of urban bureaucracies is believed to have both upgraded
the quality of administration and raised the standards of administrative performance
(Ross and Levine, 2006). Moreover, professionalization of urban administration is seen
as key to solving problems of corruption, partisanship and administrative incompetence.
Such views have been often manifested in demands for structural reforms in many
municipalities across the country (Frederickson, Johnson and Wood, 2004; Carr and
Karuppusamy, 2009). What then is the value added by the introduction of the epistemic
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communities framework to the field of urban politics? While urban scholars and policy
makers have recognized the utility of professional experts as public administrators in
individual agencies, they are not fully aware of the benefits of systematically mobilizing
professional experts both inside and outside of the government machinery and engaging
them in public policy making processes. The epistemic communities framework shows
how to utilize the intellectual resources possessed by knowledge experts for purposes of
developing consensus on defining, understanding and solving complex public problems.
Through the empirical analysis in this dissertation, I examine the presence of
epistemic communities, in the state of Michigan, within the policy area of municipal
finance--more specifically, within the three key issue areas of local government revenues,
expenditures on municipal employees and public service provision. The policy domain of
municipal finance was selected because it contains key elements favorable for the
emergence and proliferation of epistemic communities--issue complexity and technical
specificity, issue uncertainty, and perceived crisis. Municipal finance is inherently highly
complex and technical. Besides, a considerable amount of uncertainty surrounds this
policy area as a result of prolonged national recession. Additionally, the threat of fiscal
instability affects large numbers of governments in the state and is seen by many state
and local officials as constituting a crisis.
The presence of municipal finance epistemic communities is identified through
the use of purposive and snowball sampling. The purposive sample includes names from
248 newspaper articles published between November 2010 and April 2011 in two
important newspapers published in Michigan, the Detroit News and the Detroit Free
Press. These 248 articles about Michigan’s crisis in municipal finance were reviewed and
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fifty relevant persons were identified. Then these fifty individuals or their staff were
contacted for interviews. Those who consented to the interview were asked to name two
people with whom they communicated most often on each of the three issue areas of
municipal finance--local government revenues, expenditures on municipal employees,
and public service provision. The contacts identified by the initial sample became
additional potential interviewees. Members of the secondary group were contacted and
they identified more subjects. This technique, known as snowball sampling, helped
identify municipal finance experts involved in Michigan’s finance reform effort. More
details on the sampling techniques and data collection methods are provided in chapter
three.
Once I ascertained the presence/existence of municipal finance epistemic
communities, I proceeded to study their composition, interaction patterns and motivations
for interactions. I then assessed the policy performance of these communities, i.e., the
forums they use to promote their epistemes, and the liaisons they developed with decision
makers to impact policy making processes. In order to examine these different elements, I
used a combination of social network analysis (SNA) and various descriptive statistics.
Notably, a social network approach to examining the composition and role of epistemic
communities is new; analysts in the past have typically approached this topic in terms of
case studies. Epistemic communities, in simple terms, are knowledge networks. So
fundamentally, no other analytical procedure can be more appropriate than SNA for
studying these entities. Network membership, network boundaries, interaction patterns
among network participants, roles and positions of members in the production and
dissemination of knowledge, ties of network members outside the network, causes for
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network formation, and consequences of network formation are all critical variables in
studies on epistemic communities. These variables are perhaps best captured by the
methodological resources provided by social network analysis.
To sum up, a research design involving the use of deductive hypotheses, social
network analysis and rigorous quantitative methods is new to the epistemic communities
literature. Though new, the design demonstrates that this study is theoretically driven and
empirically challenging. Notably, the design will provide for a nuanced and thorough
investigation of epistemic communities emerging in Michigan around the three key issue
areas of municipal finance: local government revenues, expenditures on municipal
employees and public service provision.

Policy Development for Complex and Wicked Public Problems
Administrative Conjunctions
Nearly 50 years ago, Mathew Holden Jr. (1964) posited that despite the absence
of a centralized authority within the metropolis, systems or networks of cooperation will
evolve. He proposed that these self-organizing networks, akin to the practices of
diplomacy between nation-states, help coordinate the actions of different policy actors
and ensure the effective functioning of the public sector. That is, these networks lead to
agreements and mutual understandings that coordinate governmental activities across
jurisdictions, permitting the smooth functioning of policy and public service provision
(Frederickson and Smith, 2003).
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Drawing on these insights, H. George Frederickson (1999) developed the
administrative conjunction framework, in which local professional administrators
working to achieve metropolitan functional cooperation are described as epistemic
communities. According to him, a group of police chiefs gathering informally to identify
patterns of criminal activity in the metropolitan area constitute an epistemic community.
Similarly, a group of city administrators participating regularly via e-mail to discuss
common problems and to develop joint strategies to resolve those problems also
constitute an epistemic community (Matkin and Frederickson, 2009). Frederickson
remarks:
[w]hile Haas was describing professionals in different nation-states working out
agreements for cleaning up the Mediterranean, his description of epistemic
communities is essentially the same thing as matters of multijurisdictional
cooperation and agreement between professionals described in metropolitan
administrative conjunction (Frederickson, 1999: 707).
However, administrative conjunctions are only one of the many networks that constitute
an EC. An epistemic community is typically a network of networks; a network that is
integrated by a complex group of networks (Haas, 1992a). The conjunctions that
bureaucrats develop among them are therefore best described as a component or a subset
of an epistemic community. In short, Frederickson used the epistemic communities
concept in its most narrow sense and never really developed it adequately. I pick up the
dialogue on this topic from where he left at, more fully develop it theoretically and
subject it to empirical tests.
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Epistemic Communities
It is rather unlikely that fragmented settings will ever cease to be the norm of
American metropolitan areas; therefore, scholars must address how policy development
can occur in these settings. Through the use of ECs in regional governance processes, it is
possible to accomplish what political consolidation achieves without such formal
consolidation occurring. Knowledge is a key resource in policy making processes and
those who possess it can influence the policy game in a number of ways. They can frame
the context of the game, stipulate or modify the rules of the game, determine the
participants of the game, and perhaps even specify the goals of the game. Where to play
the game, how to play the game, who should play the game and why should the game be
played, are all key governance elements which are crucial for achieving meaningful
regional cooperation and policy coordination.
In the international relations literature, many scholars have examined several
diverse policy situations in which ECs have played an important role in achieving policy
consensus and in developing policy solutions to longstanding global problems (e.g.,
Haas, 1989; 1992a; 1992b; Adler and Haas, 1992; Hopkins, 1992; Mani, 2006,
Kutchesfahani, 2010). Importantly, there are equivalents of these policy situations in
American regional governance systems as well--whether it is in terms of political
authority, policy actors or public problems. As discussed earlier, in both global and
regional governance systems (1) political authority is decentralized; (2) policy actors
include a range of individuals and entities from public, nonprofit and private sectors; and
(3) public problems often arise from misuse/abuse of common pool resources, policy
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spillovers, unequal access to goods and services due to power and resource asymmetries,
and overlapping policies.
In the rest of this section, I briefly describe three policy situations in which
epistemic communities have acted to facilitate international policy coordination and
development. This description is included to introduce readers to the functional
performance of ECs and thereby to the potential of these entities to help resolve public
problems. Following this, I will explain how the problem-solving capabilities of existing
self-organizing regional governance solutions can be enhanced through the use of ECs.

Protecting Common Pool Resources
Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea is considered as a collective goods problem as
pollutants from one country could wash up to the shores of another. The extensive
pollution of the Mediterranean is caused by intense coastal population pressures along
with largely unregulated industrial, municipal, and agricultural emission practices (Haas,
1989). The issue of free ridership is typical of all problems requiring collective action and
this problem in no exception. For example, if Spain were the only country to build
sewage treatment plants and demand its coastal industries to reduce their emissions, the
quality of the coast can be improved, but only in part. Further, this would suggest that
only the Spanish industries are hampered by additional production costs, while other
coastal neighbors like France and Italy are free riding. This behavior of adjoining nations
would trouble Spain and eventually, it would default. In addition to the issue of free
ridership, the pollution problem stood unresolved for a long time due to an intense
conflict of policy interests among Mediterranean nation states. While developed countries
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wanted to control all sources of marine pollution, less developed countries (LDCs)
viewed pollution control as an indirect attempt to control their industrialization practices.
Consequently, the LDCs consented to the control of only municipal and tanker wastes
(Haas, 1989). An international political coalition, for the purposes of overcoming these
collective action problems and facilitating the development of convergent national
policies for controlling Mediterranean marine pollution, mobilized the “Med Plan EC”
(Haas, 1989).
In what is perhaps the most often cited study on the epistemic communities
concept, Peter Haas (1989) examines the role of this “Med Plan EC.” The “Med Plan
EC” is a transnational group of experts consisting of ecologists and marine scientists
from the United Nations Environment Programme, secretariat members from agencies
such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Health Organization, and
government officials from various countries sharing similar views. During the process of
policy development, this ecological EC was “often granted formal decision-making
authority in national administrations” (Haas, 1989: 380). It was also “given responsibility
for enforcing and supervising pollution control measures” (Haas, 1989: 380). In 1972,
there were very few measures for pollution control in the Mediterranean states. But by
1985, due to the intervention of the Med Plan EC, almost all of the governments of
Mediterranean nation states had created environmental ministries or agencies, and many
had developed measures to control oil spills and dumping (Haas, 1989).
Haas reports that through the “capture” of regulatory environmental ministries
and agencies in different countries, the “Med Plan EC” managed to consolidate its control
over environmental policy and became successful in encouraging national governments
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toward convergent policy actions.4 The significance of this EC’s contribution has been
confirmed by scientists who “concur that the quality of the Mediterranean is better than it
would have been without the Med Plan, and preliminary studies suggest that the pollution
level has at least stabilized and is now about the same as it was in the early 1970s” (Haas,
1989: 384). Given the rapid coastal population growth and industrialization practices that
occurred during the 1970s and the 1980s, even maintaining the Mediterranean Sea at a
constant level of pollution is quite an accomplishment (Haas, 1989). This study by Haas
clearly establishes that in decentralized political settings, ECs have the potential to
influence governmental behavior by facilitating meaningful policy dialogues and shared
learning, thereby developing policy consensus in persisting public problems.

Controlling Negative Externalities
The nuclear arms race problem can be characterized mostly as a negative
externalities problem. When one country strengthens its arsenal of nuclear weapons, the
military balance in the region is disrupted; other countries feel threatened and are
compelled to act. These other countries, which would have normally not considered
investing more resources in nuclear arms, may feel compelled to do so. At the very least,
they may start reevaluating their military strength. The concept of nuclear arms control,
when first introduced in the 1950s, was simply a policy idea that could neither be taken
for granted nor ruled out completely (Adler, 1992). However, an American “arms control
EC” (Adler, 1992) recognized the vulnerability of US nuclear weapons and became
concerned about surprise attacks. Due to its interest in the national security of the United
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States and in the prevention of a nuclear war, this EC was motivated to facilitate the
collaboration of superpowers to stabilize nuclear balance via nuclear arms control.
Emanuel Adler (1992) has assessed the role of this “arms control EC” in the
conception and practice of nuclear deterrence. According to him, the American “arms
control EC” consisted of personnel in government bureaus, research organizations, and
laboratories; for-profit and nonprofit organizations; university research centers; and think
tanks. Notably, members of this EC knew each other very well. “Energized by their
shared epistemic criteria about the causes of war, the effects of technological change on
the arms race, and the need for nuclear adversaries to cooperate,” members of the EC
reached out to decision makers, “thereby turning their [epistemic] ideas into widespread
national security policy and practice” (Adler, 1992: 102). Importantly, this EC did not
stop with disseminating its core policy beliefs to American decision makers; it reached
out to the Soviets as well. In fact, this knowledge diffusion on security practices
convinced the Soviets of the need to negotiate with their American counterparts. Besides,
the ideas of this domestic EC were chosen by the US government as the basis for
negotiations with the Soviets which eventually led to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile
(ABM) arms control treaty.
The greatest significance of the “nuclear arms control EC” is that a national group
of experts managed to push domestically developed policy expectations to the
international security agenda. Though many of the initial expectations were renegotiated
and the US took a more political approach to arms control, still the episteme of this EC
served as the conceptual basis for the US and the Soviet Union to sign the 1972 ABM
treaty and establish an arms control regime (Adler, 1992). Adler’s study shows that
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through the selection, retention and diffusion of new conceptual understandings,
epistemic communities can achieve reconciliation even among archrivals. These
communities can initiate and sustain crucial policy dialogues among political adversaries
and later on, even enable them to reach policy consensus on highly sensitive issues. Yet
again, a confirmation that ECs can help solve highly contentious public problems.

Streamlining Overlapping Policies/Institutions
The issue of international trade in services can be described as a problem of
multiple and overlapping policies/institutions. By the middle of 1970s, many powerful
US-based transnational corporations (TNCs) desired to have greater freedom to sell
“services” abroad wherein the markets were heavily regulated (Drake and Nicolaïdis,
1992). Each country had its own regulations, and within each country regulations differed
from one industry to another. In general, overlapping policies/institutions lead to
governance and compliance complexities that inflate transaction costs. Additionally,
governance and compliance complexities increase expertise requirements for policy
implementation. Consequently, the TNCs wanted to liberalize the policies/institutions for
selling services globally. In economic trade, the term "services" covers a broad range of
activities such as transportation, shipping, banking and finance, management consulting,
advertising, education, construction, telecommunications, entertainment and health
related activities (Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992). A service is a value enhancing activity--it
has the capacity to change the condition of a good or person receiving that service (Drake
and Nicolaïdis, 1992). However, most services are invisible--you can buy or sell them,
yet they are not visible objects that can be held in the hand or dropped on the floor (Drake

20
and Nicolaïdis, 1992). Given that a large number of “services” are invisible streams of
activity, their outputs and values are difficult to assess and accurate national accounting
measures cannot be devised (Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992). Until the 1980s, most
governments treated everything that was not agriculture and manufacturing as a broad
tertiary service sector. Without systematic data and information on the nature and volume
of services, comprehensive policies were precluded. Instead, each service activity was
treated as discrete, involving different regulatory issues and subject to different civil
codes and bureaucratic authorities (Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992). Between 1972 and 1982,
the following episteme emerged in the “international trade in services EC” (Drake and
Nicolaïdis, 1992): services transactions are important; they have trade-like properties
similar to goods and are subject to regulatory barriers; and the provision of such services
would be enhanced if international trade rules were modified (Drake and Nicolaïdis,
1992). Within the global trade policy agenda, this episteme played a significant role in
transforming international services from “invisible transactions” to “trade in services”
(Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992).
Drake and Nicolaïdis (1992) assessed the crucial role the “international trade in
services EC” played in clarifying and framing the complex issue of trade in services and
placing it on the global agenda. Their analysis is as follows. The “international trade in
services EC” consisted of two tiers of members. The first tier included personnel from
governments, international agencies, and private firms, while the second included
academics, lawyers, industry specialists, and journalists. When the question of whether
international trade in services should be governed by the rules of GATT first arose, most
national governments did not understand the issues or know whether a multilateral
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agreement would be in their interest. Their existing national interests and institutions
seemed contrary to the goal of liberalizing trade in services. However, through their
analyses of the services issues and their interactions with policymakers, members of the
“international trade in services EC” convinced decision makers in nation states. These
experts showed various stakeholder nations that diverse cross-border transactions in
telecommunications, finance, management consulting, construction, etc., had common
trade properties and that the liberalization of services through removal of nontariff
barriers was potentially beneficial to developing as well as developed countries (Drake
and Nicolaïdis, 1992). They facilitated international negotiations within the GATT forum
and helped nation states reassess their interests. They changed how governments thought
about the nature of services, their movement across borders, their roles in society, and the
objectives and principles according to which they should be governed. Community
members were also instrumental in specifying a range of policy options to be considered.
Once governments understood their interests and domestic constituencies were
mobilized, their policy choices were influenced more by power and bargaining dynamics
than by continuing, direct epistemic community influence. Due to the community’s
intervention, member governments of GATT agreed to pursue a new regime for
international trade in services as part of the Uruguay Round negotiations begun in 1986.
The talks produced a draft agreement called the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) which, if ratified, would have important implications for the world economy
(Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992).
Almost two decades after this study was conducted, where does this draft
agreement stand? The GATS, conceived at the Uruguay Round negotiations, entered into

22
force in January 1995. All members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are
signatories to the GATS. The GATS treaty provides a multilateral trading system to the
service sector just as GATT provides a multilateral trading system for merchandise trade
(Wikipedia, 2012a). In 2003, the 'GATSwatch' network published a critical statement and
over 500 organizations in 60 different countries extended their support to this statement
(Wikipedia, 2012a). Drake and Nicolaïdis’ study clearly shows the power of epistemic
communities in constructing social reality. ECs can frame issues and issue contexts for
collective debates, thereby influencing subsequent negotiations and bringing in preferred
outcomes to the exclusion of others. An EC’s values and beliefs, when used to construct
social reality, have the potential to influence the behavior of decision makers long after
the community is originally consulted with. That is, ECs have the ability to
institutionalize their policy ideas and by doing so can grant those ideas the status of
orthodoxy. How is this significant in the context of resolving complex and wicked
regional problems? Well, the “international trade in services EC” has shown that it can
change the policy focus of participating actors from “why not cooperate or defect?” to
“why not collaborate?” Isn’t this kind of attitude change fundamental for resolving
complex and wicked regional problems?
In sum, through the three different policy situations discussed above, I show that
ECs can help: (1) define complex public problems, (2) articulate cause-and-effect
relationships of these problems, (3) identify the policy interests of a governmental unit(s),
(4) frame the issues for collective debate (5) propose specific policies (6) identify salient
points for negotiation and (7) implement selected policy solutions (Haas, 1992a). These
policy situations demonstrate that mobilizing multi-faceted expertise and knowledge is a
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useful path for engaging collective debates on difficult and wicked public problems and
subsequently for identifying potential solutions to these problems and understanding the
long term implications of these solutions. These policy situations also reveal that
mobilizing knowledge communities can facilitate behavior changes and attitudes toward
development and compliance of policy actions in collective action problems.

Reconceptualizing Self Organizing Solutions
Problems arising from common pool resources, policy spillovers, unequal access
to goods and services, and overlapping policies/institutions abound in metropolitan areas
and regions in the United States. In fact, management of common natural resources like
watersheds and fisheries; controlling negative externalities that arise from activities such
as disease and drug trafficking; dealing with unequal access to housing, education, and
employment opportunities between urbanites and suburbanites; and mitigating problems
arising from overlapping tax structures and duplication of services are all everyday issues
in these areas. A variety of flexible, voluntary, and dynamic arrangements that intersect
and overlap traditional jurisdictional boundaries have been proposed by new regionalists
as avenues to dealing with these continuing problems (Strange, 1996; Frederickson,
1999; Agranoff and McGuire, 2003; Feiock, 2004; Paquet, 2005). However, the
competition to capture and sustain economic development and the “race to the bottom” in
levels of welfare and social service benefits render cooperation on critical regional issues
difficult (Olberding, 2002). Whenever policy choices in one community impose costs on
another, regional self-organizing solutions tend to be less successful. In particular, in
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several contentious issue areas, even third party coercion and incentives are inadequate to
overcome collective action problems (Feiock, 2004).
In such situations, what is needed is increased trust among stakeholders in public,
private and nonprofit organizations; reinforcement of cooperative norms; redefinition of
problems to achieve a common understanding of their scope and nature; reorientation of
the policy interests of stakeholder groups; and development of a collective identity
focused on securing collective benefits. Given that regional self-organizing solutions by
themselves cannot achieve these changes, regional governance scholars have been
repeatedly calling for “new regional processes, structures, or institutions that can identify
regional problems, formulate regional solutions, implement those solutions, and
coordinate regional actions” (Briffault, 2000: 6). This dissertation is an answer to these
calls. It draws attention to an informal institution that may be able to successfully carry
out all of these tasks--the epistemic communities.
The use of epistemic communities is increasingly recognized in transnational
policy environments as illustrated in the above case studies. However, their existence and
implications are almost unknown in the American regional context. Through this
dissertation, I establish the existence of these communities and their implication for
regional governance processes. In this study, I propose that the problem solving
capabilities of existing self-organizing governance solutions can be enhanced through the
use of epistemic communities. Policy consensus is prerequisite to policy development
and implementation, and though self-organizing NR approaches are ingenious in the
design of tools/instruments for the implementation of collaborative action, they tend to be
less resourceful when it comes to explaining the processes for bringing together
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contentious actors and convincing them to collaborate. By mobilizing epistemic
communities, this critical gap in policy making can be resolved. While the knowledge
communities can work on achieving policy consensus in defining problems, setting up
the agenda and choosing policy alternatives, NR approaches could focus on
implementing these alternatives through the collaborative mechanisms they have devised.
I believe ECs are crucial for achieving consensus over the definition and
resolution of highly contentious regional problems. Often, local level governments lack
the financial and technical resources required to conduct research and policy analysis on
these kinds of complex problems. In such conditions, the professional legitimacy and
normative authority of ECs allows them to play the role of an honest broker (Yu, 2008).
These knowledge based mediators can invite all interested parties to sit down to address a
particular problem or proposal including those issues that may be deemed too sensitive
for governments to grapple with.
Fundamental to understanding and addressing complex and wicked regional
problems like economic growth, pollution, urban sprawl, housing, transportation, etc., is
the development of a common definition of the particular problem and subsequently
comprehending the true causes of that problem. These difficult tasks can be accomplished
via the intellectual superiority and the consensus driven knowledge producing activities
of epistemic communities. Epistemic community members are recognized experts who
have specialist knowledge within a given policy area; their academic background and
professional experiences make them credible in the eyes of their target audience (Yu,
2008). Their audience who consist of politicians, bureaucrats, citizens, special interests,
businesses, nonprofits and other stakeholders view these experts as upholders of
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professional values and best practices. This credibility will in turn provide these actors
with sufficient influence to initiate meaningful and interactive dialogues in terms of
defining public problems and identifying the true causes of these problems.
Once a problem is defined and its true causes are identified, the next stage is
deliberating on the policy goals to be achieved and the various ways to achieving these
goals. ECs can employ their functional expertise to directly or indirectly point out salient
aspects of the issue in question and thereby help define decision makers’ policy interests.
They are capable of providing fresh approaches to dealing with problems that seem to be
at an impasse in deliberations among officials (Yu, 2008). They can also redefine issues
such that policy makers may see new ways of resolution (Haas, 1992a; Yu, 2008). ECs
may even go as far as setting the policy-makers’ agenda by providing new ideas or
norms. More importantly, ECs also play a role of norm socialization. That is, they do not
just create norms, but also effectively spread these norms via various professional and
political forums. Equipped with convincing and legitimate data, ECs can intensify
communication and coordination among diverse policy actors.
ECs can influence the policy making apparatus not just by employing their
cognitive resources, but also by developing liaisons with policy makers. In general, ECs
are not content with creatively initiating policy dialogues; they also seek to function as
active participants in these dialogues. It is likely that some EC members will be
renowned scholars/professional experts in their policy domain who may have provided
advices to governments at some point in their career (Yu, 2008). This suggests that these
experts and policy makers will know each other and can carry on informal dialogues
among them. Besides these informal communication links, EC members and policy
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makers will also commonly participate in scholarly interactions via collaborative research
projects, skill building sessions, joint conferences and professional associations. These
scholarly interactions serve as a solid base and perpetuate a diversified series of networks
that establish familiarity and some loyalty among participants (Yu, 2008). Notably, these
interactions set up the foundations for a habit of dialogue and on-going consultations (Yu,
2008). In due course, by virtue of these and other interactions, community members (at
least some of them) will tend to develop strong links with decision makers. At some point
they may also become significant actors in governance processes when decision makers
solicit information from them and subsequently delegate responsibility to them (Haas,
1992a).

Overview of the Dissertation
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter two, I more fully
review the epistemic communities literature and explain the roles that ECs have played in
solving complex problems. Following the review, I develop a three-part framework
focused on addressing the following questions: What are epistemic communities? When
do these communities emerge? How can these communities impact public policy
making? This three-part framework is developed through an assessment and integration
of the lessons gleaned from various studies conducted on epistemic communities. ECF
helps organize insights gained from the epistemic communities literature; it efficiently
presents ideas/propositions about the key characteristics, causal logic and policy
performance of epistemic communities. Next, I explain the contribution of this study to
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the NR and EC literatures--which is to show how epistemic communities can be used to
overcome the limitations in self-organizing NR approaches to achieve policy cooperation
and coordination across complex and wicked regional problems. Finally, I present the
major research foci of this dissertation. The research questions that are analyzed in the
empirical chapters in this dissertation are laid out in this third and last section of this
chapter.
In chapter three, I discuss the research design used in this study. In this chapter, I
explain the process by which the initial sample was developed, and the snowball
sampling technique used to identify other potential respondents. I proceed to explain how
I developed the interview questionnaire that I used to collect the data. The structure and
content of the questionnaire are also described in this section. Following this, I explain
the interview method. Lastly, I conclude this chapter with a discussion on the
measurement of my key theoretical variables. The analytical methods used to analyze
these data are discussed in chapters four and five.
In chapter four, I examine the existence of municipal finance ECs and the
composition of these ECs (i.e., network membership). I begin the chapter with a broad
overview of Michigan’s fiscal crisis. I then proceed to discuss the various constraints
imposed on Michigan’s municipalities which have severely limited the ability of these
governments to raise revenues. I follow up this discussion with a brief description of the
various strategies that have evolved in the state as responses to the growing financial
problems. In the second section, I propose research hypothesis about the potential
existence of epistemic communities in Michigan within the domain of municipal finance.
Next, I present the various analytical procedures carried out to test the proposed
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hypothesis and the findings of this test. In this same section, I propose a second set of
research hypotheses focused to the composition of municipal finance epistemic
communities. Following this, I proceed to present the various analytical procedures
carried out to test this second set of hypotheses and the findings of these tests. Finally, I
conclude this chapter with a discussion of the implications of my findings. The empirical
analysis in this chapter is based on social network mapping and descriptive statistics.
In chapter five, I analyze the interaction patterns that exist among members of the
epistemic communities identified in chapter four. In chapter five, I also analyze the
factors that motivate these actors to interact with each other. Lastly, I examine the policy
performance of these actors. This includes an assessment of the policy promotion forums
they use and the liaisons they develop with decision makers. The empirical analysis in
this chapter is based on a combination of p*/exponential random graph models, quadratic
assignment procedures analysis, network mapping, and descriptive statistics.
In the sixth and last chapter, I discuss the contributions and significance of this
study and present my suggestions for future research.
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Notes
1

The metropolitan government approach emphasizes the use of single consolidated or dual-tier government
structures to govern urban regions (Barnes and Ledebur, 1992; 1994a; 1994b; Pierce, Johnson, and Hall,
1993; Rusk, 1995). In contrast to the metropolitan government approach, the public choice approach
stresses voluntarily negotiated, ad hoc arrangements for governing urban regions (Keating, 1995). These
arrangements include service agreements between autonomous local governments; limited functional
transfers to county governments (DeSantis, 1989; Desantis and Renner, 1994); and the creation of limitedpurpose, multiunit special districts and authorities (Foster, 1997). On the other hand, new regionalism
approaches prescribe voluntary arrangements promoted by the public choice approach as well as complex
and overlapping service sharing networks (Savitch and Vogel, 2000) for governing urban regions.
2

In this dissertation, the concept of New Regionalism is used only within the regional governance context
and as developed by H.V. Savitch and Ronald Vogel.
3

The concept of “wicked problems” was first formally described by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber in
1973. Within the context of social planning, these scholars specified ten characteristics of wicked problems
that help differentiate them from relatively tame problems that can be solved. These ten characteristics are
listed below.
1.

There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem, different framings of the problem will
lead to different definitions.
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule, or point at which the problem is effectively solved.
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but better or worse.
4. There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem.
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a "one-shot operation"; because there is no opportunity to
learn by trial and error, every attempt counts significantly.
6. Wicked problems do not have an enumerable (or an exhaustively describable) set of potential
solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into
the plan.
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique.
8. Every wicked problem can be considered to be a symptom of another problem.
9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in numerous
ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem's resolution.
10. The planner has no right to be wrong (planners are liable for the consequences of the actions they
generate) (Rittel and Webber, 1973).
4

In the early 1970s, many Mediterranean countries established coordinative environmental
ministries/agencies. Notably, these ministries were staffed by members of the “Med Plan EC” and by the
marine scientists who were allied with UNEP, since they were the only ones with a strong reputation for
expertise in pollution control (Haas, 1989).
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CHAPTER II
The Epistemic Communities
The epistemic communities approach demonstrates how shared learning as a
process can be used to facilitate better politics and subsequently better policy making.
Shared learning is one of the fundamental components of collaborative efforts and
interorganizational collaborative processes are simply joint learning systems where
discussions create shared meaning, bring out added knowledge, and enable participants to
formulate ideas and processes for joint action (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003). Through
shared learning, epistemic communities help transform the political process from a
question about who gets what, when and how (Lasswell, 1950) to a question about who
learns what, when, for whose benefit and why (Adler and Haas, 1992). Besides
facilitating shared learning, epistemic communities also serve as an extremely useful
prerequisite to rational choice, one of the most commonly employed causal logics in the
study of regional governance. In general, all organizations engage in some form of
‘satisficing’ or procedural rationality in their consideration of policy alternatives (Simon,
1983); “[i]f rationality is bounded, epistemic communities may be responsible for
circumscribing the boundaries and delimiting the options” (Haas, 1992a: 16). “The definition
of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power” (Schattschneider, 1975) and by pointing
out which alternatives are viable, an epistemic community can determine the playing field of
the policy game.

Up until now, self organizing NR approaches have been deficient in addressing
issues of democratic accountability (DeHoog, Lowery and Lyons, 1990; Perlman, 1993;
Lowery, 2000); political efficacy and participation (Oliver, 2001); class/race segregation
of residences and school districts (Neiman, 1976; Weiher, 1991; Downs, 1994; Barnes
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and Ledebur, 1998; Gainsborough, 2001); and housing, environmental, and transportation
problems associated with urban sprawl (Downs, 1994; Rusk, 1995). In chapter one, I
proposed that by using knowledge based epistemic communities, it is possible to enhance
the ability of NR approaches to prevail over the politico-economic obstacles that deter
overall regional cooperation. In this chapter, I provide more details on this proposal
through an elaborate review of the lineage, organizational characteristics and functional
performance of ECs. I begin this review with an introduction to policy networks. I briefly
define these entities and explain their functional utility to public governance processes.
Next, I provide an overview of the policy networks literature. In this overview, I identify
epistemic communities as a subform of policy networks. I then proceed to review the EC
literature. I begin this review with detailed discussions on five case studies, each drawn
from a different policy domain. Subsequent to these discussions, I analyze the
contributions of these studies to the public policy making literature. In the second section,
drawing from the insights provided by these and other studies on epistemic communities,
I propose a framework focused on addressing the following questions: What are
epistemic communities? When do these communities emerge? How do they impact
public policy making? Following the presentation of the epistemic communities
framework, in the third section, I explain the key contributions of this dissertation. In
particular, I show how the framework can be used to overcome the limitations in selforganizing NR solutions to achieve policy consensus across complex and wicked regional
problems. In the fourth and last section of this chapter, I discuss the research questions
that are analyzed in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
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Policy Networks
The term “network” is generally used to describe clusters of actors who are linked
together in political, social or economic life. Via network participation, these actors can
spread information and resources or engage in collective action. Modern society is
increasingly becoming a product of relations involving mutuality and interdependence as
opposed to hierarchy and independence (Peterson, 2003). Consequently, linkages among
organizations, rather than organizations themselves, have become the central focus of
many social scientists. Today, akin to market structures, the public sector is also
becoming more and more about power relationships that are informally and socially
constructed and about the opportunistic behavior that these relationships allow (Rhodes,
1997). As public governance moves farther away from the traditional hierarchical mode,
policy networks and policy network relationships have become one of the crucial
frameworks for explaining why some issues reach the policy agenda and others do not.
In general, the term policy network connotes “a cluster of actors, each of which
has an interest, or ‘stake’ in a given…policy sector and the capacity to help determine
policy success or failure” (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 8). Typically, within policy
networks, there are few actors with close working relations and general agreement over
the scope, aims, and general institutional processes leading to policy output. Policy
network scholars use a variety of classification methods to differentiate between these
structures. These methods are usually based on different combinations of the following
dimensions of network structures: types of participants, membership rules, network
structure, power relationships, resource distribution, functional scope and strategies of
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participants (Benson, 1982; Rhodes, 1986; 1997; Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Jordan
and Schubert, 1992; Kriesi, 1994). Today, regardless of their specific forms, policy
networks have become an important part of the political landscape and “it is difficult to
understand the prominent policy continuities in some areas and the equally prominent
policy changes in other areas without focusing on these networks” (Blom-Hansen, 1997:
670).
Policy networks are involved in the development as well as in the implementation
of policy. They function as forums for voluntary bargaining for policy actors in an
increasingly interdependent society where hierarchical coordination and control are
becoming less likely (Börzel, 1997; 1998). Policy networks help to overcome the
structural dilemma of traditional bargaining systems because they provide additional
avenues for interaction and communication in inter- and intra-organizational decision
making settings. In fact, these networks have the potential to counterbalance power
asymmetries by providing additional channels of influence beyond formal structures
(Benz, 1992). Policy networks shape policy formulation and implementation not only
through information exchanges, but also through exchanges that consist of financial,
personnel and technical resources.
Policy networks also serve to reduce transaction costs and uncertainty. By
providing information about the behaviors of actors embedded in them, network
structures reduce the search and information costs associated with identifying and
screening suitable and credible partners (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 1995). By permitting
repeated face-to-face interactions among actors, these structures facilitate the
development of norms of trust and reciprocity (Axelrod, 1984). Trust and reciprocity are

35
key to reducing coordination costs. Reciprocity in exchange can make transacting parties
hostage to one another, thereby restricting opportunistic behaviors (Williamson, 1996).
Reciprocity in exchange can also create social capital by developing mutual trust among
collaborating partners. Consequently, partners’ behaviors become more predictable for
existing and subsequent exchanges (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999). Finally, network
structures also serve to reduce the costs of enforcing and monitoring mutual agreements.
Fears of sanction by other network members and the desire to maintain a good reputation
will mitigate the threat of opportunistic behavior, especially in dense (closed) networks
(Granovetter, 1985).

The Policy Networks Literature
Scholarly treatment of policy networks typically takes two forms, as a typology of
interest intermediation, and as a specific form of governance. The interest intermediation
school is concerned with how networks affect power structures and how the resultant
power relationships favor certain interests over others in policy formulation and
implementation. The governance school seeks to understand the extent to which the state
has lost its governing capacity and whether we now have governance without government
(Rhodes, 1997). In this dissertation, policy networks are treated as a typology of interest
intermediation.

The Interest Intermediation School
All governments confront a variety of interests and the aggregation of those
interests is a functional necessity. “Intermediation is therefore a fact of everyday life in
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government” (Rhodes, 1997: 9). There are a variety of policy networks, each articulating
its own interests in the process of governing. Government itself is receptive to these
varied interests as inclusiveness often enhances the effectiveness of the policy option
adopted. A key outcome of the interest intermediation perspective is the development of
analytical devices to map the configurations of these policy networks. These mapping
exercises spawned a number of network typologies, several of which have proven to be
very helpful in specifying power relations within specific policy fields.
For example, Grant Jordan and Klaus Schubert’s (1992) typology is based on
three main criteria, the level of institutionalization (stable/unstable), the scope of the
policy-making arrangement (sectoral/trans-sectoral), and the number of participants
(restricted/open). In contrast, Frans van Waarden (1992) uses seven criteria in his
typology: actors, function, structure, institutionalization, rules of conduct, power
relations, and actors’ strategies. However, he identifies three of these as most important
for distinguishing among existing types of networks. These are the number and type of
societal actors involved, the major function of the network, and the balance of power
among network actors. Rod Rhodes (1988) distinguishes five types of networks based on
the degree to which network members are integrated, the type of network members, and
the distribution of resources among them. He places his network types on a continuum
ranging from highly integrated policy communities at one end and loosely integrated
issue networks at the other, with professional networks, inter-governmental networks,
and producer networks in-between (Rhodes, 1988). While policy communities are
characterized by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive membership,
a high degree of vertical interdependence and limited horizontal articulation, issue
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networks are distinguished by their large number of participants and limited degree of
interdependence (Rhodes, 1988).
A more fundamental, but often overlooked, distinction among policy networks is
the diversity of interests and resources of network participants. Heterogeneous policy
networks are those networks in which network participants have different interests and
resources. Such heterogeneity is thought to create a state of interdependence among the
actors linking them together in a policy network wherein they mediate their interests and
exchange their resources (Börzel, 1998). On the other hand, homogeneous networks are
those in which participants have similar interests and resources. These include
professional networks (Burley and Mattli, 1993), epistemic communities (e.g., Haas,
1992a; Adler and Haas, 1992, Frederickson, 1999), and principled issue-networks
(Sikkink, 1993). Interestingly, homogeneous networks are among the least studied groups
in the interest intermediation school (Börzel, 1998).

The Epistemic Communities Literature
Though the term epistemic community has been used in a wide variety of ways, it
is most commonly used to refer to communities of scientific experts (Foucault, 1970;
Holzner, 1972; Ruggie, 1975; Haas, 1989; Antoniades, 2003). Etymologically derived
from the Greek word “ἐπιστήµη” (episteme), the term refers to knowledge or science
(Kutchesfahani, 2010). However, over the years, the concept of episteme has evolved
substantially. From referring to a shared faith in the scientific method as a way of
generating truth (Holzner, 1972; Holzner and Marx, 1979), the term has evolved as a
dominant way of looking at social reality (Foucault, 1970; Ruggie, 1975), as a way to
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explore the global governance system (Haas, 1989; 1992b), and as a way to dominate
social discourse and practice (Antoniades, 2003).
As a framework, the concept was introduced to the field of international relations
(IR) by Peter M. Haas (1989; 1992b). Haas applied the framework to international policy
coordination studies to assess the role and impact of knowledge/ideas in transnational
relations and institutions. He (1992a) defined an epistemic community as a network of
professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds who have a shared set of
normative and principled beliefs, shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity and a
common policy enterprise. Though there are several versions of the EC concept, Haas’
model is the most widely accepted one. This dissertation is also focused on Haas’ model
and the literature reviewed here includes only those studies employing Haas’ model to
examine the roles of epistemic communities in public policy making.
A review of the EC literature provides answers to three questions. First, what
exactly is an epistemic community? What are its most important characteristics? Which
actors constitute this community? Second, what is the causal logic of ECs? An EC is a
complex network of networks consisting of people who are on the same epistemological
wavelength, but not necessarily employed in the same organization. What factors or
conditions bring together experts who are geographically dispersed? That is, what factors
or conditions favor the emergence/proliferation of an epistemic community? Third, what
impacts do ECs have and how are those impacts manifested? How does an epistemic
community matter for public policy making? Does it influence policy makers and policy
making processes? Do members of the community acquire influence through liaisons
with powerful political and bureaucratic actors and groups? If so, how do these members,
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located in different organizations/jurisdictions, gain access to these decision makers? Do
they use advisory positions, contract-based consultancies, and other informal networks to
impact policy makers and the choices they make? The answers to these questions are
fundamental to understanding the concept of epistemic communities. Using these
questions as a roadmap, I review several case studies that explore the roles of ECs in
public policy making. Each study belongs to a different policy domain and each of the
domains requires a different level of technical expertise. Figure 2.1 classifies the cases
reviewed in order of their technical complexity and appearance in the discussion.

Figure 2.1: Technical Complexity of Cases Reviewed
High

Low

National
Innovation Systems

Global
Environmental Protection

Local
Fiscal Accounting

International
Labor Politics

Local
Democratic Participation

National Innovation Systems
Sunil Mani (2006) has studied Singapore’s “innovation systems EC” which
played a critical role in making the country an important generator of new technologies.
This EC, consisting of scientists, engineers, research analysts, government officials and
international technological experts with expertise knowledge on innovation systems, was
consciously mobilized by the Singapore government. Starting in the 1980s, the country
created a variety of institutions, initiatives, programs, and funding to bring together a
critical mass of qualified life sciences experts to help in the design, development and
implementation of national innovation policies. These include establishing a molecular
biology research centre; increasing funding for biomedical research at hospitals and
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universities; developing a training program for life sciences researchers; creating many
new funds for supporting innovation and commercialization in the biotechnology and life
sciences industries; and promoting Singapore as the preferred location for biotechnology
and pharmaceutical companies in Asia.
Since 1991, the National Science and Technology Board (NSTB), the main
component of the “’innovation systems EC,” has established 13 research institutes and
centers (RICs). Each of these RICs focuses on a specific area. These RICs not only
generate technologies themselves, but they also serve as a vital source of personnel for
industry. The very existence of RICs has encouraged local industries to collaborate with
them in research and development (R&D) projects. These RIC–industry collaborations
have resulted in the development of more than 70 new products and processes, 20 of
which have been commercialized, and have provided training for more than 580
researchers (Mani, 2006). Observing this, the Singapore government started to provide
grants for these R&D projects. The government also encouraged multinational
corporations to adopt a group of local small and medium enterprises and transfer
technology and skills to them. According to Mani, these achievements are not simply due
to the availability of finance for conducting technology-generating activities. Rather, they
are the result of proper and sequenced policy design and implementation which led to
proper financial maintenance and optimal outcomes. The “innovation systems EC”
played a critical role in designing logically sequenced policy instruments and in
implementing them. This EC helped develop efficient and effective technological policies
which in turn contributed to the country’s national and local fiscal growth.
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Global Environmental Protection: Preserving Stratospheric Ozone
Peter Haas (1992b) has analyzed an “ecological EC” that helped to reduce global
emission of ozone depleting chemical substances. This “ecological EC,” which was
instrumental in the control of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions, was transnational in
nature and consisted of officials of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the US State Department’s Bureau
of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). Atmospheric
scientists in the international scientific community were also members of this EC. Within
the US administration, the ecological EC was strongly represented by EPA Administrator
Lee Thomas and officials from the offices of air programs and international activities.
International concern about the depletion of the ozone layer first surfaced in 1970
and lasted for a brief period. In 1974, Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina, two
American chemists, revived the discussion. They contended that the chlorine in CFC
emissions reacts with and breaks down ozone molecules in the thin layer of stratospheric
ozone and thus hinders the ozone layer's ability to prevent harmful ultraviolet rays from
reaching the earth (Haas, 1992b).1 Following the Rowland-Molina hypothesis of 1974,
atmospheric modeling became more sophisticated and it became possible to make clearer
predictions about how various rates of CFC production would affect the ozone layer.
Seriously concerned about the risk of ozone depletion, the UNEP convened an
international conference in Washington in March 1977. At the conference, the UNEP
released the World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer, a document that called for a treaty
for ozone protection. The negotiation points for the treaty were framed by the “ecological
EC” which aimed at preserving the ozone layer. This EC also had access to a variety of
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other channels to decision making. Through UNEP, it drafted documents and reports,
gathered data, organized scientific panels, pressured delegates, and stressed issues that it
deemed important. On 22 March 1985, a framework agreement called the Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was signed by 20 countries.
Unfortunately, the agreement lacked specific control measures. At this point, the
discovery of the ozone hole alarmed the public and the UNEP quickly called for
negotiations to be reconvened in December 1986. After several negotiation sessions, the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer was adopted in
September 1987. The “ecological EC” played a significant role in institutionalizing the
control on CFC emissions via the Montreal protocol. In all, 31 nations ratified the
protocol which called for two staggered cuts in consumption that would lead to a 50
percent total reduction from 1986 levels. Since the treaty came into effect, atmospheric
concentrations of the most important CFCs and related chlorinated hydrocarbons have
either leveled off or decreased (Speth, 2004). As of January 12, 2012, the treaty has been
ratified by 196 states and the European Union (United Nations Office of Legal Affairs,
New York, 2012). It is believed that if the international agreement is adhered to, the
ozone layer is likely to recover by 2050 (Speth, 2004).

Local Fiscal Accounting
In a 2011 study, Irvine, Cooper and Moerman examine the dual role of an
Australian “financial EC” as an influencer of local government accounting policy and as
an implementer of that policy. Traditional financial practices of Australian local
governments led to inconsistent valuation and depreciation methods which rendered key
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performance indicators inappropriate for determining whether local councils were viable.
There was a nation-wide funding shortfall in Australia in the management of local
government community infrastructure. The problem stemmed from the estimated cost for
local councils to get infrastructure assets into satisfactory condition (Irvine et al., 2011).
In October 2005, the Local Government and Shires Associations announced an
independent inquiry into the financial sustainability of local councils. In its final
report, issued in May 2006, that inquiry identified ‘a huge backlog in
infrastructure renewals’ of over $6 billion, which was ‘expected to grow to almost
$21 billion within fifteen years’ (LGSA, 2006, p. 7). This ‘renewals gap’ or
backlog, was defined as the difference between ‘the rate at which councils’
physical assets are depreciating and the rate at which they are being replaced’
(LGSA, 2006, p. 7) (Irvine et al., 2011: 251).
The widespread failure of local governments across the country and the perceived
financial sustainability crisis of New South Wales (NSW) local councils motivated the
NSW state Department of Local Government (DLG) to consult with experts. Faced with
the need to formulate and implement a new set of accounting guidelines, the DLG
mobilized a local level “financial EC.” The DLG reached out, identified and mobilized
professional groups that shared a common understanding on the nature of the problem
and had the potential to develop consensus on potential ways to resolving it. The
mobilized EC was composed of finance and accounting staff from a variety of local
councils, an auditor employed by several local councils and an external consultant. Not
surprisingly, all thirteen members had at least one professional affiliation and six of them
had more than one professional affiliation (Irvine et al., 2011).
The DLG valued the expertise of the “financial EC” and invited it to assist in the
formulation of new accounting guidelines. However, members of this EC were already
involved in this process through their participation in the Local Government Accounting
Advisory Group. Through this group, they had a history of providing input and therefore,
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the DLG’s decisions about accounting policy were decisions in which they had
participated.
A significant example of [the community’s] influence… can be seen in [its]
participation in the decision relating to the timing and sequence of adoption for
various classes of infrastructure assets. Auditors were identified as being
particularly influential. The Local Government Auditors’ Association, according
to Interviewee A, ‘drive(s) the end product’ by influencing the DLG about what
they ‘will or will not accept in the audit process ’…. The DLG [finally] instituted
the policies that were developed in co-operation with the epistemic community,
acknowledging their role and importance in the process. (Irvine et al., 2011: 257,
261).
The “financial EC” believed that fair value in financial statements was beneficial as it
would give managers a better idea of council assets and what they were worth, and would
assist local councils to develop an asset management plan. Through its affiliations in
various professional finance and accounting bodies, its connections with the DLG, and
bureaucratic positions held in local councils, this EC was able to diffuse and
institutionalize its worldview in the form of DLG’s new accounting code. Additionally,
this EC also facilitated the implementation of the newly developed code.

International Labor Politics
A 2005 study by Van Daele focused on “pre-World War I labor ECs” (hereafter
“prewar ECs”) that institutionalized international labor politics. The main components of
the “prewar ECs” were the International Association for Labour Legislation (IALL) and
its numerous branches.
Stimulated by the simultaneous development of modern communication tools, the
IALL functioned as a network for the exchange of knowledge and new ideas
about labour regulations in various industrial countries. As its permanent
secretariat, the International Labour Office in Basle, Switzerland, centralized
relevant information and organized international congresses on a regular basis.
The IALL targeted both international and national communities. Separate
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divisions were set up in each member country…. [The IALL] was able to examine
pressing social current events of the day in a scientific way. Its achievement lies
in the impressive way it was able to combine the major intellectual tendencies of
the time to form a powerful framework for addressing concrete issues. It
targeted those areas that had a direct bearing on a worker’s daily life
(unemployment, working hours, female labour, housing, and national insurance),
albeit within the politico-ideological debate on the advisability of government
intervention (Van Daele, 2005: 445, 446).
Though the IALL was a private initiative, it received governmental support in
organizational and financial matters. West European governments, worried about the
rising tide of Marxian socialism, saw the IALL as a way to address grievances and preempt socialism. Hence they cooperated with the research work of IALL and sent
delegates to its various conferences. The IALL’s very first conference dealt with the
prohibition on night work for women and the use of white phosphorus in the matchstick
industry. These propositions were a successful start to additional periodic international
deliberations.
During the first half of 1919, representatives from more than 30 allied and
associated nation states gathered near Paris to outline a new world order following World
War I. Prospects for cooperation across political and social crises seemed bright in the
postwar world. During this time, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, sought
collective security by establishing the League of Nations to deal with international crises.
In addition, along with the British Prime Minister Lloyd George, and the French Premier
Clemenceau, Wilson initiated the establishment of the Commission on International
Labour Legislation entrusted with the task of devising a common labor program to serve
as a blueprint for international postwar social politics. Through this commission, “prewar
ECs,” that emerged in 1900, played a decisive role in drawing this blueprint. In fact,
these ECs even managed to institutionalize international labor politics by creating the
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International Labor Organization (ILO). The commission, consisting of internationally
renowned scholars and social policy experts from a variety of disciplines and
backgrounds, was invited by the plenipotentiaries to the Paris Peace Conference to advise
official government leaders and diplomats on specific labor and industrial development
questions. Importantly, a majority of the commission members knew each other “from
various prewar networks in politics, science, and labour administration before they came
together in Paris in 1919” (Van Daele, 2005: 436). The IALL, which had been developed
by Ernest Mahaim, had functioned as an EC for at least two decades before the founding
of the ILO. This EC was an avenue for scholars and labor experts to regularly analyze
societal breakdowns. The Second International was the key political and ideological
network for leaders of the socialist labor movement such as Emile Vandervelde. This
network facilitated the exchange and development of ideas about international labor
legislation across national political parties. It was mainly due to these experiences in
prewar ECs and political networks that members of the Commission were able to
establish the ILO so quickly in 1919--in contrast to the general peace negotiations, in
which politicians debated, rather chaotically, on much less well-prepared issues.2

Local Democratic Participation
Salvador and Ramio, in their 2011 study, investigate Barcelona’s regional level
“citizen participation EC” which helped promote polices enabling direct citizen
participation in local public affairs. This EC consisted of three principal groups of actors.
The first group consisted of a set of professionals attached to university centers,
consultancies, and independent foundations focused on research about, and the promotion
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of, citizen participation. The second group consisted of professionals and technicians,
specialists in citizen participation, who perform their functions in the actual participation
units of the municipalities. The third and last group consisted of the administrative
sphere, and included two bodies: Deputation of Barcelona’s Centre for Citizen
Participation and the General Directorate of Citizen Participation of the Government of
Catalonia. The objectives of both institutions were to strengthen citizen participation as a
strategy of the administration, and to promote research, knowledge, and practical
experience in citizen participation.
Based on repeated exchanges of ideas and joint reflection, these three groups of
actors created their own corpus of knowledge on citizen participation. Training of
specialists in the field of citizen participation and the plotting of the limits of what is
regarded as valid knowledge in the field were important elements in the construction of
this corpus. A clear example of training of specialists is found in the emergence of the
Postgraduate Course in Citizen Participation. 60% of the 42 surveyed municipalities’
citizen participation officials had undergone this specific training and 23.8% attended
additional participation courses. “[B]oth kinds of evidence—the public promotion and
diffusion of recognized practices, and shared specific training activities—illustrate…the
generation of a current of solid opinion sustained by the epistemic community’s
intellectual prestige and professional experience” (Salvador and Ramio, 2011: 11). The
participatory EC successfully diffused best practices and experiences of citizen
participation, and technical documents supporting the implementation of participation
initiatives at the local level. Civil servants and participation officials of local
governments were the principal target audience of this diffusion. The community did not
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stop with policy diffusion; it proceeded to institutionalize the citizen participation units of
municipalities. Importantly, the community managed to secure the support of mayors for
these participation units by performing a task of “intensive symbolic “evangelization”
concerning the advantages of incorporating democratic participation practices into the
city councils” (Salvador and Ramio, 2011: 13).

Contributions of the Case Studies to the Public Policy Making Literature
The five cases discussed above clearly indicate that the role of knowledge and functional
expertise is arguably one of the most important factors in policy formulation (Haas
1992a). In addition, these cases also illustrate the various ways in which knowledge and
functional expertise tend to impact public policy making processes. Finally, the five cases
also provide information about actors who possess these valuable resources.
The five cases clearly indicate that, at the very least, membership of epistemic
communities consists of at least one group of experts who possess knowledge of and
functional expertise in particular issue areas and of at least one group of relevant
government officials who are responsible for making/implementing policies within those
issue areas. In these five cases, EC members are typically found to apply their causal
knowledge to a policy endeavor subject to their normative goals, and to use the
bureaucratic advantage they possess to obtain access to decision makers.
The five cases illustrate that in the form of epistemic communities, knowledge
and functional expertise have played significant roles in a variety of policy formulation
situations. First, ECs become significant policy actors in issue areas characterized by high
levels of technical complexity and uncertainty. Whether it is designing and implementing
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innovation policies or preserving stratospheric ozone, epistemic communities have
interpreted technically complex subject matter and have made sense of and provided
predictions on uncertain scenarios (Mani, 2006; Haas, 1992b). Second, ECs tend to
become crucial policy actors not only in cases involving issues of high technical
complexity, but also in cases involving issues of low technical complexity. This is seen in
the case of the Spanish “citizen participation EC” which emerged and undertook multiple
activities to promote citizen participation in the Barcelona province (Salvador and Ramio,
2011). Third, ECs become indispensable policy actors in situations of shock or
impending crisis. The “financial EC” helped NSW local governments to restructure their
flawed accounting practices in the wake of a perceived fiscal sustainability crisis (Irvine
et al., 2011). Similarly, the “ecological EC” helped stakeholders reach consensus on
reducing CFC emissions in the wake of the shock created by the discovery of the ozone
hole (Haas, 1992b). Fourth, ECs tend to play important policy roles whenever there are
new political, social, economic, or scientific developments. This is evident in the efforts
of “pre World War I labor ECs” that helped create a common labor program to serve as a
blueprint for international postwar social politics (Van Daele, 2005). Another important
lesson to take away from this case is the time-tested utility of epistemic communities in
the policy making process. ECs are not a newly discovered fad in public governance
systems; they have a long history of proven potential in achieving policy consensus in
highly contentious issues occurring in decentralized political settings.
The five cases also illustrate the various avenues through which knowledge and
functional expertise, in the form of epistemic communities, can impact public policy
making. Haas’ (1992b) “ecological EC” influenced policy making through policy
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innovation. This EC altered perceptions about CFCs and framed the context for collective
responses to reduce the emission of these compounds. Mani’s (2006) “innovation systems
EC” participated in policy selection and implementation and helped Singapore emerge as
a generator of high-tech innovations. Similarly, Irvine et al’s (2011) “financial EC”
participated in policy selection and implementation and helped local governments in New
South Wales to reform their fiscal accounting policies. Van Daele’s (2005) “prewar
ECs,” through policy persistence, managed to institutionalize recommendations on
international labor politics by creating the ILO. Similarly, Salvador and Ramio’s (2011)
“citizen participation EC,” through policy persistence, managed to institutionalize citizen
participation policies in Barcelona local governments. Finally, all of the ECs discussed in
the five cases engaged in policy diffusion via a variety of mediums for the purposes of
disseminating policy beliefs and reaching policy consensus.
Typically, EC studies tend to focus only on those elements relevant to the
particular EC that they study. This can be observed in the five case studies where
information on EC characteristics, emergence and policy performance is specifically
focused on the particular EC examined in these studies. Therefore, in the next section, I
bring together, integrate and develop this scattered information into a three-part
framework.

The Epistemic Communities Framework
The epistemic communities framework described here seeks to provide a clear
understanding of ways to identify, mobilize, and subsequently use epistemic communities
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in governance processes. Importantly, this framework has been developed with the
intention of providing a roadmap to academics and practitioners wishing to adopt this
approach to different organizational settings.

What are Epistemic Communities?
Epistemic communities “are networks of recognized experts in a specific
knowledge field; their tasks are directed toward contributing to the collective debate on
subjects related to their field of knowledge, recommending policies, and identifying key
points for possible negotiation” (Salvador and Ramio, 2011: 2). The chief aspects, the
uniqueness and the knowledge producing activities of ECs are discussed below.

Key Characteristics of Epistemic Communities
According to Haas, an epistemic community has:
(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provides a value-based
rationale for the social action of community members;
(2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then
serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy
actions and desired outcomes;
(3) shared notions of validity-that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for
weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and
(4) a common policy enterprise—that is, a set of common practices associated
with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed,
presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a
consequence” (1992a: 3).
Structurally, an epistemic community is a network of networks; a network that is
integrated by a complex group of networks (Maldonado-Maldonado, 2004). Most

52
commonly, and at a minimum, epistemic communities consist of at least one group of
scientific or technical experts with knowledge and expertise in particular issue areas and
at least one group of relevant government officials such as bureaucrats, diplomats, or
administrators who are responsible for making and implementing policies within those
issue areas (Kutchesfahani, 2010). For example, Haas’ (1989) “ecological EC” was
comprised of ecologists, marine scientists, high-ranking officials from specialized
agencies such as the UNEP, government officials, engineers, physicists, oceanographers,
and microbiologists. Hopkins’ (1992) “food aid EC” was comprised of economic
development specialists, agricultural economists, and government administrators. The
presence of government officials within an epistemic community permits the community
to gain access to decision makers. Given that epistemic community members are
respected within their own disciplines, they have the ability to extend their influence to
eventually reach major policy actors, culminating with decision makers (Haas, 1992a)

Distinguishing Epistemic Communities from Other Policy Communities and Groups
An epistemic community should not be confused with a profession or discipline.
An EC is typically composed of individuals from several professions and disciplines.
Even when it does consist of individuals from a single profession or discipline, an EC is
not equivalent to that profession or discipline (Thomas, 1997). As Figure 2.2 indicates, it
is the combination of possessing a shared set of causal and principled (analytic and
normative) beliefs, a consensual knowledge base, and a common policy enterprise
(common interests) that distinguishes epistemic communities from various other groups
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(Haas, 1992a). Though the causal beliefs and knowledge base are shared in disciplines
and professions, principled beliefs and interests are not.
Epistemic communities are also different from classic interest groups and social
movements. ECs do not represent any particular group that might be affected by the
policy issue/decision in question. Though their participation and contribution to policy
debates will benefit some actors and harm others, still these effects are not the
fundamental motivations for ECs to intervene (Salvador and Ramio, 2011). ECs do not
act as lobbies which openly represent a particular sector, but instead they act to promote
professional best practices and thereby the best interests of society as a whole (Salvador
and Ramio, 2011). In interest groups and social movements, though principled beliefs
and interests are shared, the casual beliefs and knowledge base are not shared.
Legislators and bureaucratic agencies are in stark contrast to epistemic
communities. These entities do not share causal and principled beliefs, knowledge base,
or interests. Bureaucratic Coalitions closely resemble legislators and bureaucratic
agencies. The only difference is that, the coalitions share interests. Here, it is worth
noting that though epistemic communities are composed of bureaucrats, they do not
function under bureaucratic constraints. The actions of EC members are guided by
normative and causal beliefs and cannot be explained by the principal-agent and rational
choice theories that are used to forecast the behavior of bureaucrats (Dotterweich, 2009).
ECs are not under the pressure of making recommendations that are consistent with the
interests of policy makers or that may further their professional careers (Hechter, 1987).
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Figure 2.2: Distinguishing Epistemic Communities from Other Groups
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Knowledge Transactions of Epistemic Communities
An epistemic community diffuses its ideas through a variety of mediums, e.g.,
conferences, journals, research collaborations, and various modes of informal
communication and contact (such as phone calls, emails, organizational or individual
websites, blogspots and social networking websites like Facebook, Twitter, etc.). Some
examples of knowledge diffusion practices of ECs are listed in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Knowledge Diffusion Practices of Epistemic Communities
Adler’s (1992) American “arms control EC”
diffused ideas on arms control to the Soviets.
This EC’s members used direct diffusion avenues
such as negotiation proposals, bargaining and
negotiation positions, summit meetings, technical
conferences and scientific forums (Adler, 1992).
In addition, EC members also used indirect avenues
such as political statements and strategic debates,
congressional hearings and debates, press reports,
and academic books and articles (Adler, 1992).

Salvador and Ramio’s (2011) Spanish “citizen
participation EC” diffused best practices and
experience of citizen participation in local public
affairs via a series of publications. EC members also
produced technical documents supporting the
implementation of participation initiatives at the
local level, and subsidies and annual prizes for the
most noteworthy practices.
This EC used the congresses of the International
Observatory for Participatory Democracy as forums
for the exchange of theoretical knowledge and
international experience of participation at the local
level (Salvador and Ramio, 2011).
In addition, EC members also developed a corpus of
expert knowledge on democratic participation-which included the training of specialists in the
Postgraduate Course in Citizen Participation and the
plotting of the limits of what is considered as valid
knowledge on the subject (Salvador and Ramio,
2011).

The ability to diffuse epistemic ideas and the availability of various means to
diffuse these ideas are certainly important for the performance of ECs. However, the
ability of an epistemic community to promote its episteme also depends on two other
critical factors. First, the policy ideas furthered by a particular epistemic community have
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to be more convincing to leading political decision makers than the assertions advanced
by other epistemic communities that may have emerged around the same issue area
(Haas, 1990). Second, an epistemic community must be able to forge alliances with
decision makers (Haas, 1990). Influencing the interfaces of the corridors of power and
authority is therefore critical for epistemic communities to succeed.

When Do Epistemic Communities Emerge and Proliferate?
Several factors explain the emergence and proliferation of epistemic communities
in the public policy making domain. These include uncertainty and shock, the need for
interpreting highly complex and technical information, and the availability of governance
processes for institutionalization of policy ideas and beliefs (Haas, 1992a).

Uncertainty and Shock
Uncertainty is a crucial condition for the emergence of ECs. Uncertainty in public
policy making is frequently due to two reasons, either the information about the situation
at hand is insufficient or the available general knowledge is inadequate for purposes of
assessing the expected outcomes of different courses of action (George, 1980). In
politically fragmented settings, uncertainty in policy making may also stem from high
levels of functional interdependency among autonomous policy actors. Typically, in these
settings, policy coordination will depend heavily on the policy choices of these mutually
dependent actors. All of these uncertainties typically tend to trigger the need for a
specific type of information. This information constitutes neither guesses nor raw data;
instead, it is the product of human interpretation of social and physical phenomena (Haas
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1992a). “[I]t consists of depictions of social or physical processes, their interrelation with
other processes, and the likely consequences of actions that require application of
considerable scientific or technical expertise” (Haas, 1992a: 4). Epistemic communities,
transnational, national and subnational, are one possible provider of such information
(Haas, 1992a; Verdun, 1999). Whenever there are demands for interpretation and
technology based information, networks of specialists capable of producing and
providing such information will emerge and proliferate (Haas, 1992a; Verdun, 1999).
Like uncertainty, shock or crisis situations also favor the emergence of ECs
(Haas, 1992a; Verdun, 1999). The growing complexity and technical nature of monetary,
labor, environmental, health, public safety, population and various other issues, the
increasing number of policy actors and the range of their interactions, the globalization of
the economy, and the expansion of the administrative state are all rarely fully recognized
by decision makers. This in turn means that decision makers are not aware that their
decision making capacities are significantly limited. As a result, it often takes a shock or
crisis to overcome the institutional inertia and habit of decision makers and force them to
seek help from knowledge societies (Haas, 1992a).

Need for Interpreting Highly Complex and Technical Information
Interpretation of information is the basis of knowledge transfer and institutional
learning which in turn get translated into political activities and policy choices. Different
groups of policy actors interpret reality differently, thereby contributing to differences
and inaccuracies in knowledge transfer and institutional learning. To reduce these
differences and inaccuracies, and to streamline political processes and policy choices, it is
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vital to interpret information accurately. Policy makers often find it difficult to keep pace
with the technological and scientific advances that characterize many policy domains.
They need assistance in deciphering the technical jargon and condensing information into
understandable and manageable portions. Policy makers also must confront policy
subjects that are obscure and difficult to grasp. Such changes in the policy making
environment make it hard or even impossible for decision makers to solve problems by
themselves. Consequently, they are forced to seek help from experts who can accurately
interpret technical jargon and complex subject matter (Sundström, 2000).

Availability of Governance Processes for Institutionalizing Policy Ideas and Beliefs
Epistemic communities that dominate theory and/or experience in the relevant
field tend to make sense of, and outline alternatives to, new or uncertain situations, fill
gaps in information, and formulate a set of technically or scientifically based reasons and
arguments to support a particular course of policy action (Salvador and Ramio, 2011).
The epistemes of ECs, however, gain long term significance only when there are
processes available for institutionalizing them. Fortunately for ECs, there are a number of
ways through which members can institutionalize their values and beliefs. EC members
can institutionalize their epistemes through a) the social construction of reality, b) the
formation of coalitions in support of policies derived from their episteme, and c) the
creation of organizational bodies informed by their episteme.
An EC can use its episteme to frame issues and issue contexts for collective
debate, thereby influencing subsequent negotiations and bringing about its preferred
outcome to the exclusion of others (Haas, 1992a). Here, the said episteme serves as the
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dominant way of looking at social reality (Foucault, 1970) which helps define political
behavior both now and in the future (Haas, 1992a). An EC can also form subnational,
national and transnational coalitions in support of specific policies that emerge from its
episteme. Additionally, an EC can help build and maintain social institutions that are
informed by its episteme. An EC’s values and beliefs, when used to construct social
reality, and when assimilated in coalitions and institutions, can guide the behavior of
decision makers long after the community was consulted with (Adler and Haas, 1992).
However accomplished, institutionalization grants a given episteme the status of
orthodoxy. But it has to be remembered that institutionalization itself depends largely on
the ability of the community to consolidate formal bureaucratic power within it (Haas,
1989). The professional training, prestige, and reputation for expertise accord an
epistemic community access to the political system and also legitimize its activities
(Haas, 1992a). Further, the global practice of staffing bureaucracies with professionals
has allowed networks of knowledge elites to consolidate formal power within them. In
major industrialized countries in the Western world, a majority of public civil servants
identify themselves as technicians, policy makers and brokers (Aberbach, Putnam and
Rockman, 1981). The outlook and work ethics of these professionals are influenced by a
number of different factors, including their specialized training. Some examples showing
how uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalization have motivated the emergence of
ECs are listed in Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2: Factors that Favor the Emergence of Epistemic Communities
UNCERTAINTY

INTERPRETATION

Issue Uncertainty

Technical Complexity

Uncertainties about how to apply multilateralism to
streamline international economic trade motivated
decision makers to consult with the “international trade in
services EC” (Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992).

The issue of climate change is delineated by almost
impenetrable technical terms and complicated scientific
evidence. Further, many of the impacts are not immediate,
but may take decades to occur which makes them highly
intangible. So policy makers had to consult with the
experts of the “climate change EC” (Gough and Shackley,
2002).3

Uncertainties about how to avert nuclear destructions
motivated the US and Soviet decision makers to consult
with the “arms control EC” (Adler, 1992).

Shock/Crisis
A perceived financial sustainability crisis in local
governments forced policy makers in the state of New
South Wales in Australia to mobilize a “financial EC”
that intervened and helped introduce fair value accounting
in the state’s local councils (Irvine et al., 2011).

The issue of plant genetics resources is both complex and
technically sophisticated. In order to explore, preserve,
evaluate and make available plant genetic resources for
plant breeding and other scientific purposes, shared
assessments and standards for the most effective way of
preserving plant germplasm are required. To facilitate
these assessments and help set the necessary standards,
decision makers had to consult with the “plant genetics
resources EC” (Sauvé and Watts, 2003).

Repeated environmental crises alerted nation states to the
urgent need for collective action for controlling CFCs.
The limited scientific understanding and uncertainty about
the nature of the ozone depletion problem forced decision
makers to turn to the “ecological EC” to explain the
variety of possible policies (Haas, 1992b).

INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Social Construction of Reality

Formation of Coalitions

The “food aid EC” played a significant role in redefining
food aid. This EC helped the concept of food aid to
evolve from “a remedy for food aid recipients’ immediate
food shortages and an outlet for the donors' disposal of
surplus food commodities” into “a vehicle to foster
development-oriented projects” (Hopkins, 1992).

An international “ecological EC” institutionalized its
views on environmental harms of using CFCs via the
1987 Montreal protocol and its predecessor, the 1985
Vienna Convention. In all, 31 nations signed the Montreal
Protocol (Haas, 1992b).

The “international trade in services EC” redefined how
nation states thought about liberalizing international trade
(Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992).

The American “arms control EC” institutionalized its
episteme via the 1972 Antiballistic missile treaty (Adler,
1992).

Building and Maintaining Social Institutions
“’Pre World War I labor ECs” managed to institutionalize international labor law by creating the International Labor
Organization in 1919 (Van Daele, 2005).
A regional level “citizen participation EC” in Barcelona, Spain institutionalized its policy beliefs on participatory
democracy by establishing formal citizen participation units and later consolidating these units into the organizational
charters of the local authorities in that province (Salvador and Ramio, 2011).
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How Do Epistemic Communities Impact Public Policy Making?
Countries with sufficient internal expertise are thought to be in a better position to
design and implement good policies than those countries that do not have such expertise
(Mani, 2006). “This is because the availability of experts will enable the policy-making
bodies to process information, especially the technical information that is required to
develop policy instruments, more effectively” (Mani, 2006: 2). Such incentives
encourage decision makers to mobilize ECs. Adler and Haas (1992) propose that once
mobilized, ECs typically influence public governance through policy innovation, policy
diffusion, policy selection and policy persistence. Below is a discussion of the policy
evolution metaphor these scholars developed to capture the policy roles that ECs play in
governance processes. Following this discussion, examples of ECs playing these various
policy roles are listed in Table 2.3.

Policy Innovation
Policy innovation is the first avenue of epistemic community influence.
Community members can frame the issue and issue-context in a collective debate. In
doing so, they help determine the range of the policy discourse, the level or forum at
which the issue should be solved, and the norms and institutions that will be used in
solving the issue. These preliminary choices prepare the stage for defining policy
interests. In short, “epistemic communities exert influence on policy innovation by
framing the range of political controversy surrounding an issue, defining state interests
and setting standards” (Adler and Haas, 1992: 375).
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Policy Diffusion
The second avenue of epistemic community influence is policy diffusion. Policy
diffusion is the mechanism through which community members disseminate their views
to the world. Diffusion mechanisms include: conferences, symposia, workshops,
scholarly publications, research collaborations, membership in scientific bodies and
professional organizations, and a wide variety of informal modes of communication. The
wide acceptance of epistemic ideas can be used to put pressure on governmental units to
make specific policy choices.

Policy Selection
The third avenue of epistemic community influence is policy selection. Typically,
when there are no existing policies and decision makers are unfamiliar with an issue that
has not been dealt with in the past, an epistemic community can step in, frame the issue,
and help define the decision makers’ interests. However, when decision makers are
familiar with the issue, they will seek support from a known epistemic community that
they know will support their policy choices. This allows decision makers to legitimize
their policy choices by referring to a community of experts who approve of those choices.
In this case, the epistemic community is more involved in justifying, elaborating and
promoting policies rather than choosing among them.

Policy Persistence
The fourth avenue of epistemic community influence is policy persistence. Policy
persistence involves the maintenance of consensus on ideas, beliefs and goals over time
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among the members of the community. This persistence contributes to the credibility, and
hence the authority, of the community. Persistence determines how long the community
will remain influential. New ideas and policies, once institutionalized, likely gain the
status of orthodoxy. The process of socialization and often, the persistence of epistemic
communities, facilitate the achievement of such a status. If an epistemic community starts
losing its consensus, its authority diminishes, and decision makers pay less attention to its
advice.

Table 2.3: The Impacts of Epistemic Communities on Public Policy Making
POLICY INNOVATION

POLICY DIFFUSION

The “ecological EC” altered perceptions about CFCs and
has helped frame collective responses to environmental
pollution. Before 1972, CFCs were not universally
regarded as pollutants. But today, even governments of
LDCs have recognized CFCs as pollutants that contribute
to the depletion of stratospheric ozone and have begun to
coordinate their actions to prevent or ameliorate CFC
emissions (Adler and Haas, 1992; Douglas, 1975).

American researchers in the fields of nuclear physics,
energy conservation, and atmospheric research have
diffused their epistemic knowledge on new techniques to
their Soviet counterparts (Socolow, 1989).
American and British experts have diffused ideas among
each other and have contributed toward the development
of a postwar economic order as well as internationally
agreed banking regulations (Ikenberry, 1992).

A telecommunications regime was grounded on notions
of natural monopoly and was strongly influenced by the
views of economists. However, an EC of engineers,
concerned about design and international coordination of
telecommunications equipment and standards, intervened
and influenced the regime to move in the direction of
multilateral agreements (Cowhey, 1990).

POLICY SELECTION
The diffusion of ideas from the U.S. “arms control EC” to
the Soviets was thought to have a certain hegemonic
quality as it came from the U.S. community's conception
of America's own security (Adler, 1992).
In the case of food aid, EC members were not oblivious to
domestic political factors that provided donor countries
with an incentive/rationale for supporting food aid
programs, perhaps even increasing the amount of aid
available to recipients. For instance, recognizing US
farmers' need for export revenue, EC members wisely
targeted their energies toward topics such as efficient use
of funds budgeted for food aid, and away from issues that
would call into question whether food aid should exist
(Hopkins, 1992).

POLICY PERSISTENCE
The emergence and involvement of many new epistemic
communities caused the World Bank to shift its support
from one series of development goals and policies to
another--from building infrastructures to eliminating
poverty to encouraging export-oriented growth (Ayers,
1983; Gran, 1986).
In the case of the GATT, nation states continue to comply
with its free trade principles, despite the incentives for
free riding and despite increasing domestic pressures to
pursue protectionist policies (Adler and Haas, 1992).
Notably, in the US, continued involvement of economists
trained in the Keynesian tradition in the executive branch
has helped promote compliance with GATT in spite of a
great degree of public outcry (Goldstein, 1986).
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The Utility of ECF for Regional Governance
Currently, many municipalities across the US are seeking to merge services,
particular agencies and even entire governments in an effort to cut costs. However, these
efforts are slowed down due to the disagreements among public officials on the best ways
to streamline governance activities, and residents’ worries that property values will be
driven down and the quality of services may suffer. In some communities, citizens’
dissatisfaction has taken the form of protests and calls for public votes on any changes.
While residents of smaller communities fear losing control over their way of life, their
democratic voice, and eventually their identity, better-off communities are disinclined to
bailing out neighboring jurisdictions that are in trouble (The Detroit Free Press, 2011).
Many residents resist governmental consolidation due to fears of inadequate
political representation--they believe that the more elected officials you have, the greater
the amount of democracy you have (Dougherty and Merrick, 2009). Additionally, they
worry about changes in property tax rates and the ways in which their tax dollars will be
used. Residents resist service consolidations as they believe their tax dollars may subsidy
jurisdictions with poor service levels. Meanwhile, poorer units resist merger attempts due
to fears of receiving step-motherly treatment at the hands of wealthier ones. Also, some
residents argue that many officials in townships and small cities work part-time and are
generally paid less (Dougherty and Merrick, 2009). When services are consolidated, these
officials may have to be replaced with full-time professionals more highly paid
(Dougherty and Merrick, 2009). Further, these officials may propose more ambitious and
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costly projects, eventually erasing a good portion of the projected cost savings from
merging.
The above are only a few among the long list of concerns that residents have
whenever structural governance reforms are discussed. It is worth noting that public
officials and residents are not the only stakeholders in problems arising from regional
governance activities. Businesses, religious institutions, charitable organizations,
subregional associations, professional bodies, and officials from higher levels of
government also have vested interests in these activities.
While the interconnected nature of regional issues is creating substantial
uncertainties about potential consequences of proposed actions, the fiscal crisis
occasioned by the “Great Recession” is forcing new kinds of conversations and the
search for new kinds of approaches to dealing with financial problems. When new kinds
of approaches have to be developed and evaluated, new kinds of information have to be
provided and interpreted. And to carry out these activities, experts have to step in.
Epistemic communities are one possible source of such information and
assessment. ECs can also help in identifying potential policy interests, diffusing policy
ideas, deducing salient points for negotiation, initiating negotiations, sustaining sensitive
dialogues, reaching policy consensus, and possibly implementing policy choices. The
epistemic communities framework is essentially a prescription for developing policy
consensus; it facilitates a deliberative-analytical process involving multiple stakeholders
that may, in due course, lead to policy changes.
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Contributions of this Research
Contributions to the New Regionalism Literature
The most important contribution of this dissertation is its proposal to use
epistemic communities to enhance the utility of self-organizing approaches for regional
governance. As discussed earlier, in the US, proposals for formally structured regional
governments have met with strong resistance from local public officials, citizens,
businesses and other special interests that gain from local autonomy and regional
fragmentation (Feiock, 2004). Given the opposition to establishing legal and political
structures to centralize decision making in metropolitan areas, many local units have
opted for regional self-organizing solutions via vertically or horizontally linked
institutions (Frederickson, 1999).
Despite the increasing popularity of self-organizing approaches, the ability of
voluntary mechanisms to integrate different public concerns and to keep up with the rapid
changes that take place in metropolitan regions has often been questioned (Bollens, 1997;
Frug, 2000). Given that ECs allow for the establishment of a deliberative-analytical
process even in extremely divisive policy situations, they could be used as a precondition
in self-organizing regional solutions. In this way, voluntary collaboration in policy
development across complex, contentious and wicked regional problems can be
facilitated, while still retaining the flexibility benefits of NR approaches.
The only way to reach policy consensus on difficult regional problems is by
initiating a dialogue on the problem at hand. For instance, if the problem is metropolitan
poverty, representatives of local governments, metropolitan residents, businesses, special
interests, public charities and other stakeholders should be assembled and meaningful
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dialogues about metropolitan poverty should be facilitated. Dialogues should focus on
causes for the decline of the inner city and the resulting sprawl, the positive and negative
effects of sprawl, the long term implications of these effects, and ways to control inner
city decline and combat adverse effects of sprawl. To bring together diverse groups of
actors with conflicting interests is in itself a difficult task. To further proceed to initiate
several meaningful dialogues among these actors to make them develop a common
understanding on the causes and consequences of sprawl and to convince them to
collaborate on solutions to contain sprawl are even more arduous tasks. Scholars like
Gerald Frug (2000) call for the creation of regional institutions that can facilitate this kind
of information exchange and dialogue among these actors.
Perhaps the efforts of ECs may achieve much the same end. ECs can help deal
with the challenge of creating broader governance structures by bringing various
stakeholders together and encouraging them to act collectively despite the differences in
their values and interests. Whether it is designing a regional transportation system,
controlling environmental pollution, establishing a regional partnership for economic
development, regulating housing policies, reforming public education systems,
stimulating democratic participation, or streamlining overlapping service provision
policies, ECs possess the intellectual resources and professional credibility to initiate and
sustain collaborative action. They can shift focus from “things” regionalism to “people”
regionalism (Bollens, 1997). That is, they can reframe issues and redefine policy interests
such that stakeholders’ focus moves past superficial distributive issues to longstanding
redistributive concerns about lifestyle maintenance and access to socio-economic
opportunities.
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So what makes ECs different from the various other regional institutions
established for collaborative purposes? Often, regional entities such as councils of
governments, regional special purpose districts and interlocal functional partnerships are
established for the purpose of economic competitiveness and are biased toward singlepurpose goals. Moreover, and typically, only a small group of neighboring local
governments participates in these entities. The organizational and membership
requirements of these entities do not allow them to fully acknowledge the
interconnectedness between various regional issues or to develop policy solutions that
would target the root cause of problems. In contrast, epistemic communities can develop
comprehensive and long-term vision and can devise tradeoffs across policy areas and
political borders. They can see past narrow policy fields and single constituencies, and
take into account, as a whole, the lifestyles of the communities within the region, and the
interactions among these communities. Further, existing regional entities are biased
toward inclusion of a particular group of stakeholders--local governments. But regional
problems encompass a range of other stakeholders in both the public and nonpublic
sectors, who fear that existing regional entities are not representative of their needs and
interests. ECs may command the image of qualified and experienced experts who are
seeking to uphold professional best practices. In the eyes of their target audience, they are
neither lobbyists seeking to further someone else’s objectives, nor are they stakeholders
who have a bias toward a particular set of policies. This credibility is an important feature
that differentiates ECs from other entities. It is these distinctive characteristics of ECs
that make them capable of facilitating policy cooperation on tough problems in
fragmented settings.
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Contributions to the Epistemic Communities Literature
This dissertation also makes significant contributions to the epistemic
communities literature. I have built a flexible/adaptable framework for identifying and
analyzing epistemic communities in a broad range of governance settings and policy
domains. Though the framework draws heavily from existing EC studies, it is significant
as it systematically brings together the scattered theoretical pieces of the EC concept such
that it is fairly easy to generate testable hypotheses about the concept. Besides developing
the three-part EC framework, I have, for the first time, developed a four-step process for
identifying the existence of epistemic communities. The four-step process I have
developed permits examination of an entire policy domain for identifying the various ECs
that exist within it, regardless of their policy contributions. In prior efforts, there has been
a skewed focus on ECs that have successfully impacted policy making processes. But my
approach provides the advantage of studying a variety of ECs: ECs that have succeeded,
ECs that have failed, ECs that are newly formed, and ECs that impact policy choices in
small, incremental ways. Simultaneous study of multiple ECs facilitates comparative
analysis which in turn provides a richer and fuller understanding of the policy
performance of epistemic communities; when they succeed and when they fail. Finally, in
this study, for the first time, I have used deductive hypotheses, rigorous quantitative
methods and social network analysis to examine the composition and role of ECs.
Scholars in the past have typically approached this topic in terms of qualitative methods
and case study analysis.
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Research Questions to be Addressed
Epistemic communities are social entities wherein knowledge resides, skills are
applied, and articulation and knowledge creation take place (Håkanson, 2010).
Individuals can belong simultaneously to more than one epistemic community, all of
which influence their conceptions of identity, associated world views and policy
performances. In this dissertation, I examine five sets of research questions that are
focused on identifying how the epistemic communities concept works at the regional
level to facilitate policy development in the highly sensitive and complex policy domain
of municipal finance reform.
The first set of questions focuses on the existence of epistemic communities in the
state of Michigan, within the policy domain of municipal finance. Are there epistemic
communities emerging in Michigan in the area of municipal finance? If so how many of
them are emerging? Is there a separate epistemic community emerging in each of the
following issue areas: local government revenues, expenditures on municipal employees
and public service provision?
The second set of research questions deals with the composition of municipal
finance ECs. Which actors participate in these finance reform ECs? Are there participants
from both governmental and nongovernmental sectors? Do both state and local level
government officials participate in these knowledge networks? Do representatives of
private and nonprofit organizations also participate in these networks? Are there
academics and representatives from professional bodies in these networks? What is the
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of

participants

from

various

governmental

and

nongovernmental

organizations?
The third set of questions is about the interaction patterns of actors of municipal
finance ECs. What interaction patterns are observed among EC members? For example,
to what extent are these interactions characterized by reciprocal ties and social bonding?
Are there specific popular actors operating within the knowledge networks? Are there
specific actors who play the role of knowledge brokers within these networks? What kind
of ties do EC actors typically develop within their knowledge network--strong or weak?
Previous research on ECs has been entirely qualitative in nature. This study is the first to
employ a rigorous quantitative methods as well as SNA to study ECs. Through the use of
p*/exponential random graph models, this study will provide vital information on the
interaction patterns of EC members within their knowledge networks. This kind of
information has not been provided by previous EC studies.
The fourth set of questions is related to the factors that motivate EC actors to
interact with each other. What conditions motivate EC actors to interact with each other?
Are issue uncertainty, impending crisis, the need for interpreting highly complex and
technical information, and the motivation for institutionalizing policy ideas among these
factors? Through the use of QAP analysis, this study will explain the motivations EC
members have to interact with each other. Prior efforts have not focused on this
dimension of EC participants.
The fifth set of questions centers on the policy performance of municipal finance
ECs. This set of questions can be subdivided into two groups--policy promotion forums
and liaisons of municipal finance ECs. What are the policy forums that these
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communities typically use to broadcast their episteme? Do they promote their episteme
by publishing books, articles, technical reports, conference papers or other scholarly
material? Do they use modern communication modes such as websites, blogs, Facebook,
Twitter and other social networking sites for promoting their episteme? Do they make
direct policy recommendations to state level decision makers? Do community members
develop communication links with actual decision makers? If so, it is important to
understand the nature of these linkages. Various structural parameters of policy networks
such as degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, rank, prestige, etc.,
(Monge and Contractor, 2002) can be employed as required to understand how accessible
decision makers are to EC members. Notably, a social network approach to examining
the potential policy influence of ECs is new to the EC literature.
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Notes
1

CFCs, as a class of chemicals, were first discovered in 1931 by General Motors. Soon CFCs became
widely used for refrigeration, air conditioning, and insulation because of their inert, nontoxic,
noncarcinogenic, and nonflammable properties. By 1986, about 2.5 million metric tons of CFC compounds
were being produced, with the United States alone accounting for 35 percent of it.
2

But unfortunately, political opponents of international labor deliberations, the US in particular, thwarted
every attempt at creating a supranational legislative parliament and managed to reduce the original intent of
the ILO architects to a non-binding system of conventions and recommendations (Van Daele, 2005). The
ILO to this day must still contend with the fact that it cannot impose any decisions.
3

Despite the involvement of experts, the issue of climate change is still shrouded in complexity due to its
global origin, high distribution across society and the resulting inability to nail down specific culprits
(Gough and Shackley, 2002).
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CHAPTER III
Research Design and Methodology Used for Studying
Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities
Typically, single issue case analyses have been the norm for studying epistemic
communities. In this research, I depart from this customary practice and use social
network analysis to identify and analyze the presence of epistemic communities in
municipal finance reform in Michigan. Using a social network approach to study
epistemic communities has many benefits. Through SNA it is possible to assess a number
of important aspects about epistemic communities. These include network membership,
network boundaries, interaction patterns among network participants, roles and positions
of members in the production and dissemination of knowledge, ties of network members
outside the network, causes for network formation, and consequences of network
formation. To my knowledge, SNA has not previously been used as an avenue to study
epistemic communities.
Interviews and document analysis are the most common methods used by
researchers to collect data on epistemic communities. Information on network
membership and the distribution of associated knowledge practices is typically identified
through analysis of meeting minutes, organizational newsletters, legislative testimonies
and policy agreements. Other sources have included: newspaper articles, scholarly
material published by government officials and academicians, and information available
on websites, blogs, and other internet resources (Haas, 1992a). Interviews, usually indepth and structured, are often used to supplement and/or confirm the information
collected through document analyses. Network composition, members’ interaction
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patterns, knowledge producing activities, and impact on policy outcomes are the principal
areas that interviews focus on (Maldonado-Maldonado, 2004).
In this chapter, I discuss the research design used in this study. The chapter is
organized as follows. I begin by explaining the process by which the initial sample was
developed, and the snowball sampling technique used to identify other potential
respondents. I proceed to explain how I developed the interview questionnaire that I used
to collect the data. The structure and content of the questionnaire are also described in
this section. Following this, I explain the interview method. Lastly, I conclude this
chapter with a discussion on the measurement of my key theoretical variables. The
analytical methods used to analyze these data are discussed in chapters four and five.

Research Design and Methodology
Sampling Techniques
The Initial Sample
An initial group of potential participants in municipal finance epistemic
communities was identified through a content analysis of newspaper articles published
between November 2010 and April 2011 in two key Michigan newspapers, the Detroit
News and the Detroit Free Press. These two papers serve the most populous region of the
state, the Detroit metropolitan area, which contains 185 municipal governments serving a
population of nearly five million people.1 The papers also provide extensive coverage of
the state government. In the two papers, I selected articles relevant to the topic of
Michigan’s crisis in municipal finance. Articles were selected using a list of
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words/phrases associated with municipal fiscal crisis. These 24 search words/phrases are
listed in Table 3.1. After a careful review, articles that dealt with stories closely related to
the search terms were collected. In all, 248 articles were examined.

Table 3.1: Search Words/Phrases for Municipal Fiscal Crisis
Budget Deficit
Collective Bargaining
Consolidating Services
Contracting-out
Downsizing
Emergency Financial Management
Emergency Financial Manager
Fiscal Stress

Financial Problems
Governmental Consolidation
Joint Service Provision
Lay-offs
Mergers
Municipal Debt
Municipal Finance
Municipal Employment

Privatization
Restructuring
Service Cuts
Shared Revenues
Structural Reform
Taxes
Unions
User Fees

After analyzing the contents of the 248 articles covering various dimensions of
Michigan’s crisis in municipal finance, fifty individuals were identified from the articles
based on their policy knowledge and involvement in Michigan’s finance reform effort.
These fifty individuals served as my initial sample. I then used contacts identified by this
initial group to identify additional potential respondents. In addition to using the content
analysis to identify the initial sample, I used it to identify the various policy solutions for
confronting fiscal stress in Michigan municipal governments and the epistemes
promoting them.

Content Analysis
Content analysis is an analytical device used to establish the presence of certain
words or concepts within texts or sets of texts. Through content analysis, researchers can
analyze the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and concepts, then make
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inferences about the messages within the texts, the writer(s), the audience, and even the
culture and time of which these are a part (Colorado State University, 2012). Texts can be
defined broadly as books, book chapters, essays, interviews, discussions, newspaper
headlines and articles, historical documents, speeches, conversations, advertising, theater,
informal conversation, or any kind of communicative language. To conduct a content
analysis on any such text, the text is either coded or broken down into manageable
categories on a variety of levels--word, word sense, phrase, sentence, or theme--and then
examined (Colorado State University, 2012).
In order to analyze the contents of the articles, I use the qualitative data analysis
(QDA) Miner software package created by Provalis Research.2 QDA Miner can be used
to analyze interview or focus-group transcripts, legal documents, journal articles, entire
books, and also drawings, photographs, paintings, and other types of visual documents.
My analysis showed the repeated occurrence of certain policy proposals and actions such
as laying-off municipal employees, proposals for increasing property tax, clashes with
public unions for reducing the wages and/or benefits paid to municipal employees, and
discussions for merging provision of specific public services with other jurisdictions. On
further analysis of these proposals and actions, I observed that there were close
relationships among them. Importantly, these proposals and actions were intended to
achieve certain specific objectives targeting either the revenue or the expenditure side of
municipal budgets. Proposals and actions on the revenues side focused on increasing
municipal revenues, while those on the expenditures side either focused on decreasing
compensation for municipal employees or restructuring public service provision.
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On observing this pattern, I first coded each individual proposal or action based
solely on its functional content. I refer to these codes collectively as strategies for
municipal finance reforms. Subsequent to coding the individual policy proposals and
actions, I collapsed them into three broad groups based on the implication of the proposal
or action for the municipal budget. These groups were: increasing local government
revenues, decreasing spending on municipal employees, and decreasing spending on
public service provision by altering service provision modes. The specific strategies
identified from the content analysis are listed in Table 3.2.3

Table 3.2: Proposals and Actions for Confronting Municipal Fiscal Stress
Group 1--Increasing
Local
Government Revenues

Group 2--Decreasing Spending on
Municipal Employees

Group 3--Decreasing Spending on
Public Service Provision

Seeking additional state
shared revenues

Reducing municipal employment
through lay-offs

Consolidating one or more local
governments

Increasing local property
taxes

Reducing the wages and/or benefits of
municipal employees

Transferring certain functions to a
higher level of government

Adopting or increasing
local income taxes

Reducing the benefits paid to
municipal retirees

Consolidating services with other
local governments

Adopting or increasing
user fees for specific local
public services

Restricting the ability of municipal
employees to collectively bargain for
compensation and work rules

Contracting for services from other
local governments
Contracting for services from
nonprofit organizations
Contracting for services from
private organizations

It has to be noted that the categories are not mutually exclusive. For instance,
contracting-out service provision is intended to cut service provision costs. However, this
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action is also intended reduce expenditures on municipal employees. Similarly,
consolidation of one or more local governments does not just imply decreased spending
on service provision, but also decreased spending on municipal employees. In general, I
placed a code/reform strategy under the group representing the most obvious objective
that code/reform strategy was intended to achieve.
These three broad approaches to coping with municipal fiscal stress served as the
basis for designing the interview questionnaire used in this study. This questionnaire is
described below in detail. These three approaches also identify the potential epistemes
that are being promoted by the municipal finance epistemic communities that are
expected to exist in Michigan. In some cases, an EC’s members are known and data
collection is focused on identifying their episteme/policy beliefs. But in most other cases,
an EC’s members may not be known. So researchers tend to identify common themes or
policy beliefs from a variety of documents (such as meeting minutes, organizational
newsletters, legislative testimonies, policy agreements, newspaper articles and scholarly
material published by government officials and academicians) and, using those themes or
policy beliefs, trace the experts who embrace and seek to promote them (see for example,
Maldonado-Maldonado, 2004). Similarly, in this study, I use the potential epistemes
identified from the content analysis in the process of identifying municipal finance
epistemic communities. The method used to identify the municipal finance ECs using the
potential epistemes is discussed in the section on variable measures.
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The Interview Questionnaire
The interview schedule contained 15 questions: 10 close-ended questions and 5
open-ended questions. These questions are organized into four sections. The first section
is intended to investigate the communication networks used by the respondent to discuss
issues related to the adequacy of local government revenues. These issues include state
shared revenue, local property taxes, local income taxes, and fees for using local public
services. This section also captures the respondent’s degree of policy knowledge on the
subject of local government revenues and his/her involvement in promoting specific
reform strategies for increasing local government revenues. The interview questions from
this section are listed in Table 3.3A.
The second section focused on identifying the communication networks used by
the respondent to discuss issues related to compensation policies for local government
employees. These issues include workforce policies, compensation policies, and policies
on collective bargaining for compensation and work rules. This section also captures the
respondent’s degree of policy knowledge on the subject of compensation policies for
local government employees and his/her involvement in promoting specific reform
strategies for reducing the costs of compensating municipal employees or the size of
municipal workforce. The interview questions that comprise this section are listed in
Table 3.3B.
The third section of the interview sought to capture the communication networks
used by the respondent to discuss issues related to local government service delivery
arrangements. These issues include governmental consolidation, consolidation of local
government services, and contracting for local government services. This section also
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captures the respondent’s degree of policy knowledge on issues relating to existing local
government service delivery arrangements and his/her involvement in advancing specific
reform strategies for promoting increased reliance on alternative service provision modes.
The interview questions from this section are listed in Table 3.3C.
The fourth and last section of the instrument focused on examining respondents’
motivations for participating in the three municipal finance communication networks and
the various forums that they used to make policy recommendations about municipal
finance reform. This last section also captured several attributes for each respondent:
gender, age, education, and membership in professional or subregional organizations. The
interview questions from this section are listed in Table 3.3D.

Table 3.3A: Interview Questions--Section One
1. On a scale of 1 to 10, what kind of knowledge do you think you bring to the general topic of local government
revenues?
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 = High
1 = Basic
Technical
General
Knowledge
Knowledge
(Expert)
(Layperson)




















2. If you frequently discuss the topic of local government revenues with individuals outside of your organization, please
identify the two individuals whom you have contacted most often about this topic in the past year. Please write the
name, job title and organization of these two individuals in the space provided below.

3. During the past twelve months, to what extent have you publicly recommended changing laws at the state level to
enable local government officials to more easily:
Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Often
Very Often
Seek increased state shared revenues?











Increase local property taxes?











Adopt or increase local income taxes?











Adopt or increase user fees for specific local public
services?
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Table 3.3B: Interview Questions--Section Two
4. On a scale of 1 to 10, what kind of knowledge do you think you bring to the general topic of compensation policies
for local government employees?
1 = Basic
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 = High
General
Technical
Knowledge
Knowledge
(Layperson)
(Expert)




















5. If you frequently discuss the topic of compensation policies for local government employees with individuals outside
of your organization, please identify the two individuals whom you have contacted most often about this topic in the
past year. Please write the name, job title and organization of these two individuals in the space provided below.
6. During the past twelve months, to what extent have you publicly recommended changing laws at the state level to
enable local government officials to more easily:
Never Rarely Sometimes Often
Very Often
Reduce municipal employment through layoffs?











Reduce current pay or benefits of municipal employees?











Reduce benefits paid to municipal retirees?











Restrict the ability of municipal employees to
collectively bargain over compensation and work rules?











Table 3.3C: Interview Questions--Section Three
7. On a scale of 1 to 10 what kind of knowledge do you think you bring to the general topic of local government service
delivery arrangements?
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 = High
1 = Basic
Technical
General
Knowledge
Knowledge
(Expert)
(Layperson)




















8. If you frequently discuss the topic of local government service delivery arrangements with individuals outside of
your organization, please identify the two individuals whom you have contacted most often about this topic in the past
year. Please write the name, job title and organization of these two individuals in the space provided below.
9. During the past twelve months, to what extent have you publicly recommended changing laws at the state level to
enable local government officials to more easily:
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often
Consolidate one or more local governments?











Transfer certain functions to a higher level of government?











Consolidate services with other local governments?











Contract for services from other local governments?











Contract for services from nonprofit organizations?











Contract for services from for profit organizations?
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Table 3.3D: Interview Questions--Section Four
10. In general, to what extent do you agree that the following reasons are motivations for you to discuss, seek advice or
offer advice to your colleagues in other organizations on the topics we have covered in this survey?
Strongly
Disagree
Neither Agree
Agree
Strongly
Disagree
Nor Disagree
Agree
Your interest in achieving policy
objectives/outcomes











Your search for best practices of fiscal
governance











Your colleagues engage in similar
exchanges and so you follow suit











Your desire for more information about
these topics











To deal with the uncertainty surrounding
these issues











In order to deal with the specific
problems created by the current financial
crisis











The highly technical and complex nature
of municipal finance reform











11. In general, if you have recommended for any of the strategies we asked about in this survey, how often have you
used the following forms of recommendation?
Never Rarely Sometimes Often
Very
Often
Propagating the topic through pamphlets, brochures,
radio, television, email, etc.











Propagating the topic through blogs, websites, Facebook,
Twitter, etc.











Individually or collaboratively publishing/producing
articles, books, technical reports, conference papers or
other scholarly material on the topic











Presenting ideas on the topic at a state legislative
meeting











Directly recommending to a state level policy maker











Making state level political or administrative decisions
in support of the topic











12. What is your gender?

13. What was your age at your last birthday?

14. What is the highest level of education that you have achieved?

15. Do you belong to any professional or subregional organizations? If so, name one.

84

The Snowball Sampling Technique
Each of the fifty individuals (or their staff) in the initial sample was contacted for
interviews. The cover letter that was sent to this initial group of respondents is included
in Appendix B. Those consenting to the interview were asked to name two people with
whom they communicated most often on each of the three key issue areas of municipal
finance--local government revenues, expenditures on municipal employees, and public
service provision--identified through the content analysis described in the previous
section. This process could generate the names of up to six individuals for each
respondent but some respondents identified the same two people as their communication
link for all three topics and other respondents indicated that they did not communicate
with others on all three topics, so this number varied from one respondent to the next.
The people identified through this process were then contacted and asked to consent to an
interview, a technique known as snowball sampling.4 Individuals who were contacted
through the snowball sampling process received the same cover letter as the initial
sample.
The snowball sampling technique was used to identify additional respondents for
the study and also to identify the relationships among members of the study. Information
on relationships among respondents was in turn used to identify the structure of epistemic
community networks. Ideally, the snowball sampling continues until the researcher
reaches a point where no more new subjects are identified (Lincoln and Guba, 1985),
indicating that all of the members of the group being studied have been identified. In this
study, however, not all members of the communication networks within the policy
domain of municipal finance are identified, as this is not the goal of this study. Instead,
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the goal here is to identify the presence of epistemic communities within this domain.
Again, here the goal is not to identify every single member in these epistemic
communities, but to identify the presence of these communities and locate them within
the communication networks. For the most part, researchers have access only to a part of
the epistemic community that is being studied (Maldonado-Maldonado, 2004). Hence,
the practice of interviewing only some EC actors is common in studies on epistemic
communities.

Data Collection Methods
The Interview Method
In all, 100 interviews were conducted between August 2011 and February 2012.
Interviews were requested from 120 people and 100 (83% response rate) agreed to
respond. The interviews were conducted via telephone or email; on average each lasted
fifteen minutes. Participants were asked to do a phone interview, but for those who
preferred to answer the questionnaire online, a personalized interview link was emailed
using the Qualtrics survey design and analysis software. Consent of participants was
obtained by asking them to read a research information sheet before the interviews began.
The interview schedule was pre-tested thrice to ensure question clarity and timing before
entering the field.

Variable Measures
In this section, I discuss the most important theoretical concept used in the
empirical analysis in this research: the identification of epistemic communities involved
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in issues of municipal finance reform. This measure needs elaboration because the kind
of quantitative measurement I use for identifying an epistemic community has not been
attempted in previous research examining epistemic communities. The remaining
variable measures and the deductive hypotheses to be tested in this research, according to
their occurrence in empirical analysis, will be discussed in their respective empirical
chapters--chapters four and five.

Identifying an Epistemic Community
Identifying an epistemic community is a complex process. This process is
described in this section. Importantly, the process I have developed here is theoretically
guided and based on evidence from prior studies conducted on epistemic communities.
This process is just one way of identifying an epistemic community through the use of
social network methods and quantitative measures.

Step 1: Identifying the Communication Network that has Emerged in the Issue Area
The first step in identifying an epistemic community is identifying and mapping
the communication network in the issue area studied. In this research, I focus on three
key issue areas of municipal finance--local government revenues, expenditures on
municipal employees and public service provision. So I first map the three
communication networks that have emerged in each of these issue areas. Each respondent
in the initial sample was asked to name two people with whom (s)he frequently
communicated on each of the three issue areas of municipal finance. The people
identified by the initial sample were contacted and those consenting to interview were
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asked to identify their contacts on the three issue areas.5 Using the data collected, I
mapped the three communication networks separately.

EC Relationships: More Informal than Formal Interactions
An important feature of ECs is that they are based largely on informal rather than
formal relations (Haas, 1992a). Haas (1992a) specifically mentions that members need
not have to meet formally or even in a regular manner. Interview questions 2, 5, 8 were
designed so as to capture the informal communication ties that respondents developed on
various issues of municipal finance (see Table 3.6 under step 4).

Step 2: Identifying Actors with Epistemic Characteristics: Academic Training, Policy
Expertise, and Sharing Beliefs and Interests
After mapping the three communication networks, I proceed to identify the actors
within these networks who are qualified to be epistemic community members. In the
literature examining epistemic communities, an individuals’ academic training, policy
knowledge and professional interactions are typically used to identify if they are
functional experts in that particular policy domain (Haas, 1989; 1992a). Based on this
practice, I developed three separate variables that capture these elements. In order to be
an epistemic community member, an individual must have at least a certain level of
academic training, high policy expertise, and opportunities or venues to share policy
beliefs and interests.
An epistemic community should not be confused with a particular profession.
Also, it should not be assumed that academic prestige suggests only the highest level of
education within a subject area. EC members need not be natural scientists or social
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scientists; individuals from any discipline or profession who have a sufficiently strong
claim to a body of knowledge that is valued by society qualify as EC members (Haas,
1992a). In this study, an individual, at a minimum, must have a bachelor’s degree to
qualify as an epistemic community member. Typically, a large number of local- and
state-level bureaucrats and nongovernmental actors participating in regional governance
activities hold only a bachelor’s degree. However, many of these individuals have been
working for decades within the same policy area, thereby acquiring great expertise within
that area. Raising the threshold of academic training to the masters level may exclude
many who are recognized as experts of municipal finance within that domain. Interview
question 14 captures the academic training of the respondent.
The second variable, respondent’s policy expertise, was measured by asking
respondents to rank themselves on a policy knowledge scale of 1 to 10--where 1 denotes
basic general knowledge and 10 denotes high technical expertise. I decided to ask
respondents to rank themselves instead of asking others to rank them for two reasons.
First, self assessment is likely to be more accurate than external assessment. An
individual may know more about his/her knowledge level than anyone else. Second,
individuals may be reluctant to rank someone else’s knowledge level for fear of giving an
inaccurate estimate. This was clear on the occasions when a staff member did the
interview on behalf of an official.6 The staff member, in general, was reluctant to rank the
official on the knowledge scale. Those respondents with policy knowledge scores above
the median score qualified as epistemic community members. Interview questions 1, 4
and 7 capture the policy knowledge of the respondent on the following issues of
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municipal finance--local government revenues, expenditures on municipal employees and
public service provision.
Membership in professional organizations is viewed as an important avenue for
developing a common corpus of professional knowledge and diffusing that knowledge-both of which are fundamental functions of an epistemic community (Haas, 1989;
1992a). Usually, functional experts seek membership in such organizations and previous
studies have consistently showed that EC members are typically members of professional
or scientific bodies (e.g., Irvine et al., 2011; Van Daele, 2005). In this study, I use
membership in a professional or subregional organization as a proxy for measuring the
third variable: opportunities or venues the respondent has to share policy beliefs and
interests. Since this study examines a regional level policy area, subregional
organizations are treated as similar to professional organizations. In order to qualify as an
EC member, an individual has to be a member of at least one professional or subregional
organization. Interview question 15 captures respondents’ membership in these
organizations.
The three variables described above capture three different elements and are
therefore mandatory requirements for participating in ECs. Only respondents who satisfy
all three conditions qualify as EC members. It has to be noted that these three variables
are not the only measures used for assessing whether an individual is qualified to be EC
member. The individuals in the initial sample were selected based on their policy
knowledge and involvement in Michigan’s municipal finance reform effort. These
individuals were then asked to identify the people with whom they communicated on
issues of municipal finance. These initial steps ensure that the group studied, at a
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minimum, has basic knowledge relevant to the domain of municipal finance. The three
variables are intended to capture the experts within this relevant group. Table 3.4 lists the
interview questions that measure the epistemic characteristics of respondents.

Table 3.4: Identifying Actors with Epistemic Characteristics
Academic Training

IQ 14. What is the highest level of education that you have achieved?

Policy Knowledge

IQ 1. On a scale of 1 to 10, what kind of knowledge do you think you bring to the general topic of
local government revenues?

IQ 4. On a scale of 1 to 10, what kind of knowledge do you think you bring to the general topic of
compensation policies for local government employees?

IQ 7. On a scale of 1 to 10, what kind of knowledge do you think you bring to the general topic of
local government service delivery arrangements?

Opportunities or Venues for Sharing Beliefs and Interests

IQ 15. Do you belong to any professional or subregional organization? If so, name one.
Note: IQ means interview question.

Step 3: Identifying the Common Policy Agenda of Actors with Epistemic Characteristics
At this point, I am concerned only with the actors who possess epistemic
characteristics, the rest of the participants in the communication network do not matter. I
now proceed to analyze the policy beliefs/agenda of these actors. An epistemic
community is a finite group of individuals who share the same worldview or episteme.
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The most important element for identifying an EC is the common policy agenda shared
among its members and it is this feature that distinguishes an EC from other groups such
as issue networks that seek to influence decision makers (Haas, 1992a). The policy
agenda of respondents’ was identified from their involvement in advancing specific
reform strategies within a particular issue area of municipal finance. It is worth stressing
that these reform strategies or epistemes were originally identified from the content
analysis discussed earlier in this chapter (see Table 3.2 for the various potential
epistemes).
For those actors identified from the communication network on local government
revenues, interview question 3 was used to identify their policy agenda. For those actors
identified from the communication network on expenditures on municipal employees,
interview question 6 was used to identify their policy agenda. For those actors identified
from the communication network on public service provision, interview question 9 was
used to identify their policy agenda. Next, within each of the three issue areas, through
the use of social network mapping, I group actors promoting similar policy solutions for
reforming municipal finance as advocacy networks. Following this, I filter out the the
identified advocacy networks from the larger communication network. When filtering out
the advocacy networks, comprised of actors with epistemic characteristics and a common
policy agenda, I also filter the communication links that exists among these actors. From
this point onward, I am concerned only with these new and smaller networks of actors
and the links among them. The next step explains why these links are critical.
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Table 3.5: Identifying the Common Policy Agenda of Actors with Epistemic
Characteristics
3. During the past twelve months, to what extent have you publicly recommended changing laws at the state level to
enable local government officials to more easily:
Never Rarely Sometimes Often
Very
Often
Seek increased state shared revenues?











Increase local property taxes?











Adopt or increase local income taxes?











Adopt or increase user fees for specific local public
services?











6. During the past twelve months, to what extent have you publicly recommended changing laws at the state level to
enable local government officials to more easily:
Never
Rarely Sometimes
Often
Very Often
Reduce municipal employment through layoffs?











Reduce current pay or benefits of municipal
employees?











Reduce benefits paid to municipal retirees?











Restrict the ability of municipal employees to
collectively
Bargain over compensation and work rules?











9. During the past twelve months, to what extent have you publicly recommended changing laws at the state level to
enable local government officials to more easily:
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often
Consolidate one or more local governments?











Transfer certain functions to a higher level of government?











Consolidate services with other local governments?











Contract for services from other local governments?











Contract for services from nonprofit organizations?











Contract for services from for profit organizations?











Step 4: Identifying if Actors with Epistemic Characteristics and Common Policy Agenda
are Involved in Knowledge Transaction
An EC is not simply a finite group of qualified experts who have common policy
beliefs. It is also actively involved in developing a common corpus of knowledge on the
issue areas in which it specializes and in promoting that knowledge for societal good.
Knowledge transaction typically occurs when, through the interaction of individual
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agents, the capabilities of one or both increase (Håkanson, 2010). Haas (1992a) points out
that knowledge transaction is not limited to traditional methods of empirical research and
publication of findings. It can also originate from knowledge development and diffusion
techniques suited to the disciplines or professions that an EC’s members pursue. Activities
constituting knowledge transactions are either tangible or intangible. Some activities are

concrete and can be documented, while others are unrecorded, or difficult to observe.
Due to this fundamental variation in these activities, empirical methodologies for
measuring them differ (Håkanson, 2010).
In this study, the discussion and information-seeking activities that exist among
actors possessing epistemic characteristics and a common policy agenda are used as a
proxy for measuring the knowledge transaction activities of these actors. In descriptive
network mapping, actors are indicated by points called nodes and the ties or links among
them are indicated by lines that run from one node to another. The presence of links/lines
connecting an actor with other actors indicates that the actor is involved in knowledge
transaction activities. In order for actors with epistemic characteristics and a common
policy agenda to belong to an epistemic community, they should participate in knowledge
transaction. For this, each actor should be connected to at least one other actor.
In the absence of these ties, then the second measure of knowledge transaction is
examined. The second measure of knowledge transaction is scope for professional
interactions. If an actor was member of a professional or subregional organization in
which other actors of his network also participate, then the actor was considered as
participating in knowledge transaction. If an actor had no communication ties with other
network actors and was also not a member of any professional or subregional
organization in which these other network actors were members, then that actor was
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treated as an isolate and was not considered to be an EC member. Interview questions 2,
5, 8 and 15 capture the knowledge transacting activities of municipal finance experts.
These questions are listed in Table 3.6.
In this last step, those individuals participating in knowledge transaction are
filtered out. Along with these actors, the communication links that exist among them are
also filtered out. These actors and the links that exist among them are treated as an
epistemic community and a name is given to this epistemic community. With this the
process of identifying an epistemic community is complete.

Table 3.6: Measuring Epistemic Knowledge Transaction
2. If you frequently discuss the topic of local government revenues with individuals outside of your
organization, please identify the two individuals whom you have contacted most often about this topic in
the past year. Please write the name, job title and organization of these two individuals in the space
provided below.
5. If you frequently discuss the topic of compensation policies for local government employees with
individuals outside of your organization, please identify the two individuals whom you have contacted most
often about this topic in the past year. Please write the name, job title and organization of these two
individuals in the space provided below.
8. If you frequently discuss the topic of local government service delivery arrangements with individuals
outside of your organization, please identify the two individuals whom you have contacted most often
about this topic in the past year. Please write the name, job title and organization of these two individuals in
the space provided below.
15. Do you belong to any professional or subregional organizations? If so, name one.

The expectation is that at least one EC will be present within the domain of
municipal finance. However, there may also be more than one EC and each of these ECs
maybe promoting a different episteme/policy solution(s) for reforming municipal finance.
These ECs may consist of entirely different sets of actors or have some common
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members.7 This is the significant advantage of using social network methods and
quantitative measures for studying epistemic communities; it is possible to identify
multiple ECs simultaneously and conduct comparative/correlative analysis on the
membership and linkages of these ECs. Such analysis will in turn allow a researcher to
make generalizations about ECs within the specific policy domain studied.
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Notes
1

The Detroit–Warren–Livonia Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) includes the six counties of Lapeer,
Livingston, Macomb, Oakland, St. Clair, and Wayne. In 2005, the Detroit–Warren–Livonia MSA was the
10th largest MSA in the US. According to the 2010 census, this MSA has a population of 4,296,250 (almost
half of Michigan’s population), and covers an area of 3,913 square miles (10,130 km2). Within this area,
there are 185 cities and townships (Wikipedia, 2012b).
2

In recent times, several software packages have been developed to facilitate sophisticated coding and
quantitative analysis of qualitative data. In particular, Provalis Research and Wordij have developed userfriendly software packages for in-depth document analysis.
3

Originally, there were four groups of codes identified from the content analysis, the fourth group being
emergency financial management. However, this group of codes was not included in the rest of the analysis
as emergency financial management is not a solution but a means of imposing certain solutions.

4

In this sampling technique, the interviewee identifies members of the group under study. Members in the
initial sample are contacted and this group identifies a secondary group. Members of the secondary group
are contacted and they identify more subjects (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
5

This process is described elaborately in the sampling section.

6

Only six of the 100 interviews were given by staff members.

7

Experts can be members of more than one epistemic community.
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CHAPTER IV
Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities: Existence and Composition
Epistemic communities are complex self organizing systems. Often, participants
in these communities hold memberships in more than one epistemic community. Their
worldviews developed in multiple knowledge communities and their multiplex
relationships developed from repeated and overlapping interactions in these communities
are thought to provide these actors with the advantages of interconnected perspectives,
long term focus and valuable social capital.1 It is possible to import these advantages and
the enhanced cognitive capabilities of epistemic communities into policy making
environments to facilitate and sustain voluntary collaboration amidst fragmented political
and administrative settings.
In this chapter, using social network analysis, I identify the epistemic
community/communities that are expected to exist within the domain of municipal
finance in the state of Michigan. As discussed in earlier chapters, this is the first time that
social network methods are used to identify epistemic communities. In order to identify
the existence of epistemic communities, I have developed a multi-step process. This
process is based primarily on the insights provided by Peter Haas (1992a) on the concept
of epistemic communities. Identifying the existence of these communities, and
understanding their composition, interaction patterns, motivations for interactions, and
functional performance will help recognize the various roles these knowledge networks
play to facilitate coordination and cooperation across the highly complex and critical
policy domain of municipal finance reform. Such recognition will convey to policy
makers the incentives they have for mobilizing epistemic communities and will
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encourage them to more formally and systematically utilize these valuable policy making
resources. While policy makers in US regions and metropolitan areas are already seeking
and consulting functional experts on complex policy matters, empirical evidence on the
prevalence and utility of these practices may motivate them to more fully acknowledge
and formally engage the resources at their disposable. In this chapter, I focus only on
identifying municipal finance epistemic community/communities and examining their
composition (i.e., network membership). In chapter five, I analyze the interaction patterns
that exist among actors of the epistemic communities identified in this chapter. In chapter
five, I also analyze the factors that motivate these actors to interact with each other.
Lastly, I examine the policy performance of these actors.
This chapter is organized as follows. I begin the first section with a broad
overview of Michigan’s fiscal crisis. I then proceed to discuss the various constraints
imposed on Michigan’s municipalities which have severely limited the ability of these
governments to raise revenues. I follow up this discussion with a brief description of the
various strategies that have evolved in the state as responses to the growing financial
problems. In the second section, I propose research hypothesis about the potential
existence of epistemic communities in Michigan within the domain of municipal finance.
Next, I present the various analytical procedures carried out to test the proposed
hypothesis and the findings of this test. In this same section, I propose a second set of
research hypotheses focused to the composition of municipal finance epistemic
communities. Following this, I proceed to present the various analytical procedures
carried out to test this second set of hypotheses and the findings of these tests. Finally, I
conclude this chapter with a discussion of the implications of my findings.
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Michigan’s Municipal Fiscal Crisis
In the year 2000, Michigan’s economy was performing well, as indicated by its
3.8 percent rate of unemployment. However, beginning in 2001, the state’s economy
suffered a long and steady decline.
Unemployment jumped to 5.2 percent in 2001 and increased over the next seven
years, reaching 12.9 percent by April 2009. Through 2006 Michigan’s economic
hardship was largely due to declines in manufacturing, in the context of a state
that has historically relied on manufacturing as the primary component of its
economic base. Since 2007, however, the challenges have been exacerbated by
the severe national recession. Second, continuing structural deficits at the state
level have led to reductions in revenue sharing to local units. Third, the
combination of restrictive property tax limitations and a down housing market
over the past two years has exacerbated fiscal conditions (Skidmore and Scorsone,
2009: 675).
Additionally, Michigan’s economy is facing more problems due to a shrinking tax base.
People are leaving Michigan at a staggering rate. About 109,000 more people left
Michigan last year than moved in. It is one of the worst rates in the nation,
quadruple the loss of just eight years ago. The state loses a family every 12
minutes, and the families who are leaving -- young, well-educated high-income
earners -- are the people the state desperately needs to rebuild….
Michigan's exodus is one of the state's best known but least understood problems.
Long ignored or downplayed, outmigration has been shrugged off partly because
it was assumed that those who were leaving were unemployed blue-collar workers
and retirees, groups that, in economic terms, don't cripple the state with their
departure.
But a Detroit News analysis of U.S. Census Bureau and Internal Revenue Service
data reveals that every day, Michigan gets less populated, less educated, and
poorer because of outmigration….
The state suffered a net loss to migration of 18,000 adults with a bachelor's degree
or higher in 2007 alone -- the equivalent of half the staff of the University of
Michigan crossing the state line (The Detroit News, 2009).
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Adding to the state’s woes is the effect of the aging of baby-boomers. Though a
national phenomenon, it is more acute in Michigan where the population over 60 is
greater than the population below 60 (Anderson Economic Group, LLC, 2011). An aging
population is typically seen as generating less revenue for state and local governments,
while requiring more services (Snyder, 2011). On the other hand, Michigan’s
unemployment has grown from three percent to fourteen percent between 2000 and 2010,
higher than the national rate of ten percent for the same period (Snyder, 2011). Today,
Michiganders are also earning less than a decade ago, which also means less revenue and
more need for government services (Snyder, 2011). Personal income growth between
1995 and 2009 was only seven percent as opposed to the national average of thirty-five
percent during the same period (Anderson Economic Group, LLC, 2011). As citizens
struggle with persistent unemployment and economic hardship, they look up to the
government for more services than ever before (Snyder, 2011).
Plagued with a highly restricted property tax environment, housing market
crashes, and an aging and shrinking tax base, Michigan municipal governments are in no
position to sustain growing needs for public services. At the same time when service
provision related expenditures were mounting, between 2000 and 2009, the compensation
(salary and benefits) for classified Michigan state government employees increased by
nineteen percent and the compensation for classified Michigan local government
employees increased by thirteen percent (US Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2009). This
growth has been mostly in employee health care, retiree health care and pensions
(Snyder, 2011). In contrast, during this ten year period, private sector compensation in
Michigan fell by four percent. When confronted with rising expenditures and declining
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revenues, local units tend to turn to parent governments for help. To make matters worse,
both federal and state intergovernmental revenues have been harder to come by. While
transfers from the federal government have almost vanished due to a variety of reasons,
the state government also has drastically cut aid to local governments due to its own
budget challenges (Citizens Research Council, 2005). Consequently, many Michigan
communities have depleted their fund balances, borrowed money and failed to put aside
money for impending liabilities, in particular pensions and retiree benefits (Snyder,
2011). Michigan’s 1,800 local governments have borrowed billions of dollars (Henion,
2011); but property tax revenues have plummeted in recent years and municipalities
struggle to repay debts.
A few local communities have come close to bankruptcy. In an effort to hopefully
put such fiscally distressed communities on the path of fiscal solvency, the state has
resorted to the application of the new revised emergency financial manager law. This
law, the Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act/ Public Act 4
(PA 4), authorizes state officials to intervene in units of local government that experience
severe financial stress or financial emergencies.
If, after statutory due process has been accorded to local officials, the Governor
confirms the existence of a financial emergency, the Governor then is required to
declare the unit of local government to be in receivership and to appoint an
emergency manager… If a unit of local government is placed in receivership,
beginning then and throughout the receivership, the governing body and chief
administrative officer of the unit of local government may not exercise any of the
powers of those offices except as may specifically authorized in writing by the
Emergency Manager. In addition, the governing body and chief administrative
officer are subject to any conditions required by the Emergency Manager (PA 4,
2011: 8).
This law provides an emergency financial manager (EFM) with a broad range of
tools to tackle the problems of the jurisdiction in fiscal distress.2 An EFM, with the
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approval of the Governor, may even disincorporate or dissolve a municipal government
and assign its assets, debts, and liabilities as provided by law (PA 4, 2011). Once all
financial conditions are met and a two-year budget is in place, the EFM may return power
to the elected officials.3

Michigan’s Restrictive Revenue-Raising Environment
The above discussion provides a broad overview of Michigan’s municipal fiscal
crisis. However, the chronic financial problems that local units in the state confront can
be fully recognized only with an understanding of the restrictive revenue-raising
environment in which they operate. In Michigan, local governments raise their revenues
from three primary sources: (1) property tax, (2) intergovernmental revenues, and (3) a
mix of user fees, licenses/permits, fines, investment income, etc. (Ohren, 2004). The
general property tax has traditionally been an important part of Michigan’s tax structure
for funding its counties, cities, townships, villages and school districts. In fact, general
property tax has been the largest yielding tax of all of Michigan’s state and local taxes
(Michigan Legislature, 2011).
But this important revenue source for municipal governments has some critical
limitations. First, value of real property though assessed locally by cities or townships, is
equalized by counties and the state.
Equalization is needed to ensure that property owners in all parts of the county or
school district pay their fair share of that unit’s taxes. Equalization provides that
all similar properties are equally and uniformly assessed and serves to ensure that
a school district, city, township, or village in which property is underassessed
does not get more than its fair share of state aid (Michigan Legislature, 2011: 2).
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Those communities with greater state equalized value (SEV) can generate more revenue
from a mill than communities with lower SEV.
Moreover, the state constitution, through the 1978 Headlee amendment, limits the
growth in revenue that a community can receive from property tax values to the lesser of
the rate of inflation or five percent. When property values in a jurisdiction increase faster
than inflation, millage rates must be reduced to stay within the revenue limits imposed by
Headlee. Such a rate reduction is popularly referred to as a “Headlee rollback” (Skidmore
and Scorsone, 2009). After Proposal A was approved by voters in 1994, these rollbacks
were greatly reduced in number and magnitude. This proposal imposes a taxable value
cap on individual properties. The new cap limited the growth of the value of property for
tax purposes to the lesser of the rate of inflation (as measured by the national Consumer
Price Index (CPI)) or five percent, regardless of the actual increase in state equalized
value (SEV) of property. Thus, over time, the taxable value of a property could fall well
below the SEV (Skidmore and Scorsone, 2009).
Besides a restrictive property tax environment, other potential sources of revenue
are also constrained in Michigan. Cities can levy income tax, but only with voter
approval. As a result, of the 273 cities in the state, only 22 raise revenue from local
income taxes (Skidmore and Scorsone, 2009). Further, the imposition of income taxes on
nonresidents is a very contentious issue and has led to controversies in virtually every
city that has adopted local income taxes (Ross and Levine, 2006). Municipalities tax
nonresidents who work within their boundaries based on the argument that commuters
should help pay for public safety, transportation and other services the central city
provides. Nonresidents, however, resist contributing to the tax revenues of a jurisdiction
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in which they do not live. In some cases, this conflict of interest has led to the state
legislature denying localities authority to tax. In others, the tax rate for nonresidents is set
at a lower rate than residents (Ross and Levine, 2006). This is typical in Michigan cities
where the income tax rates for nonresidents are different from those for residents. Despite
such compromises, the high collection and administration costs of local income taxes
make them unattractive.
As of 2002, 28 states in the US allow their municipalities to levy a sales tax. The
states contain 58 percent of the cities with over 50,000 population (Ross and Levine,
2006). Michigan, however, has no county or city sales tax and only the state levies a 6%
sales tax. Michigan also does not allow cities or other local units to impose a use tax, the
companion to sales tax. Only the state imposes 6% use tax on the total price (including
shipping and handling charges) of all taxable items brought into Michigan or purchases
by mail from out-of-state retailers (State of Michigan, 2011).4
The ability of Michigan communities to charge fees for specific local public
services is also limited by state statute and court rulings; fees must not exceed the cost of
service provision (Skidmore and Scorsone, 2009). The Headlee Amendment of 1978
requires that local governments have to obtain voter approval before a tax can be imposed
or increased. However, a growing number of Michigan counties, cities and townships are
skirting the voter approval requirement by labeling certain taxes as user fees.
Consequently, many disputes on the fairness of user fees have been litigated (State of
Michigan, 2011).
In short, nearly all potential sources of revenue for Michigan municipal
governments are restricted in some way by state law, leaving them limited options for

105
generating revenue (Skidmore and Scorsone, 2009). Michigan municipal governments
have, hence, traditionally relied excessively on the growth in taxable values to boost their
property tax revenues (Skidmore and Scorsone, 2009). But starting in 2001, growth in
property values stagnated, and then began to decline in 2006 (Skidmore and Scorsone,
2009). Figure 4.1 traces the rates of change of average property values in Michigan for
the period between 1994 and 2007. For comparison, the figure shows the rate of change
of the national CPI, since the property tax assessment cap is based on the change of the
CPI.5

Figure 4.1: A Comparison of Michigan Housing and National Consumer Price
Indexes--1994 to 2007

Note: Adopted from Skidmore and Scorsone (2009). CPI indicates national consumer price index and HPI
indicates Michigan housing price index.
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Responses to Michigan’s Municipal Fiscal Crisis
Given such state-imposed limitations and a depressed housing market, how do
Michigan’s municipalities respond to their ongoing fiscal challenges? In Michigan, local
government responses on the revenue side include:
1. placing proposals before their citizens for Headlee overrides and millage
increases;
2. adopting or increasing user fees for specific local public services;
3. requesting passage of special millages for financing specific services such as
public safety and recreation; or
4. exploring the possibility of implementing a local income tax, which also
requires a referendum (Ohren, 2004).
On the expenditure side, common local government responses in the state include:
1. drawing from fund balances or “rainy day funds” to compensate for reductions
in current year revenues;
2. leaving positions vacant when they become open, and eliminating positions
from budgets altogether;
3. postponing maintenance and deferring capital construction;
4. prioritizing service provision by government and subsequent decisions to shed
less important functions such as recreation and library services;
5. eliminating some services and transferring those services to the county;
6. cooperating with other jurisdictions to jointly deliver services; and
7. contracting-out to the nonprofit or private sector for the delivery of services,
e.g., collection and disposal of solid waste (Ohren, 2004).
While none of these strategies are easy to accomplish, many communities have
managed to implement critical changes to their revenue raising capabilities and spending
patterns. I organize these responses into three issue areas--local government revenues,
expenditures on municipal employees and public service provision arrangements. I then
proceed to identify if there exists an epistemic community or communities either

107
specifically within a single issue area or spanning multiple issue areas by mapping the
communication networks in the three issue areas.

Michigan’s Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities
Existence of Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities
Both issue uncertainty and technical complexity provide opportunities for
epistemic communities to influence decision makers. When these factors combine with
an impending shock or crisis, a demand for functional expertise arises. As discussed in
the previous section, several of Michigan’s municipalities have been facing a decade-long
period of fiscal uncertainty and instability. At least half a dozen communities in the state
have either been placed in receivership or brought under the direct control of an EFM,
thereby creating a sense of fiscal crisis in the minds of many state and local public
officials. Given these suitable conditions for the emergence and proliferation of epistemic
communities, I expect that at least one epistemic community exists in the state of
Michigan within the domain of municipal finance. This community could be either
specifically embedded within a single issue area among the three issue areas of local
government revenues, expenditures on municipal employees, and public service
provision, or spans more than one issue area. Accordingly, I propose that,
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): In Michigan, within the policy area of municipal finance,
there exists at least one epistemic community.
To test my proposition, I have developed a multi-step process that will for the first
time help identify epistemic communities using social network analysis. These steps are
outlined in Table 4.3. Before I discuss the process, it is necessary to explain some
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analytical decisions which were important in shaping the outcomes of this analysis. As
there is no general expectation or specific assumptions that suggest the epistemic
community/communities may be limited to a single issue area or span multiple issue
areas, I chose to do an issue by issue analysis. The benefit of this approach is it allows me
to analyze the membership in communities identified within each issue area and compare
them. Such comparisons will allow us to see if the same community is operating across
different issue areas, if the communities in the different issue areas are overlapping, or if
the community in each issue area is exclusive to that area. Another reason for adopting
this approach is that the process I have developed is an entirely novel effort that has no
precedents. As the approach has not been tested before, it made more sense to proceed
with a simple issue by issue analysis, rather than start with a complex approach which has
three different issue areas aggregated together. Also, the three municipal finance
communication networks each have 100 actors and pooling all of them and their
communication relations together as a single network increases complexity.
Having chosen to conduct an issue by issue analysis, I proceeded to group
municipal finance reform strategies within each issue area. Earlier in chapter three (see
Table 3.2), I had grouped the municipal finance reform strategies identified from the
newspaper articles analysis into the three groups that represent the implication of these
strategies for the municipal budget. These groups include increasing local government
revenues, reducing expenditures on municipal employees, and altering public service
provision options. These three groups correspond to the three issue areas--local
government revenues (LGR), expenditures on municipal employees (EME), and public
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service provision (PSP)--within which I examined the presence of epistemic
communities.
Within the first group of strategies for increasing local government revenues,
there are four specific strategies. The newspaper stories on policy actors’ proposal and
implementation of revenue increasing strategies revealed a pattern. Many Michigan
communities typically sought millage increases on property taxes and also creatively
adopted or increased user fees for public services (Detroit Free Press 2010; 2011; Detroit
News, 2010; 2011). In general, policy actors in a number of these communities also
complained about reduced state aid and were seeking more assistance. The three
strategies were therefore combined together as a single episteme, Episteme
ALLREVENUES. The remaining strategy of increasing local income taxes was
individually identified as Episteme INCOMETAX. This strategy was kept separate from
the other three based on the type and number of governments it involves--which is only a
small group of cities that either already have voter approval or are seeking approval to
levy income tax.
The second group of strategies for reducing expenditures on municipal employees
also includes four specific strategies. Here again, I group related strategies based on
patterns seen in newspaper stories and on the functional content of the strategies.
Reducing municipal employment through lay-offs and reducing the wages and/or benefits
of municipal employees are grouped as Episteme EMPLOYEES, while the remaining
two strategies--reducing the benefits paid to municipal retirees and restricting the ability
of municipal employees to collectively bargain for compensation and work rules are
grouped as Episteme RETIREES. The strategies in Episteme RETIREES, in particular
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the strategy restricting the ability of municipal employees to collectively bargain, are
highly sensitive politically and are often those that elected officials try to avoid.
The third group consists of strategies for altering service provision options. Here
there are three epistemes. The first strategy involves political consolidation; an extremely
rare phenomenon in Michigan. This strategy alone was treated as Episteme
CONSOLIDATE. The next two strategies--transferring functions to a higher level of
government and consolidating services with other local governments--were jointly treated
as Episteme COOPERATE. Finally, the three strategies related to contracting services to
different sectors--public, nonprofit, and private--were collectively treated as Episteme
CONTRACT. Table 4.1 lists the seven epistemes used in identifying the municipal
finance epistemic communities.
Other ways of grouping these strategies would have led to different outcomes in
terms of the composition of municipal finance epistemic communities. However, the
classification is chiefly based on patterns observed in the document analysis of the 248
newspaper articles which has shaped this entire study. First, through the document
analysis, I identified my initial sample of fifty individuals. Using this initial sample and
the snowball sampling technique I identified the communication networks in the three
issues of municipal finance. Next, through the document analysis, I identified the various
policy solutions for confronting fiscal stress in Michigan municipal governments and
grouped them into three broad groups--raising local government revenues, reducing
expenditures on municipal employees and altering service provision options. These three
groups served as the basis for designing the interview questionnaire used in this study.
Respondents were asked about their level of support for individual strategies within the

111
three groups. This information has been a very important element in the process of
identifying the municipal finance epistemic communities. That is, I first grouped specific
strategies as epistemes based on patterns seen in the newspaper stories and the functional
content of the strategies. Next, I used these epistemes for identifying municipal finance
experts that promoted these epistemes as potential ways to tackle specific municipal
finance problems. This methodology of identifying potential epistemic community actors
around specific policy beliefs is customary in EC studies (Dotterweich, 2009).

Table 4.1: Epistemes for Identifying Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities
Local
Government Revenues

Expenditures on
Municipal Employees

Public
Service Provision

Episteme INCOMETAX

Episteme EMPLOYEES

Episteme CONSOLIDATE

Adopting or increasing local
income taxes

Reducing municipal employment
through lay-offs

Consolidating one or more local
governments

Reducing the wages and/or benefits of
municipal employees

Episteme ALLREVENUES

Episteme RETIREES

Episteme COOPERATE

Seeking additional state shared
revenues

Reducing the benefits paid to
municipal retirees

Transferring certain functions to a
higher level of government

Increasing local property taxes

Restricting the ability of municipal
employees to collectively bargain for
compensation and work rules

Consolidating services with other
local governments

Adopting or increasing user
fees for specific local public
services

Episteme CONTRACT
Contracting for services from
other local governments
Contracting for services from
nonprofit organizations
Contracting for services from
private organizations
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In sum, a systematic analytical connection has been established between the initial
document analysis and sample selection, design and development of the interview
instrument, and identification of key issue areas and the policy beliefs (epsitemes) within
those issue areas. All of these elements have directly influenced the analysis and the
outcomes of this study. Such analytical connection is particularly useful to ensure
consistency across the various stages in this research and the decisions made in those
stages.

A Process for Identifying Epistemic Communities Using Social Network Analysis
Step 1: Identifying the Communication Network
In this process, described elaborately in chapter three and depicted in Table 4.2,
the first step in identifying an epistemic community in a particular issue area is
identifying and mapping the discussion and information-sharing network (hereafter
communication network) that has emerged in that issue area. Using the snowball
sampling technique and data collected from 100 interviews, I map the three
communication networks on local government revenues (N=148) (see figure 4.2),
expenditures on municipal employees (N=138) (see figure 4.8) and public service
provision (N=148) (see figure 4.14). The three communication networks are directed
networks, that is, the direction of communication ties, who communicates with whom is
known. The presence of a communication tie is indicated with a 1 and the absence of a tie
with a 0. For example, if actor A has a tie with actor B, it is indicated with a score of 1 in
the row of A and the column of B. In the network map, this relationship is indicated with
a line having an arrow running between two circles which represent actors A and B. In
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this case, the tie stems from A and is directed toward B, so the arrow head is pointed
toward B.
As noted earlier, this study is not focused on identifying all members who
participate in the communication network on the three issue areas of municipal finance.
Instead, the goal here is to identify the presence of epistemic communities within these
issue areas. So interviews were requested with 120 people of whom 100 agreed to
participate. So, for each communication network, I first map all actors identified by the
100 respondents. However, in network analysis, you typically need a finite set of actors
with no missing data. Therefore, I excluded all the actors who did not respond to the
interview questionnaire. This means in the areas of LGR and PSP I excluded 48 actors,
and 38 in the issue area of EME. After excluding the nonrespondents from each of the
three networks, I once again map the three networks with the 100 actors (see figures 4.3,
4.9 and 4.15). Given that nonrespondents are excluded from the map, the ties that go
from the remaining 100 actors toward these nonrespondents are also gone. This results in
many actors appearing as isolates/unconnected actors in the second network.

Step 2: Identifying Actors with Epistemic Characteristics: Academic Training, Policy
Expertise, and Sharing Beliefs and Interests
After mapping the three communication networks, I proceeded to identify the
actors within these networks who meet the requirements to be epistemic community
members. In the EC literature, individuals’ academic training, policy knowledge and
professional interactions are often used to identify if they are a functional expert in that
particular policy domain (Haas, 1989; 1992a). Based on this practice, I developed a
measure that will help identify potential ECs. The measure consists of three separate
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variables that capture these elements. In order to be an epistemic community member, an
individual must have at least a certain level of academic training, high policy expertise,
and opportunities or venues to share policy beliefs and interests with other EC members
(see chapter three for more details on this measure). With regard to academic training, an
individual must have at least a bachelor’s degree to qualify as an EC member. As regards
policy expertise, respondents with policy knowledge scores above the median score
qualified as EC members. This score was 8 on a policy knowledge scale of 1 to 10 for all
three issue areas.6 Lastly, membership in professional or subregional organizations is
viewed as an avenue for sharing ideas, developing a common corpus of professional
knowledge and for diffusing that knowledge. Hence, only individuals who belonged to at
least one professional or subregional organization qualified as EC members. Only those
individuals who fulfilled all three of these requirements were considered as actors with
epistemic characteristics. Once actors were classified based on the presence of each
characteristics, new networks involving only these actors possessing epistemic
characteristics were mapped for each issue area. You can find these maps in Appendix A
(see Figures 1A, 2A and 3A). As can be seen, the network on LGR (Fig. 1A) is left with
63 actors, while the networks on EME (Fig. 2A) and PSP (Fig. 3A) each have 60 actors.7

Step 3: Identifying the Common Policy Agenda of Actors with Epistemic Characteristics
An epistemic community is a finite group of individuals who share a common
policy agenda. Given this, it was necessary to examine the policy beliefs/agenda of the
actors judged to have epistemic characteristics.8 Earlier, I had identified seven different
epistemes. Based on their support for each episteme, the epistemic actors within each
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area were grouped together. Respondents should have demonstrated at least a minimum
level of support for all strategies included in an episteme to be considered as supporters
of that episteme. That is, interviewees choosing answer options “rarely,” “sometimes,”
“often,” or “very often” were grouped as supporters of that particular strategy. Those who
chose the answer option “never” were grouped as nonsupporters of that particular
strategy. EC participation is about sharing professional and policy beliefs, developing a
common body of policy knowledge in the issue area it specializes in, and working
collaboratively to promote and institutionalize professional practices that stem from this
knowledge. It is important to note here that all EC actors need not have to be active
policy promoters. So this coding was sufficient for capturing this concept. In this way, I
created separate dichotomous variables for individual strategies within each episteme. An
actor’s support for a particular episteme (i.e., support for all strategies within that
episteme) was indicated with a 1 and his/her lack of support was indicated with a 0.
Following this, within each issue area, I divided the actors with epistemic
characteristics into advocacy networks based on their support for the epistemes within
that issue area. These advocacy networks are shown in the Appendix A (see Figures 1B,
2B and 3B). In the advocacy network for a particular episteme, the episteme lies at the
center and lines run toward it from actors who support that episteme. Those actors who
do not support any of the epistemes within an issue area are left as isolates in the network
(indicated by circles with no connections running from them). Those actors who support
all epistemes within an issue area have lines running toward all of them. In the issue area
of LGR, there are 27 isolates (see Fig. 1B); in the issue area of EME, there are 30 isolates
(see Fig. 2B) and in the issue area of PSP, there are 8 isolates (see Fig. 3B). These
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isolates were excluded from subsequent analysis as they possess epistemic
characteristics, but do not share policy beliefs with other actors.
After excluding the isolates, advocacy networks involving only the actors
possessing both epistemic characteristics and a common policy agenda were mapped for
each issue area in Figure 4.4 (LGR), Figure 4.10 (EME), and Figure 4.16 (PSP).
In Figure 4.4 (LGR), blue circles indicate actors who support only Episteme
INCOMETAX (due to space constraints referred to as Episteme A in the network maps)
(N= 4), green circles indicate actors who support only Episteme ALLREVENUES
(Episteme B) (N=14), and black circles indicate actors who support both Episteme
INCOMETAX and Episteme ALLREVENUES (N=18).9 The total number of actors
supporting Episteme INCOMETAX = 4+18 (22), while the total number of actors
supporting Episteme ALLREVENUES = 14+18 (32). Figure 4.10 (EME) indicates that
12 actors support only Episteme EMPLOYEES (Episteme C), three actors support only
Episteme RETIREES (Episteme D), and 15 actors support both Episteme EMPLOYEES
and Episteme RETIREES. The total number of actors supporting Episteme
EMPLOYEES = 12+15 (27), while the total number of actors supporting Episteme
RETIREES = 3+15 (18). Figure 4.16 (PSP) indicates that three actors support only
Episteme CONSOLIDATE (Episteme E), 12 actors support only Episteme COOPERATE
(Episteme F), six actors support only Episteme CONTRACT (Episteme G), one actor
supports both Episteme CONSOLIDATE and Episteme COOPERATE, one actor
supports both Episteme CONSOLIDATE and Episteme CONTRACT, 10 actors support
both Episteme COOPERATE and Episteme CONTRACT, and 19 actors support all three
epistemes. The total number of actors supporting Episteme CONSOLIDATE =
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3+1+1+19 (24), the total number of actors supporting Episteme COOPERATE =
12+1+10+19 (42), and the total number of actors supporting Episteme CONTRACT =
6+1+10+19 (36).

Step 4: Identifying if Actors with Epistemic Characteristics and Common Policy Agenda
are Involved in Knowledge Transaction
As mentioned earlier, an EC is not just a finite group of qualified experts who
share policy beliefs. It is also a group involved in developing a common body of
professional knowledge on the issue areas in which it specializes, and in promoting the
knowledge developed for collective benefit. Therefore, in order for actors with epistemic
characteristics and a common policy agenda to belong to an epistemic community, they
must participate in knowledge transaction. Knowledge transaction can occur through a
number of avenues. In this study, the process of knowledge transaction was measured in
two ways. The first measure involved the presence of direct communication ties among
the members of an epistemic community. In descriptive network mapping, actors are
indicated by points called nodes, and the ties or links among them are indicated by lines
that run from one point to another. The presence of links connecting an actor with other
actors indicates that the actor is involved in knowledge transaction activities. To be an
EC member, actors should be connected to at least one other actor they share policy
beliefs.
If the actors have no communication with other actors in their network, then the
second measure of knowledge transaction is examined. The second measure of
knowledge transaction is scope for professional interactions. If this actor was member of
a professional or subregional organization in which other actors of his/her network also
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participate, then the actor was considered as participating in knowledge transaction. If an
actor had no communication ties with other network actors and was also not a member of
any professional or subregional organization in which these other network actors were
members, then that actor was treated as an isolate and was not considered to be an EC
member.
Two overlapping advocacy networks supporting epistemes INCOMETAX and
ALLREVENUES were identified within the issue area of LGR. Two overlapping
advocacy networks supporting epistemes EMPLOYEES and RETIREES were identified
within the issue area of EME. Three overlapping advocacy networks supporting
epistemes CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE and CONTRACT were identified within the
issue area of PSP. Within each of these seven advocacy networks, I analyzed the
knowledge transaction activities of the actors who participated in these networks. Of the
22 actors in the network of Episteme INCOMETAX, only one member did not participate
in knowledge transaction (i.e., had no communication ties with other actors in the
network and did not belong to any professional or subregional organization that the other
actors in the network participate). So, I excluded this single actor. The remaining 21
individuals (who possessed epistemic characteristics, a common policy agenda and
participated in knowledge transaction) and the communication links that existed among
these actors were together treated as a municipal finance epistemic community and a new
name was given to this EC--municipal finance epistemic community INCOMETAX (see
Figure 4.5). Obviously, the name is derived from the episteme supported/promoted by
this community. With this, the process of identifying the first municipal finance epistemic
community (hereafter MFEC) in the issue area of LGR is complete. This process was
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repeated for the six remaining epistemes which resulted in the identification of six more
MFECs (see Figures 4.6; 4.11; 4.12; 4.17; 4.18; and 4.19).10 The results of this process
are summarized in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities in Michigan
Local Government Revenues
MFEC_INCOMETAX

N=21

MFEC_ALLREVENUES

N=31

Expenditures on Municipal Employees
MFEC_EMPLOYEES

N=22

MFEC_RETIREES

N=13

Public Service Provision
MFEC_CONSOLIDATE

N=22

MFEC_COOPERATE

N=39

MFEC_CONTRACT

N=32

A color scheme is used to differentiate between actors involved in knowledge
transaction through direct communication linkages as opposed to those involved in
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knowledge transaction through interactions facilitated by their shared membership in
professional and subregional organizations.

Interpreting the Findings
It appears that seven different municipal finance epistemic communities (MFECs)
have been identified across the three issue areas of municipal finance reform. Two of
these are within the issue area of local government revenues, two within the issue area of
expenditures on municipal employees, and three within the issue area of public service
provision. In fact, however, this is not the case. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the
focus of this study is not to identify the entire communication networks in the three issue
areas of municipal finance, nor is it to identify the entire epistemic community or
communities that exist within these issue areas. Rather, the goal was to identify the
existence of epistemic communities in Michigan within the domain of municipal finance.
Given the limitations in the data, while I have found seven communities that are
epistemic communities, I cannot conclude that these are seven different communities and
that the actors that I have identified are the only actors in these communities. All that I
can conclude is that in Michigan, within the policy area of municipal finance there exists
at least one epistemic community. Given that this is so, Hypothesis 1a is strongly
confirmed.
The seven MFECs may consist of the same or different or overlapping actors. The
extent to which the examination of the composition of these ECs permits me to make
conclusions about the number of these communities is discussed in the section on the
composition of the seven municipal finance ECs (which is the next section). Furthermore,
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I made the choice of grouping individual policy strategies for resolving municipal finance
problems into seven different epistemes. Hence, I have the obvious outcome of seven
knowledge communities. Another way of grouping the strategies into epistemes may
have led to a different outcome. Still, regardless of whichever route is being used, as long
as an approach is sufficiently capturing the essence of the epistemic communities
concept, the analyst must be able establish the presence of ECs within a domain and
locate at least some key EC actors within that domain.

Visualizing the Presence of Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities within the
Communication Networks
The presence of municipal finance epistemic community (communities) has been
established. Now it is necessary to locate these communities within the full
communication network in each issue area. In Figure 4.7, I again map the full
communication network shown in Figure 4.2. But in Figure 4.7, I show the presence of
municipal finance epistemic communities INCOMETAX and ALLREVENUES. In this
figure, there are 65 non-EC members and a total of 35 EC members (who are members of
MFECs INCOMETAX and ALLREVENUES). A color scheme is used to differentiate
between non-EC members, actors who are members in both MFECs, actors who are
members only in MFEC_INCOMETAX and those who are members only in
MFEC_ALLREVENUES. This visualization process is repeated for the two other issue
areas. There are some differences in the overall structure of figures 4.2 and 4.7. This is
because the network in Figure 4.7 was drawn such that similar actors are grouped
together. (See Figure 1C in Appendix A to visualize the location of the two MFECs
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within the network consisting of the communication linkages of only the 100
interviewees.)
In Figure 4.13, I map the full communication network on EME, and show the
presence of MFECs EMPLOYEES and RETIREES.11 (See Figure 2C in Appendix A to
visualize the location of the two MFECs within the network consisting of the
communication linkages of only the 100 interviewees). Finally, in Figure 4.20, I map the
full communication network on PSP and show the presence of MFECs CONSOLIDATE,
COOPERATE and CONTRACT. Unlike the other two issue areas, in PSP, three ECs
have been identified. Moreover, this area has the maximum number of EC actors. Also,
the communication network on PSP is denser than the other two networks. Among
others, the reason for this broader participation can be attributed to the fact that
nongovernmental actors have greater stakes in this area due to the contracting-out option.
Additionally, while actors from townships and counties are not very much interested in
local income tax, both governmental and nongovernmental actors are highly restricted in
communicating or revealing their communication contacts on municipal employment
issues. Such limitations are not found in the issue area of PSP and, hence, the observed
high level of involvement from a variety of policy actors. (See Figure 3C in Appendix A
to visualize the location of the three MFECs within the network consisting of the
communication linkages of only the 100 interviewees). One overall conclusion from this
visualization process is that popular actors (that is, actors who have more ties coming
toward them) typically happen to be EC actors who are members in more than one
MFEC. Importantly, this pattern is prominent in the issue areas of LGR and PSP.

Table 4.3: A Process for Identifying Epistemic Communities Using Social Network Analysis
Step 1: Identifying the Communication Network that has Emerged in the Issue Area
The first step in identifying an epistemic community in a particular issue area is identifying and mapping the communication network
that has emerged in that issue area.
Step 2: Identifying Actors with Epistemic Characteristics
The second step is identifying the actors within the communication network who satisfy the requirements to be epistemic community
members. In the literature examining epistemic communities, individuals’ academic training, policy knowledge and professional
interactions are typically used to identify if they are functional experts in that particular policy domain (Haas, 1989; 1992a).

An epistemic community is a group of individuals who share a common policy agenda (Haas, 1992a). Given this, it is necessary to
examine the policy beliefs/agenda of actors with epistemic characteristics and group together actors who have similar policy beliefs.
Step 4: Identifying if Actors with Epistemic Characteristics and Common Policy Agenda are Involved in Knowledge Transaction
An EC is not just a finite group of qualified experts who share policy beliefs. It is also a group that is actively involved in developing a
common body of professional knowledge on the issue areas it specializes and in promoting that knowledge for collective benefit.
Therefore, in order for actors with epistemic characteristics and a common policy agenda to belong to an epistemic community, they
should participate in knowledge transaction. Knowledge transaction can occur through a number of avenues such as communication
linkages, interactions in professional organizations, workshops, conferences, etc., and publishing newsletters, technical reports,
conference papers, books, articles or other scholarly material.

123

Step 3: Identifying the Common Policy Agenda of Actors with Epistemic Characteristics

Figure 4.2: Communication Network on the Issue of Local Government Revenues
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=148.

Figure 4.3: Communication Linkages of Interviewees on the Issue of Local Government Revenues
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=100.

Figure 4.4: Actors with Epistemic Characteristics and a Common Policy Agenda
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Episteme A

Episteme B

Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.354. N=36. Blue circles indicate actors who support only Episteme A (N= 4), green circles indicate actors who support only Episteme B
(N=14), and black circles indicate actors who support both Episteme A and Episteme B (N=18).

Figure 4.5: Municipal Finance Epistemic Community A
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N= 21. Fourteen EC members are involved in knowledge transaction through direct communication linkages.
These fourteen actors are indicated by green circles. The remaining seven members are involved in knowledge transaction through interactions facilitated by their
common membership in professional and subregional organizations. Through these memberships the group of fourteen and the group of seven are connected.
The seven actors are indicated by yellow circles. The episteme promoted by this municipal finance EC is Episteme INCOMETAX.

Figure 4.6: Municipal Finance Epistemic Community B

128

Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N= 31. Sixteen EC members are involved in knowledge transaction through direct communication linkages.
These sixteen actors are indicated by pink circles. The remaining fifteen members are involved in knowledge transaction through interactions facilitated by their
common membership in professional and subregional organizations. Through these memberships the group of sixteen and the group of fifteen are connected. The
fifteen actors are indicated by yellow circles. The episteme promoted by this municipal finance EC is Episteme ALLREVENUES.

Figure 4.7: Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities A and B within the Full Communication Network on LGR
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N of network=148. N of nonrespondents= 48, N of non-EC members=65, and N of all EC members=35. Pink circles indicates nonrespondents, green
circles indicate actors who are non-EC members, red circles indicate actors who are members in both municipal finance epistemic community A as well as municipal finance epistemic community B,
blue circles indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic community A, and yellow circles indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic community B.

Figure 4.8: Communication Network on the Issue of Expenditures on Municipal Employees
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=138.

Figure 4.9: Communication Linkages of Interviewees on the Issue of Expenditures on Municipal Employees
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=100.

Figure 4.10: Actors with Epistemic Characteristics and a Common Policy Agenda

Episteme C

Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.354. N=30. Green circles indicate actors who support only Episteme C (N=12), purple circles indicate actors who support only Episteme
D (N=3), and black circles indicate actors who support both Episteme C and Episteme D (N=15).
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Episteme D

Figure 4.11: Municipal Finance Epistemic Community C
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=22. Eight EC members are involved in knowledge transaction through direct communication linkages.
These actors are indicated by blue circles. The remaining fourteen members are involved in knowledge transaction through interactions facilitated by their
common membership in professional and subregional organizations. Through these memberships the group of eight and the group of fourteen are connected. The
fourteen actors are indicated by red circles. The episteme promoted by this municipal finance EC is Episteme EMPLOYEES.

Figure 4.12: Municipal Finance Epistemic Community D
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=13. Seven EC members are involved in knowledge transaction through direct communication linkages.
These actors are indicated by pink circles. The remaining six members are involved in knowledge transaction through interactions facilitated by their common
membership in professional and subregional organizations. Through these memberships the group of seven and the group of six are connected. The six actors are
indicated by green circles. The episteme promoted by this municipal finance EC is Episteme RETIREES.

Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N of network=138. N of nonrespondents=38, N of non-EC members=76, and N of all EC members=24. Teal circles indicates nonrespondents, blue
circles indicate actors who are non-EC members, pink circles indicate actors who are members in both municipal finance epistemic community C as well as municipal finance epistemic community D,
green circles indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic community C, and yellow circles indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic community D.

135

Labor Attorneys-Potential Members of ECs C & D

Figure 4.13: Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities C and D within the Full Communication Network on EME

Figure 4.14: Communication Network on the Issue of Public Service Provision
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek Software. N=148.

Figure 4.15: Communication Linkages of Interviewees on the Issue of Public Service Provision
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek Software. N=100.

Figure 4.16: Actors with Epistemic Characteristics and a Common Policy Agenda
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Episteme E

Episteme G

Episteme F
Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.354. N=52. purple circles indicate actors who support only Episteme E (N=3), pink circles indicate actors who support only Episteme
F (N=12), green circles indicate actors who support only Episteme G (N=6), teal circle indicates actor who supports both Episteme E and Episteme F (N=1), grey circle indicates actor who supports
both Episteme E and Episteme G (N=1), yellow circles indicate actors who support both Episteme F and Episteme G (N=10), and orange circles indicate actors who support all three epistemes-Epistemes E, F and G (N=19)..

Figure 4.17: Municipal Finance Epistemic Community E
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=22. Fourteen EC members are involved in knowledge transaction through direct communication linkages.
These actors are indicated by pink circles. The remaining eight members are involved in knowledge transaction through interactions facilitated by their common
membership in professional and subregional organizations. Through these memberships the group of fourteen and the group of eight are connected. The eight
actors are indicated by grey circles. The episteme promoted by this municipal finance EC is Episteme CONSOLIDATE.

Figure 4.18: Municipal Finance Epistemic Community F
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=39. Thirty-four EC members are involved in knowledge transaction through direct communication
linkages. These actors are indicated by light brown circles. The remaining five members are involved in knowledge transaction through interactions facilitated by
their common membership in professional and subregional organizations. Through these memberships the group of thirty-four and the group of five are
connected. The five actors are indicated by teal circles. The episteme promoted by this municipal finance EC is Episteme COOPERATE.

Figure 4.19: Municipal Finance Epistemic Community G
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=32. Twenty-four EC members are involved in knowledge transaction through direct communication
linkages. These actors are indicated by green circles. The remaining eight members are involved in knowledge transaction through interactions facilitated by their
common membership in professional and subregional organizations. Through these memberships the group of twenty-four and the group of eight are connected.
The eight actors are indicated by blue circles. The episteme promoted by this municipal finance EC is Episteme CONTRACT.

Figure 4.20: Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities E, F and G within the Full Communication Network on PSP
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N of network=148. N of nonrespondents=48, N of non-EC members=53, and N of all EC members=47. Grey circles indicates nonrespondents, green
circles indicate actors who are non-EC members, dark pink circles indicate actors who are members in all three municipal finance epistemic communities--E, F and G (N=18), blue circle indicates actor
who is member of both municipal finance epistemic community E as well as municipal finance epistemic community F (N=1), teal circles indicate actors who are members in both municipal finance
epistemic community F as well as municipal finance epistemic community G (N=9), black circles indicate actors who only members in municipal finance epistemic community E (N=3), yellow circles
indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic community F (N=11) and light pink circles indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic community G
(N=5).
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Composition of Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities
Evidence from the existing epistemic communities literature suggests that ECs
typically consist of at least one group of scientific or technical experts with knowledge of and
expertise in a particular issue area, and of at least one group of relevant appointed and/or
elected government officials who are responsible for formulating and implementing policy
within that issue area (Haas, 1992a; Kutchesfahani, 2010). Importantly, in many cases the

membership of these constituent groups overlap, as experts take positions in government,
while elected and appointed government officials move from their jobs to work for
nonprofit organizations or private firms (Kutchesfahani, 2010). Given that consolidating
formal bureaucratic and political power within itself is considered critical for an EC’s policy
success (Haas, 1992a), this pattern is likely to be observed in the municipal finance ECs also.

Therefore, I propose the following set of hypotheses regarding the composition of the
municipal finance epistemic communities that were identified in the previous section.
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): Any municipal finance epistemic community will include at
least one government bureaucrat who is a specialist in municipal finance.
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Any municipal finance epistemic community will include
one or more municipal finance specialists drawn from professional bodies,
nonprofit organizations and/or private firms.
Hypothesis 2c (H2c): Occasionally, municipal finance epistemic communities will
include one or more elected officials who are specialists in municipal finance.

The Issue Area of Local Government Revenues
MFEC_INCOMETAX consists of 21 members. Of these 21 members, 12 are state
and local government actors. Among these 12 actors, three are elected officials and nine
are bureaucrats. Besides these governmental actors, MFEC_INCOMETAX also includes
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a group of nine actors from nongovernmental sectors--six actors from nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), an academic who specializes in municipal finance issues, an
attorney who previously worked as a government official and is a municipal governance
expert, and an official from a private firm.12 MFEC_INCOMETAX is the second smallest
of the seven municipal finance epistemic communities; the smallest being
MFEC_RETIREES.
MFEC_ALLREVENUES consists of 31 members. Like MFEC_INCOMETAX,
this MFEC also has two groups of actors, 22 actors representing the governmental sector
and nine actors representing the nongovernmental sector. Seventeen actors in MFEC_
ALLREVENUES are also members of MFEC_ INCOMETAX. Except for a city council
member, a city chief fiscal analyst, and two officials from NGOs, all other participants in
MFEC_ INCOMETAX are also participants in MFEC_ ALLREVENUES. This
overlapping membership of EC actors is not limited to a single issue area. Instead, it
spans the three issue areas of LGR, EME and PSP. More detailed discussion of the
complex web of overlapping memberships of EC actors across the seven MFECs
embedded in the three issue areas is provided toward the end of this section.
Of the 18 bureaucrats in MFEC_ ALLREVENUES, 10 are city managers. In
contrast, MFEC_ INCOMETAX includes only two city managers. Further, unlike
MFEC_ INCOMETAX, this MFEC includes township level actors such as a township
supervisor and township manager. The absence of township level actors from MFEC_
INCOMETAX can be attributed to the nature of the episteme promoted by this MFEC-adopting or increasing local income taxes. As mentioned earlier, in Michigan, only cities
can levy income taxes and hence the disinterest of township level actors in participating
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in this EC. Table 4.4 is a frequency table on the composition of MFEC_ INCOMETAX
and MFEC_ALLREVENUES.

Table 4.4: Composition of MFECs INCOMETAX and ALLREVENUES
INCOMETAX

ALLREVENUES

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

3 (14.3%)

4 (12.9%)

Michigan State House Representative

1

1*

City Mayor

1

1*

City Council Member

1

1

Township Supervisor

----------

1

9 (42.9 %)

18 (58.1%)

County Deputy Executive

1

1*

County Administrator

1

1*

County Chief Financial Officer

1

1*

County Finance Director

1

1*

City Manager

2

2* + 8

Deputy City Manager

1

1*

Deputy City Administrator

1

1*

City Chief Fiscal Analyst

1

----------

City Financial Director

----------

1

Township Manager

----------

1

6 (28.6%)

6 (19.4%)

Official from NGO Supporting Local Govt. Leadership in MI

2

2*

Official from a Regional Planning Partnership in Southeast MI

1

1* + 1

Official from a Community Conference in MI

1

----------

Official from an Association of MI Local Governments

1

----------

----------

1

1

1*

1 (4.8%)

1 (3.2%)

1

1*

Academics w/Municipal Expertise

1 (4.8%)

1* (3.2%)

Attorneys w/Municipal Expertise

1 (4.8%)

1* (3.2%)

21 (100%)

31 (100%)

Elected Officials

Bureaucrats

Officials from NGOs

Official from an Association of MI Municipal Governments
Official from an Association of MI Bureaucrats
Officials from Private Firms
Official from an Accounting and Business Advisory Firm

Total
Note: * Indicates same actor as in MFEC_INCOMETAX.
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The Issue Area of Expenditures on Municipal Employees
MFEC_EMPLOYEES consists of 22 members which includes 15 governmental
and 7 nongovernmental actors. Nearly two-thirds of the members of MFEC_
EMPLOYEES are governmental bureaucrats, and nearly two-thirds of these are city
managers. Among the nongovernmental actors, three actors deserve special mention. The
academic who specializes in municipal finance, the attorney who previously worked as a
government official, and the official from a private firm, earlier identified in MFECs
INCOMETAX and ALLREVENUES also participate in MFEC_EMPLOYEES and
MFEC_RETIREES.
MFEC_ RETIREES is the smallest of all MFECs, consisting only 13 members.
The small size of MFEC_ RETIREES does not come as a surprise given the sensitive
nature of the reform strategies promoted by this group. These strategies include reducing
the benefits paid to municipal retirees and restricting the ability of municipal employees
to collectively bargain with compensation and work rules. Also, unlike the other six
MFECs, this MFEC does not include any elected officials. Despite this difference in its
composition and its smaller size, MFEC_ RETIREES is not greatly different from the
other MFECs, as it is made up of both governmental (eight) and nongovernmental (five)
actors. Among its 13 actors, MFEC_ RETIREES shares nine actors with MFEC_
EMPLOYEES. Further, akin to MFEC_ EMPLOYEES, a substantial portion of
MFEC_RETIREES is made up of governmental bureaucrats (61.5%) and half of these
bureaucrats are city managers. However, participation of officials from NGOs is very low
in this MFEC--only one actor.
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Relative to the other two issue areas, this issue area is technically more complex
due to its legal component. Hence, the expectation is that ECs in this area will include
more number of actors from specialized bodies such as law firms. However, together,
MFECs EMPLOYEES and RETIREES include only two attorneys.13 Table 4.5 is a
frequency table on the composition of MFEC_EMPLOYEES and MFEC_RETIREES.

Table 4.5: Composition of MFECs EMPLOYEES and RETIREES
EMPLOYEES

RETIREES

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

1 (4.5%)

0 (0%)

1

----------

14 (63.6%)

8 (61.5%)

----------

1

County Administrator

1

1

Assistant County Administrator

1

----------

County Finance Director

1

1*

City Manager

9

4*

Deputy City Manager

1

----------

City Chief Fiscal Analyst

1

----------

----------

1

4 (18.2%)

1 (7.7%)

Official from NGO Supporting Local Govt. Leadership in MI

1

1*

Official from a Regional Planning Partnership in Southeast MI

1

----------

Official from an Association of MI Local Governments

1

----------

Official from an Association of MI Municipal Governments

1

----------

1 (4.5%)

1 (7.7%)

1

1*

Academics w/Municipal Expertise

1 (4.5%)

1* (7.7%)

Attorneys w/Municipal Expertise

1 (4.5%)

1* + 1 (15.4%)

22 (100%)

13 (100%)

Elected Officials
City Council Member
Bureaucrats
County Deputy Executive

Township Manager
Officials from NGOs

Officials from Private Firms
Official from an Accounting and Business Advisory Firm

Total
Note: * Indicates same actor as in MFEC_EMPLOYEES.
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The Issue Area of Public Service Provision
MFEC_CONSOLIDATE consists 22 members--fifteen governmental and seven
nongovernmental

actors.

MFEC_CONSOLIDATE

MFEC_COOPERATE
consisting

of

39

is

actors--29

larger

in

size

governmental

and

than
10

nongovernmental actors. In fact, this is the largest of the seven MFECs. Further, among
the seven MFECs, MFEC_COOPERATE has the largest number of city managers--14 of
them. MFEC_ COOPERATE shares 19 (that is, 65.5%) of its actors with MFEC_
CONSOLIDATE. MFEC_CONTRACT consists of 32 members--23 governmental and
nine nongovernmental actors. It shares 10 of its actors with MFEC_ COOPERATE, and
17 of its actors with both MFEC_ CONSOLIDATE and MFEC_ COOPERATE. This
suggests that in the issue area of public service provision, 17 actors are participants in all
three MFECs. In particular, the academic who specializes in municipal finance, the
attorney who previously worked as a government official, and the official from a private
firm, earlier identified in MFECs INCOMETAX, ALLREVENUES, EMPLOYEES, and
RETIREES, also participate in MFECs CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE and
CONTRACT.
Overall, the issue area of public service provision has more EC actors than the
other two issue areas. This issue area also includes a more diverse range of governmental
actors such as a managing director of a county commission, a county undersheriff, a
township treasurer and a township financial director. In general, in this issue area, there
are more actors from township governments. One obvious reason for this is that service
provision is common to all local governments. Table 4.6 is a frequency table on the
composition of MFECs CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE and CONTRACT.
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Table 4.6: Composition of MFECs CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE and CONTRACT
CONSOLIDATE

COOPERATE

CONTRACT

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

Frequency (%)

2 (9.1%)

4 (10.3%)

4 (12.5%)

1

1*

1***

----------

1

1**

1

1* + 1

1***

----------

----------

1

13 (59.1%)

25 (64.1%)

19 (59.4%)

1

1*

1***

County Administrator

----------

1

1** + 1

Assistant County Administrator

----------

1

1**

Managing Director of a County Commission

----------

1

----------

County Chief Financial Officer

1

1*

1***

County Finance Director

1

1*

1***

----------

1

----------

6

6* + 8

3** + 6*** + 2

Deputy City Manager

----------

1

1**

City Financial Director

1

1* + 1

1***

Township Manager

2

1

----------

Township Financial Director

1

----------

----------

3 (13.6%)

6 (15.4%)

6 (18.8%)

1

1* + 1

1** + 1*** + 1

2

2*

2***

----------

1

1**

----------

1

----------

1 (4.5%)

1 (2.6%)

1 (3.1%)

1

1*

1***

Academics w/Municipal Expertise

1 (4.5%)

1* (2.6%)

1*** (3.1%)

Attorneys w/Municipal Expertise

2 (9.1%)

2* (5.1%)

1*** (3.1%)

22 (100%)

39 (100%)

32 (100%)

Elected Officials
Michigan State House Representative
County Executive
City Council Member
Township Treasurer
Bureaucrats
County Deputy Executive

County Under Sheriff
City Manager

Officials from NGOs
Official from NGO Supporting Local Govt.
Leadership in MI
Official from a Regional Planning Partnership
in Southeast MI
Official from an Association of MI Local
Governments
Official from an Association of MI Municipal
Governments
Officials from Private Firms
Official from an Accounting and Business
Advisory Firm

Total

Note: * Indicates same actor as in MFEC_CONSOLIDATE, **indicates same actor as in MFEC_COOPERATE *** indicates same
actor as in MFEC_CONSOLIDATE and COOPERATE.
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All of the seven MFECs consist of two groups of actors, a set of governmental
actors and a set of nongovernmental actors. Among governmental actors there are both
elected officials as well as bureaucrats serving at the state as well as the local level. Only
in the case of MFEC_RETIREES, elected officials do not participate. The
nongovernmental actors come from professional bodies (such as universities), nonprofit
organizations and private firms. This pattern is observed across all seven MFECs. These
findings confirm H2a which proposes that any municipal finance epistemic community
will include at least one government bureaucrat who is a specialist in municipal finance.
They also confirm H2b which proposes that any municipal finance epistemic community
will include one or more municipal finance specialists drawn from professional bodies,
nonprofit organizations and/or private firms. The data also provide support for H2c which
proposes that occasionally, municipal finance epistemic communities will include one or
more elected officials who are specialists in municipal finance. Typically the proportion
of elected officials participating in MFECs ranges from 4.5 to 14.3 percent.

A Complex Web of Overlapping Memberships in MFECs
ECs are complex, integrated structures that contain several networks and
subnetworks which involve overlapping membership of experts from the public,
nonprofit and private sectors. The complex memberships of the various municipal finance
ECs serve as a solid base and perpetuate a diversified series of networks that establish
familiarity and loyalty among participants (Yu, 2008). Importantly, this familiarity and
loyalty among individual actors increases the credibility of the ECs to which these actors
belong. Thus, the immediate interactions facilitate extended relations, all of which
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collectively provide the foundation for a habit of dialogue and on-going consultation (Yu,
2008). Also, through these kinds of repeated and overlapping interactions, community
members develop strong links with the decision makers who are part of these ECs.
Through these elected officials, EC members reach out to other decision makers,
eventually increasing their overall access to and influence on decision makers.
Table 4.7 displays the trend of complex interconnected membership in the seven
MFECs. That is, there are 24 different combinations into which EC actors can be grouped
based on their membership in multiple MFECs. While the smallest of these combinations
consists of two MFECs, the largest consists of all the seven MFECs. While 42 of the 58
EC actors are members in two or more MFECs, 16 of them are members of only a single
MFEC. Table 4.8 presents details on actors who participate in a single MFEC.
Table 4.7 indicates that five actors participate in all seven MFECs. These actors
are the academic who specializes in municipal finance, the attorney who previously
worked as a government official, the official from a private firm, a county finance
director and a city manager. Among these actors, many interviewees made special
mention of the academic and the actor’s expertise in various issue areas of municipal
finance. Similarly, special mention was made concerning the expertise of a county deputy
executive. This county deputy executive, along with a city manager, participates in six of
the seven MFECs. Likewise, a senior executive from an NGO supporting local
government leadership in MI and a senior executive from a regional partnership in
Southeast Michigan were referred to as experienced municipal finance experts by a
number of interviewees. These two actors are members of five of the seven MFECs.
Also, there are a number of city managers, identified as experts of municipal finance
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issues, serving as members in two or more MFECs. The social network analysis formally
confirms the expertise of these actors as well as the observations of the interviewees.

Table 4.7: Memberships in Multiple MFECs
MFEC
Cluster
No.

MFECs
in the Cluster

No. of MFECs
in the Cluster

No. of Actors
in the Cluster

7

5

6

1

6

1

5

1

5

1

5

5

5

1

5

3

9

INCOMETAX, ALLREVENUES, EMPLOYEES, RETIREES,
CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE, CONTRACT
INCOMETAX, ALLREVENUES, RETIREES, CONSOLIDATE,
COOPERATE, CONTRACT
ALLREVENUES, EMPLOYEES, RETIREES, CONSOLIDATE,
COOPERATE, CONTRACT
INCOMETAX, ALLREVENUES, EMPLOYEES, RETIREES,
CONTRACT
INCOMETAX, ALLREVENUES, EMPLOYEES, COOPERATE,
CONTRACT
INCOMETAX, ALLREVENUES, CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE,
CONTRACT
ALLREVENUES, EMPLOYEES, RETIREES, COOPERATE,
CONTRACT
ALLREVENUES, EMPLOYEES, CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE,
CONTRACT
INCOMETAX, EMPLOYEES, COOPERATE, CONTRACT

4

1

10
11

ALLREVENUES, CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE, CONTRACT
INCOMETAX, ALLREVENUES, RETIREES

4
3

2
1

12
13

ALLREVENUES, EMPLOYEES, COOPERATE
EMPLOYEES, COOPERATE, CONTRACT

3
3

2
3

14
15

RETIREES, CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE
CONSOLIDATE, COOPERATE, CONTRACT

3
3

1
1

16
17

INCOMETAX, ALLREVENUES
INCOMETAX, EMPLOYEES

2
2

3
1

18
19

INCOMETAX, COOPERATE
ALLREVENUES, EMPLOYEES

2
2

1
1

20
21

ALLREVENUES, CONSOLIDATE
ALLREVENUES, CONTRACT

2
2

1
1

22
23

EMPLOYEES, RETIREES
EMPLOYEES, COOPERATE

2
2

1
1

24

COOPERATE, CONTRACT

2

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

3
Total

42
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Table 4.8: Membership in a Single MFEC
MFEC No.
1
2

Name of MFEC
INCOMETAX
ALLREVENUES

No. of Actors in MFEC
1
2

3
4

RETIREES
CONSOLIDATE

1
2

5
6

COOPERATE
CONTRACT

7
3
16

Total

As pointed out earlier, though I identify the existence of epistemic
community/communities in Michigan within the domain of municipal finance, the
limitations of the data do not allow me to determine the exact size and number of these
ECs. However, my analysis of the composition of the seven ECs reveals a complex,
overlapping web of membership among the actors involved in these ECs. This complex
web suggests that perhaps there are not seven different ECs but fewer than that--maybe
just four, or three or even two. Additional data collection that is focused only on the EC
actors identified from my analysis, is one possible route to uncover the exact number of
municipal finance ECs present in Michigan. While this kind of analysis is a potential part
of my future research efforts, at present, I can verify my claim that there are multiple
groups of municipal finance experts with overlapping memberships that span the three
issue areas of LGR, EME and PSP.
This overlapping membership of these EC actors should be reflected in the data
gathered on communication ties. A pooled network of the 58 actors spanning the three
issue areas should be connected. To investigate this, I aggregated all incoming and
outgoing ties of the 58 EC actors into one network; even if an actor connected twice or
thrice with another actor, it was indicated only as a single tie.14 I then mapped the
network revealing the connection patterns of the 58 actors across the three issue areas.

Figure 4.21: Communication Network of Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities A, B, C, D, E, F and G
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Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.354. N=58.

155
This network, shown in Figure 4.21, is sufficiently connected with a main
component consisting of 48 actors (nearly 83%), a minor component consisting of 6
actors (10.3%), 4 isolates and two actors with a single connection. Thus, the data
generally confirm the overlapping membership of actors in the seven MFECs. Though
identifying the number of clusters within this network will to some extent help
understand whether there are seven different subnetworks (MFECs) operating within this
network, I have avoided doing this. The reason being that I have neither fully identified
all epistemic communities nor all members of these communities. Therefore, I withhold
drawing conclusions based on insufficient data.

Concluding Remarks
Few, if any, policy makers in Michigan are familiar with the concept of epistemic
communities. But a number of elected and appointed officials in the state are certainly
associated with these entities--either through their direct membership in them or through
communication and information-sharing ties with those who participate in these entities.
Identification of the various ECs embedded in the communication networks on LGR,
EME and PSP reveals the importance of these entities in information exchange on
questions of municipal finance. This study is just a cross-sectional analysis. Perhaps a
longitudinal analysis would more clearly show the significance of the municipal finance
ECs in general, and the “popular” EC actors in particular. Furthermore, the full
communication networks were not mapped. If these are mapped, more elaborate details
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may emerge on the knowledge transaction and brokerage roles that EC actors are playing
in Michigan in efforts to address municipal finance problems.
The analysis on the composition of MFECs has been particularly useful in
specifying the complex, overlapping structure of ECs within each issue area and across
the entire domain of municipal finance. This maze of interconnections was explored in
detail because it is a critical feature of ECs. That is, the ability to consolidate formal
political and bureaucratic power within an EC is a key factor that determines the level of
policy influence an EC possesses and subsequently its capability in promoting and
institutionalizing its epistemic ideas (Haas, 1992a). Whether it is Haas’ (1992b)
“ecological EC” or Van Daele’s “prewar labor ECs” or Mani’s “innovation systems EC,”
memberships of EC actors in multiple, overlapping networks have played critical roles in
building trust, reciprocity and credibility among policy actors within epistemic
communities. These elements have in turn helped these knowledge experts reach out to
other policy actors outside these communities and build social capital and political
legitimacy. Using social capital and political legitimacy, EC actors have successfully
created policy consensus on difficult and wicked problems and have institutionalized
various professional best practices. This same dynamic is likely the fundamental basis of
the operation strategies of municipal finance ECs.
The multiplexity of the relations of MFEC actors is important not just for building
and sustaining social capital and political legitimacy, but also for developing
interconnected perspectives and assuming a long term focus on “wicked” public
problems. As Haas (1992a) points out, several contentious public problems are so that
without sufficient expertise it is not even possible to fully understand the nature of these
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problems. MFEC members participating in multiple ECs in the issue areas of LGR, EME
and PSP have the unique advantage of seeing the bigger picture. They may more fully
understand how policy actions taken in the issue area of LGR may impact other
interconnected issue areas such as EME and PSP. Using their heightened awareness,
along with their professional credibility and political and bureaucratic influences, these
actors could initiate and sustain meaningful dialogues to achieve policy consensus on
conflicting municipal finance policy choices.
In sum, the data discussed in this chapter have empirically established the
existence of deliberative, analytical resources in the form of Michigan’s municipal
finance epistemic communities. It would be useful to formally introduce these resources
to policy makers and also explore the extent to which they are aware of the existence of
these resources and the extent to which they are willing to utilize them in policy making
processes.
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Notes
1

Social network analysis is an analytical technique that enables researchers to represent relational data and
explore the nature and properties of those relations. The actors whose relations are measured are
represented as points or nodes (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). The relations between these actors, for
example, “communication with,” are represented as lines connecting these actors or nodes (Monge and
Contractor, 2002). These lines are typically referred to as lines, links, ties, or arcs (Wasserman and Faust,
1994). When relations between actors are studied one at a time, they are called uniplex relations. When two
or more relations are studied together, they are called multiplex relations.
2

3
4

An EFM can :
• hire staff and additional staff;
• direct existing staff;
• determine staffing levels or implement layoffs;
• renegotiate labor contracts;
• enter into new contracts with other local governments for service provision;
• issue, approve or disapprove vendor contracts;
• amend, revise, approve, or disapprove the budget of a unit of local government;
• consolidate departments of a unit of local government, or transfer functions from one department to
another department;
• appoint, supervise, and, at his or her discretion, remove heads of departments other than elected
officials of the unit of local government;
• review payrolls or other claims against the unit of local government before payment;
• sell or otherwise use the assets of a unit of local government to meet past or current obligations;
• recommend consolidation of the unit of local government with one or more municipal governments;
and
• authorize the unit of local government to proceed under federal bankruptcy provisions (PA 4, 2011).
PA 4 of 2011 replaced and repealed the previous law on financial emergencies--PA 72 of 1990.
Credit is given for tax paid to another state.

5

Skidmore and Scorsone (2009) point out that there is usually a lag between the time that property values
change and the time those changes are reflected in assessments and incorporated into the tax rolls.
6

The median score is a location. Therefore, though the median score was 8 in each of the three issue areas,
many scores above the median were also 8.
7

The generation of each subnetwork involves the creation of a new adjacency matrix whose size is
proportional to the number of actors in the subset. For example, for the network shown in Figure 4.3, a
100*100 adjacency matrix was created. This process will help in excluding irrelevant actors, the ties that
stem from these actors, and the ties directed toward these actors. This pattern continues throughout the rest
of the analysis.
8

It has to be noted here that the sampling was intentional/purposive and purposive sampling is typical in
studies of epistemic communities (see for example, Dotterweich, 2009). That is, starting with the
identification of the initial sample of 50 individuals, my focus was on municipal finance experts. Following
this, the snowball sampling was also targeted to capture experts of municipal finance. Accordingly, the
interview questions were so worded to identify the two people most frequently contacted by an individual
for discussion and information sharing on a particular issue of municipal finance. Therefore, there is a large
group of actors with epistemic characteristics. However, the mere possession of epistemic characteristics is
not sufficient qualification to be an EC member.
9

Separate attribute files were created to show these differences through color scheme in the network.
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10

From this point onward, I use the terms MFEC and EC interchangeably to refer to the seven
communities.
11

With regard to this issue area, some actors preferred not to identify their contacts. This hesitation was
particularly noticeable among attorneys. In particular, two key labor attorneys were identified as experts on
municipal employment issues by a number of my respondents. However, these two attorneys did not
consent to the interview. They said it violated their professional ethics to divulge the names of their
contacts. They were also equally unwilling to discuss their policy preferences on issues of municipal
finance. However, through other respondents and secondary sources, I was able to assess that these two
attorneys were EC actors. I have indicated the position of these actors in the communication network on
EME through labels in Figure 4.13.
12

I refer to nongovernmental organizations as well as nonprofit organizations as NGOs.

13

Earlier, I noted that two labor attorneys declined to be interviewed. Through secondary sources, these
attorneys were identified as EC actors but were not included in the analysis. Besides these attorneys, there
may be other attorneys who are also EC members but remain unknown.
14

As the concern here is about the connectivity and not the strength of connectivity of these actors, binary
ties are enough for analysis.
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CHAPTER V
Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities:
Patterns of Interaction, Motivations for Interaction and Policy Performance
Epistemic communities are complex, integrated network structures and social
network theory is perhaps the best avenue to demonstrate the nature, the causes, and the
effects of the interaction and exchange that take place among network participants.
However, this methodology has never been applied by scholars to understand the
functional performance of epistemic communities. For the first time, in this dissertation, I
use this methodology to explore the interaction patterns of epistemic community
members and to identify factors that motivate them to interact with each other.
Importantly, I use sophisticated statistical models to examine how the actors within these
knowledge communities use their roles and positions to transact knowledge.
Structural characteristics of networks are viewed by analysts as the outcomes of
certain social processes (Robins, Pattison, Kalish, and Lusher, 2007). That is, certain
behavioral characteristics of network participants lead actors to structure networks in
specific and predictable ways. For instance, when participants seek to have access to
credible information, they reach out to popular actors in the network, who have, by virtue
of their credibility, already attracted many other network participants to form ties with
them. This behavior of participants produces a network configuration called “in-stars.”
Similarly, when participants tend to reciprocate relationship choices of other network
participants, the result is the formation of “reciprocal ties.” Elaborate explanations of
these configurations along with their graphic representations are provided in the next
section. Through statistical network models, analysts can predict and test the occurrence
of certain network structures to explain the dynamics of the workings within a network.
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With this chapter, I am employing the same techniques, to understand the dynamics of
the knowledge producing activities of EC actors. This approach to understanding the
functional performance of ECs by analyzing network structural characteristics is a
significant step in shifting the EC literature from inductive, qualitative analysis to
deductive, quantitative analysis. Following this analysis, I explore the various avenues
that EC actors use to develop liaisons with politicians in order to influence public policy
making and to thereby promote professionally best practices within the domain of their
expertise.
As discussed in chapter four, I can conclude that among the 100 persons
interviewed, 58 actors are epistemic community members. These actors belong to one or
more of the seven communities identified. Yet, whether these seven communities are part
of a single epistemic community or more than one epistemic community can be
established only with additional data collection that focuses on these 58 actors. As of
now, I refer to these seven subnetworks, which are a part of the municipal finance
epistemic communities that exist in Michigan, as subsets of these MFECs. For ease of
interpretation, I refer to them simply as epistemic communities or municipal finance
epistemic communities. I also retain the names given to them in chapter four. In all the
analyses conducted in this chapter, I analyze these 58 actors and the communication
linkages that exist across them in the three different issue areas (local government
revenues, expenditures on municipal employees and public service provision) as a single
communication network. Only at the end of this chapter, where I examine the ties that
epistemic community members develop with elected officials, do I approach each of the
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seven subsets as individual communities embedded within the full communication
network in the particular issue area.
In this chapter, I propose and test three different sets of hypotheses. The first set is
focused on the anticipated interaction patterns among members of the municipal finance
ECs. Based on the characteristics and functional performance of EC actors, I propose that
certain network structures are more/less likely to be present in the communication
network consisting of the 58 EC actors. I then proceed to test these proposed hypotheses
using exponential random graph models (ERGM). In the context of predicting interaction
patterns among EC actors, I also propose a hypothesis that is focused on the prevalence
of strong and weak ties among these actors. This hypothesis is based on Granovetter’s
(1973) insights on the strengths of ties and their implications for information flow within
interorganizational networks. I test my hypothesis using network mapping and
descriptive statistics.
The second set of hypotheses is focused on the factors that motivate EC actors to
develop communication linkages with each other to discuss and share information on
issues of municipal finance. I use quadratic assignment procedures (QAP) analysis to test
this second set of hypotheses. The third set of hypotheses is focused on the policy
performance of EC actors. The policy agenda of the seven EC subsets have already been
identified and discussed in chapter four during the process of identifying the common
policy agenda of actors with epistemic characteristics. In this chapter, I only propose
hypotheses about the preferred policy promotion forums of EC actors and about the ties
that these actors develop with elected state and local government officials in Michigan. I
test these hypotheses using descriptive analysis and network mapping. Each set of
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hypotheses, along with its tests and the findings of these tests, are presented in separate
sections in this chapter. Finally, in the concluding section of this chapter, I discuss the
implications of my findings.

Interaction Patterns of the Members of
Michigan’s Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities
In this section, I analyze the interaction patterns of EC actors. This analysis is
two-fold. First, I employ the ERG model to describe parsimoniously the local selection
forces that shape the global structure of the observed communication network of the 58
EC actors. The observed network is understood as one particular pattern of ties out of a
large set of possible patterns that can emerge given the same number of actors and the
same number of relationships as the observed network. The ERGM analysis reveals there
are significantly more, or less, of the structural characteristics of interest in the observed
network than expected by chance. For instance, do actors in the observed network of EC
members tend to reciprocate communication relationship choices? Based on the
qualitative case study literature on ECs, I propose they do. ERGM provides a means to
empirically test this proposition.
Second, using network mapping and descriptive statistics, I analyze the strength
of the ties among EC actors. Social networks are essentially composed of ties that differ
in their interpersonal strength. Strong ties are more efficient contributors of information,
especially within organizational subsystems (Friedkin, 1982). But since Granovetter’s
(1973) seminal paper on the strength of weak ties, network scholars have started to
acknowledge the value of weak ties, in particular, their efficiency in allowing information
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to flow between one organizational subsystem and another. Findings in chapter four
(Figure 4.21) clearly indicated that the seven communities are overlapping subsets of
municipal finance experts. In this chapter, I examine whether the communication
linkages between EC actors are weak ties that are unreciprocated and limited to a single
issue of municipal finance, or are they strong ties that are reciprocated ties and/or ties that
span more than a single issue of municipal finance. Given EC actors are members of
overlapping knowledge communities, the expectation is that strong ties will be more
prevalent than weak ties.

Exponential Random Graph Models
I am using the PNet for single networks program to estimate the probability that
the network structures included in the model appear at a greater frequency than would be
explained by a comparable random graph with the same number of actors (nodes) and
relationships (links/ties). Importantly, the model, controlling for other network effects
specified in the model and for potential random relationships within the network,
estimates the probability that a given structure occurs at a greater or lesser frequency than
would be explained by comparable random graphs. In the ERGM analysis, the
hypothesized network structures are the independent variables and the observed
communication network of EC actors is the dependent variable/matrix. Table 5.1 presents
descriptive graph statistics of the communication network of all EC actors.
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Table 5.1: General and Hypothesized Network Structures
Graphic
Representation
of Network Configuration

Network
Configuration

Vertices/Nodes

Isolates

Arcs

Reciprocal Ties
(Reciprocity)

B

Hypothesized
Relations

58

N/A

4

N/A

68

N/A

9

More
Likely

A

+

In-2-stars
(Popularity)

Occurrences
of Configuration in
Observed Network

X

Out-2-stars
(Activity-Expansiveness)

-

52

Less
Likely

36

Less
Likely

D

2-paths
(Information-Bridging)

B

C

55

Less
Likely

6

More
Likely

A
C

Transitive Triads
(Transitivity-Bonding)

+
B

A

Note: Values indicate occurrences of the particular configuration in the observed network. General network structures are fundamental
features of networks and so I do not propose specific hypotheses on these structures.
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In Table 5.1, general and hypothesized network structures are graphically
represented. The table also provides information on the number of times a particular
network configuration occurs in the observed network and about the proposed hypothesis
on each of these configurations. More likely indicates that a given configuration is
expected to occur at a greater frequency in the observed communication network of EC
actors than in comparable random graphs with the same number of actors and
relationships as the dependent network. Less likely indicates that a given configuration is
expected to occur at a lower frequency in the observed communication network of EC
actors than in comparable random graphs.

Network Structure Hypotheses
Reciprocity
The reciprocity characteristic is measured by “reciprocal ties.” In this network,
reciprocity indicates actor A is reaching out to actor B to discuss and seek information on
issue(s) of municipal finance and actor B is reciprocating the tie by reaching out to actor
A to discuss and seek information on issue(s) of municipal finance. Reciprocal ties foster
a cohesive relationship between the actors involved in such ties, eventually leading to the
development of social capital and mutual solidarity (Coleman, 1988).
Reciprocity and group solidarity are fundamental for the functioning of epistemic
communities. We can see this in Van Daele’s (2005) “prewar labor epistemic
communities.” The Commission on International Labour Legislation, consisting of
epistemic community actors, was invited to advise official government leaders and
diplomats on specific labor and industrial development questions. Importantly, a majority
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of the commission members knew each other from various prewar networks in politics,
science, and labour administration before they came together in Paris in 1919 (Van
Daele, 2005). The reciprocity and repeated interactions in these overlapping networks
facilitated group solidarity and allowed members of the commission to institutionalize
their worldviews by successfully establishing the international labour organization as
early as in 1919. Based on patterns observed in Van Daele’s “prewar labor ECs” and in
other epistemic communities (Adler and Haas, 1992) it is expected that the ties that
members of municipal finance epistemic communities develop among them will be
reciprocal. So I propose that,
Hypothesis 3a (H3a): The discussion and information-sharing ties observed in the
communication network of municipal finance epistemic communities are more
likely to be reciprocal than ties observed in comparable random graphs.

Popularity
The popularity characteristic is measured by “in-stars.” In this network, a
popularity pattern of communication relationships occurs when many municipal finance
EC actors seek to discuss and share information with a particular EC actor. An actor is a
popular (or central) actor when many other actors create links to this particular actor.
These ties are depicted in Table 5.1 by in-stars coming toward this actor. The popularity
concept illustrates reputational differences among EC actors, and that actors will choose
to develop communication ties with those actors who have managed to attract more incoming communication ties than others in the network (Shrestha, 2008; Snijders, Bunt
and Steglich, 2010).
Within epistemic communities, there is a common knowledge base; there are
common norms of validity; and a common policy agenda. Peter Haas (1992a) (whose
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model is used in this study) does not mention anything about whether hierarchies may or
may not exist within epistemic communities. Also, existing EC literature in the IR field,
in general, does not discuss the existence of hierarchical systems of authority or
credibility within these communities. However, Amy Verdun (1997), based on Ernst
Haas’ (1980) insights, does not rule out the possibility of the existence of leadership in an
epistemic community. As Amy Verdun suggests, it is not possible that an epistemic
community is made of completely equal actors; some of them are likely to be more
informed and influential than others, and a hierarchy could exist. However, the existence
of a hierarchy within an EC is only a possibility, not a certainty. Therefore, though
reputational differences may exist among EC actors, these differences may not be a
regular feature and the popularity pattern may not occur frequently. In the
communication network of EC actors, linkages across three issue areas of municipal
finance are examined. Here the popularity concept captures actors who are popular and
central in all three issue areas. My expectation is that there may be only a few popular
actors spanning all the issue areas. Therefore, I propose that,
Hypothesis 3b (H3b): The discussion and information-sharing ties observed in the
communication network of municipal finance epistemic communities are less
likely to produce a popularity pattern of communication relationships than ties
observed in comparable random graphs.

Activity--Expansiveness
The network activity (expansiveness) characteristic is measured by “out-stars.” In
this network, expansiveness is expected to occur when actors choose multiple partners to
communicate on the three issues of municipal finance. This activity appears in the
network as out-stars configuration or what is commonly referred to as ego-centered
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network structures (Feiock, Lee, Park and Lee, 2010; Lusher, Robins, Pattinson, and
Lomi, 2012).
I believe that members of municipal finance ECs are less likely to form egocentered network structures. In the communication network of EC actors, participants can
identify up to six different individuals as their contacts--two in each issue area. Given the
existence of many actors who are experts in more than a single issue area of municipal
finance, EC members may not be interested in expending additional time and resources in
reaching out to multiple actors. Also, in the case of epistemic communities, norms,
beliefs and policy agenda are shared among all actors (Haas, 1992a). So there is relatively
less benefit in having multiple partners. Additionally, in MFECs, credible commitments
of members are already established via academic prestige and professional background.
So, there is likely to be fewer worries within these communities as to the authenticity of
the information shared. Hence I propose that,
Hypothesis 3c (H3c): The discussion and information-sharing ties observed in the
communication network of municipal finance epistemic communities are less
likely to produce ego-centered network structures than ties observed in
comparable random graphs.

Information Bridging
Structural bridges are essentially actors who provide access to parts of the
network that are unreachable by other means (Friedkin, 1982). The information bridging
characteristic is measured by “2-paths” (Feiock, Lee, Park and Lee, 2010). In this
network, the 2-paths configurations are expected to occur when actors rely on
information brokers to exchange information with actors who are not directly linked to
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them (Andrew and Carr, Forthcoming). In other words, actors are expected to form weak
ties (Friedkin, 1982).
Weak ties are unreciprocated ties that do not occur on a regular basis
(Granovetter, 1973). In contrast, strong ties are ties that involve reciprocal relationships;
also, these ties occur frequently, for example, once a week (Friedkin, 1982). Bridging
relationships are essentially weak ties (Lubell, Scholz, Berardo and Robins, 2011). Given
the general expectation for reciprocal relationships among members of ECs (Van Daele,
2005; Adler, 1992), and the complex overlapping web of Michigan’s MFECs, strong
rather than weak ties are expected to be more prevalent in the observed communication
network. Consequently, the occurrence of 2-path structures is also expected to be less
frequent. So I propose that,
Hypothesis 3d (H3d): The discussion and information-sharing ties observed in the
communication network of municipal finance epistemic communities are less
likely to produce 2-paths structures than ties observed in comparable random
graphs.

Transitivity--Bonding
The transitivity/bonding characteristic is measured by “transitive triplets.” The
transitive triad structures indicate parts of the network where actors have formed tightlyclustered linkages with other actors (Feiock, Lee, Park and Lee, 2010). In this network,
transitive triads are expected to occur when actors choose to forge tightly clustered
communication relationships that span beyond simple reciprocal relationships. An
example of this principle is to become friends with people whose friends are already
yours (Shrestha, 2008).

171
Kendra and Wachtendorf (2004) suggest that when actors feel a strong sense of
obligations and duties, they are more likely to engage in bonding activities that support
these values. Members of epistemic communities typically have a commitment to uphold
professional best practices (Irvine et al., 2011) and bonding activities are particularly
suitable for furthering their objective. Further, bonding activities result in closeness,
reciprocity, mutual trust and stability by transforming short-term interactions into
repeated games (Leonard, 2004; Berardo and Scholz, 2010; Andrew and Carr,
Forthcoming), which is the essence of EC functionality (Adler and Haas, 1992).
Therefore, transitivity, a direct extension of reciprocity (Lee, 2011), is expected to be the
preferred norm of EC members and I propose that,
Hypothesis 3e (H3e): The discussion and information-sharing ties observed in the
communication network of municipal finance epistemic communities are more
likely to be transitive than ties observed in comparable random graphs.

Findings
The estimated parameters in Table 5.2 provide relatively straightforward
information about the presence of the hypothesized structural effects in the observed
network data. Statistically significant positive parameters indicate that more configurations
of that type are observed in the network than expected by chance, while controlling for
other network effects specified in the model and the presence of potential random
relationships in the network (Robins, Pattison, and Wang, 2009). Significant negative
parameters indicate that fewer configurations of that type are observed in the network than
expected by chance, given the relative dependence of all specified network relationships
and the presence of potential random relations (Robins, Pattison, and Wang, 2009).
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Positive and statistically significant coefficients for reciprocity and transitivity
confirm the predicted hypotheses 3a and 3e and establish that EC actors choose to create
reciprocal ties and tightly-clustered network structures while discussing and sharing
information on multiple issues of municipal finance. The negative and statistically
significant coefficients for popularity, activity and bridging are consistent with my
predictions, thereby confirming hypotheses 3b, 3c and 3d. These findings indicate that
these EC actors do not rely on popular or bridging actors, nor do they seek to expand their
network links by reaching out to multiple partners in order to obtain information on issues
of municipal finance.

Table 5.2: Interaction Patterns of Members of Municipal Finance ECs
Parameter (Std Error)

t-statistic

Reciprocity (Reciprocal Ties)

1.656 (0.426)

0.02*

Popularity (In-2-stars)

-0.323 (0.142)

-0.00*

Activity (Out-2-stars)

-1.134 (0.223)

-0.01*

Bridging (2-paths)

-1.153 (0.124)

-0.05*

Bonding (Transitive Triads)

1.324 (0.336)

0.07*

Network Structure Effects

Note: Coefficients from PNet for Single Networks ERGM analysis of directed network matrix. All statistics converged
with t-statistic <0.1 with minimum of 1000 iteration. * p< 0.05.

The Strength of Ties: Strong versus Weak Links
In the previous section, the patterns of the ties among EC actors were analyzed.
Besides the ties themselves, the strength of these ties also matter for understanding the
strength and quality of relationships within a network. By differentiating between strong
and weak ties, Granovetter (1973) described how the diversity, homogeneity and
heterogeneity of these ties affect access to resources, opportunities and privileged
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information. According to Granovetter, “the strength of a tie is a (probably linear)
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (1973: 1361). In
network studies, scholars measure tie strength based on some or all of the elements
specified by Granovetter (Friedkin, 1982). Typically, frequency of contact is used to
measure the interpersonal strength of ties (Marsden and Campbell, 1984).
Consistent with Granovetter’s definition and the way in which other network
scholars have measured tie strength, in this study also, frequency of contact is used to
measure tie strength. Any asymmetric tie, i.e., unreciprocated tie, which spans only a
single issue area, is treated as a weak tie. In contrast, ties that are reciprocated are treated
as strong ties. These reciprocated ties may be limited to a single issue area or span more
than one issue area; regardless, they are treated as strong ties as the actors have more
opportunity to interact than if interactions were only one way. At the same time,
unreciprocated ties that span more than a single issue area are also treated as strong ties.
This is because, an EC actor who connects with another EC actor on issues of local
government revenues and public service provision is likely to interact with this other
actor more often than if (s)he were to communicate with this actor only on one of those
issues. Thus, except for the unreciprocated ties that span a single issue area of municipal
finance, all other ties are treated as strong ties.
Reciprocity and group solidarity are fundamental operational strategies of
epistemic communities (Haas, 1992a; Adler, 1992; Van Daele, 2005). Besides, findings
in chapter four clearly show that the 58 EC actors are participants in an extensively
overlapping web of municipal finance epistemic communities, which in turn indicates
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that many EC actors specialize in more than a single issue area of municipal finance. This
suggests that if actor A has established contact with actor B for discussing topics of local
government revenues and if actor A comes to know that actor B is also a specialist in the
issue area of public service provision, then it is natural that actor A will start discussing
with actor B topics of public service provision. That is, it is relatively easier and cheaper
to form a tie with an already familiar actor than expend time and resources in locating a
new contact. This in turn suggests that connections that span more than one issue area are
more likely in the communication network of EC actors. Similarly, if actor C is
communicating with actor D because the latter specializes in the issue area of
expenditures on municipal employees, and actor D who is seeking information on the
issue of local government revenues comes to know that actor C is a specialist in that area,
then it is natural that actor D will initiate a tie on that issue area with actor C rather than
seek out another specialist of local government revenues. Hence, I propose that,
Hypothesis 3f (H3f): The discussion and information-sharing ties observed in the
communication network of municipal finance epistemic communities are more
likely to be strong ties than weak ties.
To test Hypothesis 3f, I use network mapping and descriptive statistics. The 68 arcs
in the EC actors’ communication network (see Table 5.1) were examined on the basis of
their tie strengths. In Figure 5.1, I map the communication network of the 58 EC actors
and differentiate between strong and weak ties using color and line thickness. Thicker
lines indicate stronger ties. Blue dotted lines indicate communication is limited to a single
issue area of municipal finance (tie strength=1), red dotted lines indicate communication
spans two issue areas of municipal finance (tie strength=2), and green dotted lines
indicate communication spans all three issue areas of municipal finance (tie strength=3).

Figure 5.1: Strong Ties and Weak Ties of Members of Municipal Finance ECs
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Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.354. N=58. Colors and thickness of lines indicate strength of ties among EC actors. Blue dotted lines indicate tie
strength is 1, red dotted lines indicate tie strength is 2, and green dotted lines indicate tie strength is 3. In some reciprocal ties, two colors overlap indicating variation in the
strength of ties stemming from the two actors. In others, both ties are of the same strength and have the same color. See Table 5.3 for cumulative value of reciprocal ties.
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Single, unreciprocated blue dotted lines are the only weak ties in the figure. The
rest of the unreciprocated and reciprocated ties are strong ties. In some reciprocal ties,
two colors overlap indicating variation in the strength of ties stemming from the two
actors. In others, both ties are of the same strength and have the same color. In
reciprocated ties where both ties have the same color, the dashed lines will merge and
appear almost like a solid line. Table 5.3 identifies the four possible combinations of
reciprocal ties and the total strength of these ties in each combination.
This table indicates that 4 is the maximum tie strength observed between two EC
actors in the pooled communication matrix. There are two possible combinations of tie
strengths that add up to 4. First, actor A communicates with actor B on all three issues of
municipal finance and actor B reciprocates by communicating with actor A on a single
issue area of municipal finance. Next, both actor A and actor B communicate with each
other on two issue areas of municipal finance. Other values taken by reciprocated ties are
2 and 3.
Table 5.3 also indicates that there are a total of 28 occurrences of weak ties. In
contrast, there are 40 occurrences of strong ties. Among the 40 strong ties, 14 ties span
across two issue areas of municipal finance, 8 ties span across 3 issue areas and 9 are
reciprocated ties. Strengths of reciprocated ties range from 2 to 4. Note there are nine
instances of reciprocated ties and since they are reciprocated, they have to be counted
twice. Both the network mapping and the descriptive statistics reveal that strong ties are
more prevalent than weak ties among EC actors, thereby confirming Hypothesis 3f.
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Table 5.3: Strong Ties and Weak Ties of Members of Municipal Finance ECs
Tie Strength

Frequency

1
2
3

28
14
8

2
3
4
4
----------

2
4
1
2
9*2=18

-------------------

28
40 (14+8+18)
68

Arcs

Reciprocal Ties (Combination of Tie Strengths)
(1+1)
(2+1)
(2+2)
(3+1)
Total Reciprocal Ties
Total Arcs Indicating Weak Ties
Total Arcs Indicating Strong Ties
Total All Arcs

Note: Tie strength indicates the total number of issue areas of municipal finance on which EC actors communicate. Frequency indicates
the number of times ties with the particular tie strength occur in the communication network of EC actors.

Motivations for Interactions among Members of
Michigan’s Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities
As extensively discussed in chapter two, several factors explain the emergence
and proliferation of epistemic communities within the public policy making domain.
These include issue uncertainty and shock, the need for interpreting highly complex and
technical information, and the availability of governance processes/motivation for
institutionalization of policy ideas and beliefs (Haas 1992a). The data collected from the
interviews do not permit me to analyze when exactly the municipal finance epistemic
communities emerged. However, interview question 10 is intended to capture
respondent’s motivations for communicating on the three issues of municipal finance.
This question is presented in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Interview Question on EC Actors’ Motivations for Interactions
IQ 10. In general, to what extent do you agree that the following reasons are motivations for you to
discuss, seek advice or offer advice to your colleagues in other organizations on the topics we have covered
in this survey?
Strongly
Disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly
Disagree
Nor Disagree
Agree
Your interest in achieving policy
objectives/outcomes











Your search for best practices of
fiscal governance











Your colleagues engage in similar
exchanges and so you follow suit











Your desire for more information
about these topics











To deal with the uncertainty
surrounding these issues











In order to deal with the specific
problems created by the current
financial crisis











The highly technical and complex
nature of municipal finance reform











Using the information collected from this question, it is possible to analyze the
following questions.
•

When two EC actors perceive that issue uncertainty motivates them to develop
communication ties, what is the likelihood that a communication tie exists
between them?

•

When two EC actors perceive that information inadequacy motivates them to
develop communication ties, what is the likelihood that a communication tie
exists between them?1

•

When two EC actors perceive that the specific problems created by the current
financial crisis motivate them to develop communication ties, what is the
likelihood that a communication tie exists between them?

•

When two EC actors perceive that issue technical specificity and complexity
motivates them to develop communication ties, what is the likelihood that a
communication tie exists between them?
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•

When two EC actors perceive that their interest in achieving policy
objectives/outcomes motivates them to develop communication ties, what is the
likelihood that a communication tie exists between them?2

It is useful to recall that each of the five motivation factors analyzed are identified
by existing EC literature as conditions that favor the emergence and proliferation of ECs.
Notably, each of these factors, individually or in combination, has been shown to impact
the emergence/proliferation of ECs (e.g., Adler, 1992; Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992; Haas
1992b; Irvine et al., 2011). Though I cannot identify the causal logic of Michigan’s
municipal finance ECs, I can ascertain if these factors have motivated the communication
linkages that have developed among these actors. Assessing the five factors separately is
therefore consistent with the theoretical framework of epistemic communities.
Interviewees were asked to identify the individuals they contacted in the past 12
months to discuss and share information on issues of municipal finance. During this time
period (August 2010 to August 2011), the perception of an impending financial crisis had
been particularly acute among many government officials in Michigan (Detroit Free
Press, 2010; 2011; Detroit News, 2010; 2011). Assessing the five factors separately will
allow me to draw the conclusion as to whether the current financial crisis is the only
motivator for MFEC actors to interact with each other or do they interact for other
longstanding reasons such as issue complexity and technical specificity, and the interest
to achieve policy objectives.
Based on Haas’ (1992a) causal logic for the emergence of ECs, I propose that,
Hypothesis 4a (H4a): When two EC actors perceive that the uncertainty of
municipal finance issues motivates them to develop communication ties, a
communication tie exists between them.
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Hypothesis 4b (H4b): When two EC actors perceive that inadequate policy
information in municipal finance issues motivates them to develop communication
ties, a communication tie exists between them.
Hypothesis 4c (H4c): When two EC actors perceive that the specific problems
created by the current fiscal crisis motivate them to develop communication ties,
a communication tie exists between them.
Hypothesis 4d (H4d): When two EC actors perceive that the highly technical and
complex nature of municipal finance issues motivates them to develop
communication ties, a communication tie exists between them.
Hypothesis 4e (H4e): When two EC actors perceive that the intention to achieve
municipal finance related policy objectives motivates them to develop
communication ties, a communication tie exists between them.

Table 5.5 summarizes these hypotheses. To test the hypothesized relationships, I
employed quadratic assignment procedures analysis. This analysis includes both QAP
correlation analysis and QAP full partialling, original (Y-permutation) method regression
analysis.3 These analyses were conducted using the UCINET program Version 6.354.

Table 5.5: Motivations for Interactions among Members of Municipal Finance ECs
Motivation for Communication Exchanges
Issue Uncertainty
Information Inadequacy
Fiscal Crisis
Issue Technical Specificity and Complexity
Institutionalization of Policy Beliefs

Hypothesized Impact
+
+
+
+
+

The QAP Correlation Analysis
First, I employed the QAP correlation analysis to investigate the simple
correlation between each of the five motivators for communication (issue uncertainty,
information inadequacy, fiscal crisis, issue technical specificity and complexity, and
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institutionalization of policy beliefs) and the communication network of the 58 EC actors.
The QAP correlation analysis is an investigation of the correlation between a covariate
(which is an independent variable in the QAP regression analysis) matrix and the
observed communication network matrix of the EC actors (which is the dependent
variable in the QAP regression analysis). The communication network matrix is the
matrix consisting of the discussion and information-seeking ties of the 58 EC members
on the three issue areas of municipal finance.4
The first covariate matrix is issue uncertainty. To create this matrix I first
identified EC actors who said that their communication ties on issues of municipal
finance were motivated by the intention to deal with the uncertainty surrounding issues of
municipal finance. EC actors who “agreed” and “strongly agreed” were coded as 1, while
the respondents who chose the remaining three options (“neither agree nor disagree,”
“disagree” and “strongly disagree”) were coded as 0. A coding of 1 indicates that
respondents perceive that their discussion and information-seeking ties are motivated by
the intention to deal with the uncertainty surrounding issues of municipal finance. In the
communication network matrix of the 58 EC actors (i.e., the dependent matrix), if two
actors perceived that issue uncertainty motivated their communication ties, and if there
existed a communication tie between them, then the tie that existed between them was
coded as 1. If one or both of them did not believe that issue uncertainty motivated their
communication ties and if there existed a communication tie between them, then the tie
that existed between them was coded as 0. For example, if actors A and F both had a
score of 1 on issue uncertainty, and if actor A had a communication tie with actor F, then
this was indicated with a 1 in the row of A and in the column of F. Alternatively, if actors
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A and F both had a score of 0 (or one of them alone had a score of 0) on issue uncertainty
and if actor A had a communication tie with actor F, this was indicated with a 0 in the
row of A and in the column of F. After the ties of all actors had been recoded based on
their issue uncertainty scores, the matrix was saved as the covariate matrix on issue
uncertainty. The same logic was used in the creation of the other four covariate matrices.
More details on these matrices are provided in the endnotes.5
I use QAP analysis to identify the degree of association between two matrices and
develop standard errors to test for its significance (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). In the
first step, the analysis computes the Pearson's correlation coefficient and the simple
matching, Jaccard, and Goodman Kruskal Gamma coefficients along with the Hamming
distance between corresponding cells of the two data matrices.6 This analysis includes
binary relations in both matrices, and so I focus on analyzing the Jaccard coefficient.
What this coefficient indicates is the likelihood of the presence of a communication tie
between a pair of EC actors who share the same motivation for developing
communication linkages. For example, in case of information inadequacy, the Jaccard
coefficient indicates the percent chance that a communication tie exists between two
actors who perceive that information inadequacy motivates them to develop
communication ties.
In the second step, the analysis randomly permutes rows and columns
(synchronously) of one matrix (the observed communication matrix) and recomputes the
correlation and other measures. The second step is carried out hundreds of times in order
to compute the proportion of times that a random measure is larger than or equal to the
observed measure calculated in step 1. In doing so, the QAP analysis takes into account
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the assumption of independency of observations in standard bivariate analyses (Shrestha
and Feiock, 2009). Table 5.6 reports the findings of the QAP correlation analysis.

Table 5.6: QAP Correlation Analysis of the Communication Network of EC Actors
Correlation between Communication Network of EC Actors and Issue Uncertainty
Statistics
Pearson Correlation
Simple Matching
Jaccard Coefficient
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma
Hamming Distance
Hubert’s Gamma

Value
0.881***
0.995***
0.779***
1.000***
15.000***
53.000

Significance
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Average
0.000
0.964
0.009
-0.237
118.756

Std. Deviation
0.018
0.019
0.009
0.570
3.181

Correlation between Communication Network of EC Actors and Information Inadequacy
Pearson Correlation
0.889***
0.000
0.000
0.018
Simple Matching
0.996***
0.000
0.963
0.019
0.794***
Jaccard Coefficient
0.000
0.009
0.009
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma
1.000***
0.000
-0.223
0.566
Hamming Distance
14.000***
0.000
119.676
3.217
Hubert’s Gamma
54.000
Correlation between Communication Network of EC Actors and Fiscal Crisis
Pearson Correlation
0.881***
0.000
0.000
Simple Matching
0.995***
0.000
0.964
0.779***
Jaccard Coefficient
0.000
0.009
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma
1.000***
0.000
-0.232
Hamming Distance
15.000***
0.000
118.712
Hubert’s Gamma
53.000

0.018
0.019
0.009
0.575
3.221

Correlation between Communication Network of EC Actors and Issue Technical Specificity and Complexity
Pearson Correlation
0.734***
0.000
0.000
0.018
Simple Matching
0.991***
0.000
0.968
0.019
0.544***
Jaccard Coefficient
0.000
0.008
0.009
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma
1.000***
0.000
-0.314
0.647
Hamming Distance
31.000***
0.000
103.393
2.726
Hubert’s Gamma
37.000
Correlation between Communication Network of EC Actors and Institutionalization of Policy Beliefs
Pearson Correlation
0.872***
0.000
0.000
0.018
Simple Matching
0.995***
0.000
0.964
0.019
0.765***
Jaccard Coefficient
0.000
0.009
0.009
Goodman-Kruskal Gamma
1.000***
0.000
-0.253
0.584
Hamming Distance
16.000***
0.000
117.810
3.170
Hubert’s Gamma
52.000
Note: A total of 2500 permutations were conducted for each analysis. Significance: * p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.

184
The second column of Table 5.6 reports the values of each measure for the
correlation; the third column tests the significance of the values in column two based on
standard errors; the fourth column shows the average value of the correlation across a
large number of random trials generated by random QAP process; and the fifth column
reports a standard deviation of the distribution of the measures for a correlation across the
random trials.
For issue uncertainty, the Jaccard coefficient of .779 indicates that when two EC
actors perceive that issue uncertainty motivates them to develop communication ties,
there is 78 percent chance that a communication tie exists between those two actors
(which is represented by a 1 in the communication network matrix). The coefficients of
the information inadequacy, fiscal crisis, and institutionalization of policy beliefs are also
similar, indicating that when a pair of EC actors shares any of these three motivations,
there is nearly 80 percent chance that a communication tie is present between that pair of
actors. Unlike the above four factors, perception that issue technical specificity and
complexity motivates the development of communication ties has a significant, but very
low coefficient of .544. This value is barely better than chance and indicates that when
two EC actors perceive that issue technical specificity and complexity motivates them to
develop communication ties, there is only 54 percent chance that a communication tie
exists between those two actors. This is not surprising given that EC actors are
themselves municipal finance experts, and therefore, have the ability to decode and make
sense of the technical specificity and complexity of municipal finance issues without
having to reach out to other actors. In sum, the findings indicate that issue uncertainty,
information inadequacy, problems created by the current financial crisis, and the interest
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in institutionalizing policy beliefs motivate municipal finance EC actors to communicate
with each other on issues of local government revenues, expenditures on municipal
employees and public service provision. These findings of the matrix correlation analysis
provide strong support for associational hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4e.

The QAP Regression Analysis
Next, rather than simply correlating a perceived motivation with the existence of a
communication tie, I wanted to predict one relation knowing the other. That is, rather
than examine symmetric association between the relations, I wanted to examine
asymmetric association. The standard tool for this question is linear regression which
allows the investigation of more than one independent variable (Hanneman and Riddle,
2005; Krackhardt, 1987). So I supplement the correlation analysis by estimating the QAP
matrix regressions to examine how the five predicted factors explain the existence of
communication linkages among the 58 EC actors. The QAP regression randomly
permutes rows and columns of the original data matrix for the dependent variable and
reestimates the original regression model to compute unbiased standard error of the
estimates (Krackhardt, 1987; Shrestha and Feiock, 2009). The estimated coefficients
show the probability of the occurrence of the relationship in the dependent matrix given
the presence of the relationship in the independent matrix when the effects of all other
specified independent variables have been controlled for (Krackhardt, 1987; Shrestha and
Feiock, 2009).
While in the correlation analysis, the simple association between a perceived
motivation and the communication linkages of EC actors was assessed, in the regression
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analysis, the associational impact of a particular perceived motivation on the
communication linkages between EC actors was assessed, while controlling for the
effects of the other four perceived motivations. For example, if two EC actors perceive
that information inadequacy motivates them to develop communication ties in the
information inadequacy matrix, the estimated coefficient on information inadequacy
reports the likelihood that a communication tie exists between them, while controlling for
the effects of issue uncertainty, fiscal crisis, issue technical specificity and complexity,
and institutionalization of policy beliefs.
In the first regression model, I examined only the five hypothesized factors.
However, in the second regression model, I also controlled for effects of homophily, i.e.,
similarity in actor attributes. I added two actor attribute variables to these five factors to
understand how the seven factors together explain the existence of the communication
linkages among EC actors. As in the correlation analysis, all variables have to be
converted to the matrix form.
The first of these actor attribute matrices was created based on the extent to which
similar organizational affiliations/positions motivated actors to communicate with each
other--the theory of homophily. To do this, I first collapsed the various organizational
affiliations of EC actors into four categories of a single variable. A score of 1 indicates an
actor is an elected government official, 2 indicates an actor is an appointed government
official, 3 indicates an actor belongs to a nonprofit/nongovernmental organization and 4
indicates an actor belongs to a private organization.7 However, within the covariate
matrix, the variables are used in binary form. Ties between actors belonging to the same
sector were coded 1 and those between actors from mismatched sectors were coded 0.
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For example, actor X is an appointed government official who has a communication tie
with actor Y who is also an appointed government official. This relationship is indicated
with a 1 in the row of X and in the column of Y. If Y is not an appointed government
official, then this relationship is indicated with a zero in the row of X and in the column
of Y. The second actor attribute matrix was created based on the extent to which gender
similarity motivated actors to communicate with each other. Ties between EC actors
belonging to the same gender were coded 1 and those between actors of different genders
were coded 0.
Table 5.7 reports the results of the regression analysis. Model fits (R2) for both
models are statistically significant. R-square of Model I indicates that knowing whether
two EC actors perceive issue uncertainty, fiscal crisis, issue technical specificity and
complexity, and interest in institutionalization of policy beliefs motivate them to form
communication linkages, reduces uncertainty in predicting the existence of a
communication tie between them by a very substantial 89%. Knowing the organizational
affiliations and the gender of these actors further modestly reduces this uncertainty to
92.8% as indicated by Model II. In Model I, which included five predictor variables, the
coefficients of issue uncertainty, fiscal crisis, issue technical specificity and complexity,
and institutionalization of policy beliefs are positive and statistically significant. In Model
II, even after controlling for the effects of homophily, these four variables continue to
remain statistically significant. This indicates that each of these factors is a significant
motivator for EC actors to develop communication linkages with each other. In the EC
literature, these factors have been shown to influence the emergence and proliferation of
epistemic communities. Case studies conducted in different policy areas have shown that
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a variety of policy actors, including decision makers, consult with epistemic communities
due to issue uncertainty, crisis situation, issue technical specificity and complexity,
and/or availability of processes/motivation for institutionalization of policy beliefs
(Adler, 1992; Drake and Nicolaïdis, 1992; Haas 1992b; Gough and Shackley, 2002;
Irvine et al., 2011). This study indicates that EC actors’ motivations for consulting with
the members of their community are similar to the motivations the entire policy
community has for consulting with epistemic communities. This is an important finding
because previous literature focused on the policy community as a whole and did not
specifically explore the motivations EC actors had for interacting with each other. Also,
previous analyses have never systematically examined these motivations; conclusions
have typically been drawn based on broad patterns observed rather than on individual
actors’ perceptions.
In Model II, both attribute variables are statistically significant. Though no
specific hypotheses have been proposed on the homophily effects, these effects are
important in the network literature and it is useful to discuss them. The organizational
similarity coefficient indicates that actors with similar organizational affiliations are more
likely to communicate with each other. For example, an elected government official is
more likely to communicate with another elected government official rather than with a
bureaucrat or an official from an NGO or a private firm. This finding provides strong
support for the homophily argument in the social network literature: homogeneity breeds
collaboration (Lubell, 2007). Similarly, results indicate that actors of the same gender are
more likely to communicate with each other. However, not much should be drawn from
this finding as 79 percent of EC actors are men.
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The regression analysis indicates that issue uncertainty, the intention to deal with
specific problems created by the current financial crisis, issue technical specificity and
complexity, and the interest to institutionalize policy beliefs, serve as positive reinforcers
of communication ties between EC actors. Of the hypothesized factors, only the
information inadequacy factor is not statistically significant in both models. Overall, the
results of the regression analysis support all the associational hypotheses, except
Hypotheses 4b on information inadequacy as a predictor. In the correlation analysis, there
is support for all associational hypotheses, except Hypotheses 4d on issue technical
specificity and complexity as a predictor.

Table 5.7: QAP Regression Analysis on the Communication Network of EC Actors
Variables
Issue Uncertainty
Information Inadequacy
Fiscal Crisis
Issue Technical Specificity and Complexity
Institutionalization of Policy Beliefs
Similar Organizational Affiliation
Same Gender
Intercept
R2
Adjusted R2
No. of Observations
No. of Permutations

Model I
(Five Variables)
0.296***
0.100
0.356***
0.155***
0.130*
------------------0.000
0.890***
0.890
3306
1999

Model II
(Seven Variables)
0.212***
-0.048
0.201***
0.110***
0.285***
0.134***
0.216***
0.000
0.928***
0.928
3306
1999

Note: The dependent variable in this analysis is the pooled communication network of the 58 EC actors and numbers in
each variable represent standardized coefficients. QAP regression in UCINET output does not report standard errors on
each variable but provides p-values. Significance: * p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .001.
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Policy Performance of Members of
Michigan’s Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities
Previous research on epistemic communities suggests that the policy success of an
EC depends largely on its ability to be more convincing to political decision makers than
rivaling epistemic communities that have emerged around the same issue area, and on
that EC’s ability to forge alliances with decision makers (Haas, 1990). Based on these
assumptions, I propose a last set of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 5a (H5a): Making direct recommendations to state level policy
makers is the most preferred policy promotion forum of members of municipal
finance epistemic communities.
Hypothesis 5b (H5b): Popular actors in municipal finance epistemic communities
will develop communication ties with elected officials.
Hypothesis 5c (H5c): Elected officials will develop communication ties with
popular actors in municipal finance epistemic communities.

Policy Promotion Forums
Given that the ability to diffuse epistemic ideas and the availability of various
means to diffuse these ideas are crucial components of the policy performance of ECs, I
examined the policy forums that previous research on epistemic communities has found
are used to broadcast epistemes. Interview question 11 was intended to identify these
forums and is presented in Table 5.8. Table 5.9 displays the frequency at which
municipal finance EC actors use the six different policy promoting forums to advance
their respective epistemes.
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Table 5.8: Interview Question on the Policy Promotion Forums Used by EC Actors
IQ 11. In general, if you have recommended for any of the strategies we asked about in this survey, how often
have you used the following forms of recommendation?
Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very Often
Propagating the topic through pamphlets,
brochures, radio, television, email, etc.











Propagating the topic through blogs, websites,
Facebook, Twitter, etc.











Individually or collaboratively
publishing/producing articles, books, technical
reports, conference papers or other scholarly
material on the topic











Presenting ideas on the topic at a state legislative
meeting











Directly recommending to a state level policy
maker











Making state level political or administrative
decisions in support of the topic











Table 5.9 shows that 55 (95%) of the 58 MFEC actors make direct policy
recommendations to state level policy makers on issues of municipal finance; only three
actors (5%) never used this forum. Not surprisingly, 36 actors (62%) tend to use this
forum on a regular basis (that is, often or very often). Clearly, this is the most used policy
promotion forum. Following this, in second place, is the use of pamphlets, brochures,
radio, TV and emails. 50 (86%) of the 58 MFEC actors rely on this forum to promote
their epistemes. Twenty-six actors (45%) tend to regularly use this indirect policy
promotion avenue. Next, in third place, is presentation of policy ideas at state level
legislative meetings; 48 actors (83%) tend to use this forum. While 23 actors (40%) use
this direct policy promotion avenue on a regular basis, 10 actors (17%) never use it at all.
This pattern clearly provides strong support for Hypothesis 5a.

Table 5.9: Policy Promotion Forums Used by Members of Municipal Finance ECs
Frequency of Usage

Policy Promotion Forum

Never

Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Very Often

3

2

17

25

11

(5.2%)

(3.4%)

(29.3%)

(43.1%)

(19.0%)

10

7

18

15

8

(17.2%)

(12.1%)

(31.0%)

(25.9%)

(13.8%)

37

2

9

8

2

(63.8%)

(3.4%)

(15.5%)

(13.8%)

(3.4%)

8

8

16

20

6

(13.8%)

(13.8%)

(27.6%)

(34.5%)

(10.3%)

15

10

14

16

3

(25.9%)

(17.2%)

(24.1%)

(27.6%)

(5.2%)

27

7

10

10

4

(46.6%)

(12.1%)

(17.2%)

(17.2%)

(6.9%)

Rank

Direct Forums
Making direct recommendations to a state level policy maker
Presenting ideas at a state level legislative meeting

3
6

Indirect Forums
Use of pamphlets, brochures, radio, tv, emails
Use of blogs, websites, Facebook, Twitter
Publishing articles, books, reports, conference papers, scholarly material

2
4
5
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Personally involved in making state level political/administrative decisions

1
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Liaisons with Policy Makers
To examine the ties that MFECs develop with elected officials, I analyze the full
communication networks in each of the three issue areas. This examination allows me to
compare the ability of the members of the seven MFECs to develop communication
linkages with decision makers within each of the three issue areas of municipal finance.
At this juncture, I would like to remind that I neither have the full communication
network in each issue area, nor do I have all the epistemic community actors. It is
important to recognize this limitation in this analysis The seven communities identified in
chapter four are presented in separate maps to show the relative degree of direct influence
each MFEC within a particular issue area has on decision makers. In these maps, circles
indicate non-elected officials and boxes indicate elected officials. Table 5.10 summarizes
the findings of the network mapping.

The Issue Area of Local Government Revenues
Figure 5.2 shows INCOMETAX within the full communication network on LGR
(N=148) and Figure 5.3 shows ALLREVENUES within the same network. In Figure 5.2,
non-EC members are colored green and EC members are colored red. Three elected
officials are members in this EC. Besides the connections with these elected officials, the
members of this community have managed to develop communication links with seven
other elected officials who lie outside this community. Of the 43 elected officials in the
LGR network, 10 (23.3%) have direct incoming or outgoing communication ties with
members of INCOMETAX. Among these ten elected officials, three reach out to popular
EC actors and two of the popular EC actors reach out to elected officials. Popular actors
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are actors who have two or more ties coming toward them (the in-stars concept in the
ERGM analysis).8 The analysis in this section is targeted at this popularity concept--Do
elected officials, both within and outside the epistemic community, reach out to popular
EC actors and vice versa? In addition to the occurrences of the hypothesized popularity
concept, it also important to understand the occurrences of tightly clustered network
structures consisting of EC actors and elected officials. EC actors connected to a chain of
three or more elected officials are highlighted in this map using two dashed circles.
Figure 5.3 shows that within ALLREVENUES there are four elected officials.
Eleven other elected officials, while not members of this EC, have developed direct
communication linkages with the members of this EC. In total, 34.9% of all elected
officials in the LGR network are linked with members of this EC. Similar to
INCOMETAX, in this EC also, it can be observed that five elected officials reach out to
popular EC actors and four popular EC actors reach out to elected officials. Again, in this
figure, I use dashed circles to highlight EC actors who are connected to a chain of three
or more elected officials. This pattern is more prominent in figure 5.3 than in figure 5.2.
Overall, connection patterns seen in figures 5.2 and 5.3 strongly support Hypotheses 5b
and 5c which propose that popular actors of municipal finance ECs will develop
communication linkages with elected officials, and that elected officials will reach out to
popular actors in these communities.
Compared to members of INCOMETAX, members of ALLREVENUES have
managed to develop more links to decision makers. This is not surprising based on the
policy beliefs the two ECs are promoting. The former is focused on adopting or
increasing only one revenue source: an income tax. Given the constitutional restrictions

195
that only cities can levy income taxes with voter approval, it is understandable that only a
restricted group of elected policy actors are involved in this policy idea. In contrast, the
episteme of ALLREVENUES is seeking additional state shared revenues, increasing
local property taxes, and adopting or increasing user fees for specific local public
services. This collection of policy ideas applies to a variety of local government types
and hence, more elected officials participate in the consideration/promotion/restriction of
these ideas.

The Issue Area of Expenditures on Municipal Employees
Figure 5.4 shows EMPLOYEES within the full EME communication network
(N=138) and Figure 5.5 shows RETIREES within the same network. As discussed in
chapter four, the issue area of expenditures on municipal employees is a politically
sensitive area and only one elected official participated in the two MFECs in this area.
Even this official participates only in EMPLOYEES and not in RETIREES as seen in
Figure 5.4. Besides this elected official, members of EMPLOYEES are linked to only one
other elected official. Thus, connectivity with decision makers is very low in
EMPLOYEES, only 6.7%. Neither of these two elected officials reaches out to popular
EC actors. Similarly, none of the popular EC actors reach out to either of these officials.
In case of RETIREES, none of the 30 elected officials in the EME network are connected
with the members of EC. Thus, there is no support for Hypotheses 5b and 5c within the
issue area of EME.
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The Issue Area of Public Service Provision
Figure 5.6 shows CONSOLIDATE within the full PSP communication network
(N=148); Figure 5.7 shows COOPERATE and Figure 5.8 shows CONTRACT within the
same network. In addition to developing connections with the two elected officials
embedded in CONSOLIDATE, members of CONSOLIDATE have developed ties with
nine other elected officials making the overall connectivity nearly 29%. Three of these
elected officials reach out to popular EC actors and two of the popular EC actors reach
out to elected officials. Figure 5.7 shows that COOPERATE includes four elected
officials. Members of this EC also have ties with 11 non-EC elected officials; a
connectivity rate of 39.5%. Four of these elected officials reach out to popular EC actors
and two of the popular EC actors reach out to elected officials. Figure 5.8 shows that
CONTRACT includes four elected officials. Additionally, members of this EC have
direct communication ties with eight non-EC elected officials, making the overall
connectivity rate 31.6%. Just as in COOPERATE, four of these elected officials reach out
to popular EC actors and two of the popular EC actors reach out to elected officials.
Again here, in all three figures, I use dashed circles to highlight EC actors who are
connected to a chain three or more elected officials. In all these figures, the most
interesting connections stem from a popular EC actor connected to a transitive triad
consisting solely of elected officials.
The patterns of connectivity observed in Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 are similar to
patterns observed in the issue area of LGR. Connections with elected officials are denser
in the issue area of public service provision than in the other two issue areas and these
connections provide strong support for Hypotheses 5b and 5c. Among the seven MFECs,
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only members of RETIREES, due to the high sensitivity of their episteme, have zero
connectivity with elected officials. In contrast, members of COOPERATE have the
highest proportion of connections with elected officials; this EC is connected to 39.5% of
the elected officials in the PSP communication network. This does not come as a huge
surprise as the episteme of this community consists of transferring certain local
government service functions to a higher level of government and consolidating services
with other local governments through interlocal cooperation. My analysis of newspaper
articles revealed that both these strategies and, in particular interlocal cooperation are
among the most commonly proposed and/or implemented reforms in Michigan local
governments

Table 5.10: Liaisons of EC Actors with Policy Makers
MFEC

Total elected officials in
communication
network

Elected officials
who are members
of MFEC

Elected officials
outside of MFEC
but linked to it

INCOMETAX
ALLREVENUES
EMPLOYEES
RETIREES
CONSOLIDATE
COOPERATE
CONTRACT

43
43
30
30
38
38
38

3
4
1
0
2
4
4

7
11
1
0
9
11
8

MFEC

Total elected officials
linked to MFEC
(Percent)*

Total elected officials
reaching out to
popular MFEC actors

Total popular MFEC
actors reaching out to
elected officials

INCOMETAX
ALLREVENUES
EMPLOYEES
RETIREES
CONSOLIDATE
COOPERATE
CONTRACT

10 (23.3%)
15 (34.9%)
2 (6.7%)
0 (0%)
11(28.9%)
15 (39.5%)
12 (31.6)

3
5
0
0
3
4
4

2
4
0
0
2
2
2

Note: As percent of all elected officials in the particular communication network.

Figure 5.2 Political Ties of MFEC_INCOMETAX within the Full Communication Network on LGR
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Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.385. N of network=148 and N of MFEC_INCOMETAX=21. Green color indicates actors who are non-EC members and red color
indicates actors who are EC members. Circles indicate actors who are non-elected officials and boxes indicate actors who are elected officials.

Figure 5.3: Political Ties of MFEC_ALLREVENUES within the Full Communication Network on LGR
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Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.385. N of network=148 and N of MFEC_ALLREVENUES=31. Blue color indicates actors who are non-EC members and yellow color
indicates actors who are EC members. Circles indicate actors who are non-elected officials and boxes indicate actors who are elected officials.

Figure 5.4: Political Ties of MFEC_EMPLOYEES within the Full Communication Network on EME
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Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.385. N of network=138 and N of MFEC_EMPLOYEES=22. Green color indicates actors who are non-EC members and red color
indicates actors who are EC members. Circles indicate actors who are non-elected officials and boxes indicate actors who are elected officials.

Figure 5.5: Political Ties of MFEC_RETIREES within the Full Communication Network on EME
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Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.385. N of network=138 and N of MFEC_RETIREES=13. Grey color indicates actors who are non-EC members and orange color
indicates actors who are EC members. Circles indicate actors who are non-elected officials and boxes indicate actors who are elected officials.

Figure 5.6: Political Ties of MFEC_CONSOLIDATE within the Full Communication Network on PSP
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Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.385. N of network=148 and N of MFEC_CONSOLIDATE=22. Light green color indicates actors who are non-EC members and rust
color indicates actors who are EC members. Circles indicate actors who are non-elected officials and boxes indicate actors who are elected officials.

Figure 5.7: Political Ties of MFEC_COOPERATE within the Full Communication Network on PSP

203

Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.385. N of network=148 and N of MFEC_COOPERATE=39. Green color indicates actors who are non-EC members and purple color
indicates actors who are EC members. Circles indicate actors who are non-elected officials and boxes indicate actors who are elected officials.

Figure 5.8: Political Ties of MFEC_CONTRACT within the Full Communication Network on PSP
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Note: Network generated using the UCINET software, Version 6.385. N of network=148 and N of MFEC_CONTRACT=32. Dark blue color indicates actors who are non-EC members and orange color
indicates actors who are EC members. Circles indicate actors who are non-elected officials and boxes indicate actors who are elected officials.
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Concluding Remarks
This study is the first step taken in the direction of systematically analyzing
epistemic communities as dependent variables. Up to now, epistemic communities have
typically been analyzed as independent variables which influence policy behaviors and
outcomes. The only dimensions examined about epistemic communities include the
composition of these communities and, to some extent, the causes for their emergence. A
structurally sophisticated understanding of epistemic communities has been conspicuous
in its absence from the EC literature. This study, in particular, the analyses in this
chapter, are intended to address this critical gap in this literature.
First, departing from the traditional approach of qualitative analysis, I use
methods of social network analysis such as exponential random graph models and
quadratic assignment procedures analysis to examine the interaction patterns of EC actors
and the motivations for such interactions. Available knowledge on the dynamics of
epistemic communities is limited to norms of reciprocity, and repeated games of shortterm interactions facilitated by membership in multiple, overlapping knowledge
networks. The potential existence of leadership and a hierarchical structure of interaction
patterns within epistemic communities are unexplored in existing EC studies. Similarly,
the tendency of EC actors to go past simple reciprocal relationships and engage in social
bonding via tightly clustered structures has also not been dealt with in this literature.
Other important questions on the organizational structure of ECs are also yet to be
examined by EC scholars. Some of these questions are: Do EC actors seek multiple
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knowledge transaction partners or do they limit themselves to few and already familiar
actors? Do EC actors tend to form strong, reciprocal relationships among members of
their community or do they develop weak, unreciprocated and infrequent ties? If indeed
EC actors are likely to interact in certain definite patterns that lead to the formation of
specific network structures, then what are the motivations for these actors to interact in
these patterns? Using the knowledge on EC actors’ motivations for interacting in definite
patterns, can we make predictions about the structure of EC networks?
This dissertation has taken the first step in identifying the pathways to address
these critical questions. It has reoriented the EC concept and has analyzed these
questions; but the answers it provides are limited and additional research is necessary to
make generalizations and predictions on epistemic communities. Till date, questions on
the structural characteristics of EC networks have not been given their due attention
mainly due to the current form of the EC framework and the complementary qualitative
analytical procedures used in the application of this framework. The current framework
precludes the conception of ECs as networks in a real sense. That is, a metaphorical
allusion to the network concept is all that the framework provides. I have reoriented this
framework in such a way that it permits scholars to conceive of epistemic communities as
networks and analyze them using testable hypotheses and network methods.
Knowledge on the interaction patterns among EC actors and the motivations for
these interactions are very important. But this knowledge alone is not sufficient and it is
necessary to uncover the operational strategies of these actors in the wider policy
community. Besides Peter Haas (1992a), a number of EC scholars have repeatedly
emphasized that the success of an epistemic community is largely based on its ability to
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influence policy makers (e.g., Adler, 1992; Hopkins, 1992; Van Deale, 2005;
Kutchesfahani, 2010). Typically, however, these assertions have been based on single
issue case studies centered on successful execution of specific legislative bills or policy
agreements. Importantly, the conclusions drawn are broad enough that they do not focus
on the specific roles and positions of actors in the wider policy community. This study,
for the first time, assesses the proposition that EC actors seek leverage in the policy
process by reaching out to policy makers through the use of deductive hypotheses and
social network mapping. My findings support prior findings that ECs reach out to
decision makers. They indicate that making policy recommendations directly to decision
makers, presenting ideas in legislative meetings, and developing communication linkages
are the most popular avenues for achieving this leverage.
In addition to confirming findings from prior studies, my analysis on the liaisons
between EC members and elected officials provides other useful insights. I had limited
my analysis and focus to direct linkages that EC actors develop with elected officials.
However, in each of the seven network maps, it can be observed that many EC members
have access to a number of other elected officials through indirect connections. That is,
they are connected to the decision makers via brokers (the bridging/2-paths concept in the
ERGM analysis). The network mapping process has also revealed the other side of the
story, how decision makers reach out to knowledge experts. In particular, decision
makers seek out popular EC actors, who are, in general, experts in multiple issue areas.
The roles and positions of these popular EC actors are important in understanding the
impact that epistemic communities have on public policy making processes. The analysis
also shows how EC actors are for the most part closely-knit within the communication
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network of the issue area in which they specialize. These connections span beyond
elected officials to encompass other policy actors from the governmental and
nongovernmental sectors who participate in the particular issue area.
The ability of EC actors to consolidate formal decision making power within the
community (i.e., by attracting elected officials as network participants), to develop direct
communication links with elected officials, to reach out to unconnected elected officials
through brokers, and to embed themselves within the larger policy community by
developing ties with policy actors other than elected officials, are all revealed in the
network mapping process. The graphic depiction of the ties of EC actors, which permits
an elaborate exploration of the operational strategies of these actors within their larger
policy community, has not been attempted before. This study neither maps the full
communication networks, nor identifies all EC actors within these networks. But despite
this limitation, it paves the way for fuller and more sophisticated analysis on the
functionality of EC actors.
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Notes
1

Issue uncertainty is often a result of inadequate policy information (Haas, 1992a). This factor is also
included in the analysis of the motivations for the communication linkages of EC actors.
2

The motivation to achieve policy objectives indicates the intention to institutionalize policy beliefs and
ideas. In case of an individual EC actor, these beliefs and ideas refer to the episteme(s) that the particular
actor is seeking to promote.
3

Though the interpretations and implications of the correlation and regression analyses may be very similar
to a traditional statistical approach, the major difference is that the QAP analyses deal with a series of
dyadic data in which observations are more likely to be interdependent (Lee, Feiock and Lee, 2011).
However, QAP analytical techniques allow us to control for interdependencies that are commonly observed
in social network data (Lee, Feiock and Lee, 2011).
4

Figure 5.1 in this chapter and Figure 4.21 in chapter four were generated using this matrix.

5

The second covariate matrix is information inadequacy and was created based EC actors’ scores on the
information inadequacy factor (see option 4 in IQ 10). Here again, respondents who chose answer options
“agree” and “strongly agree” were coded as 1 and respondents who chose the remaining three options were
coded as 0.The third covariate matrix is fiscal crisis and was created based on EC actors’ scores on the
fiscal crisis factor (see option 6 in IQ 10). The fourth covariate matrix is issue technical specificity and
complexity and was created based on EC actors’ scores on the issue technical specificity and complexity
factor (see option 7 in IQ 10). The fifth covariate matrix is institutionalization of policy beliefs and was
created based on EC actors’ scores on the policy objectives/outcomes achievement factor (see option 1 in
IQ 10).
6

The Pearson correlation is a standard measure when both matrices have valued relations measured at the
interval level (that is, the strength of the ties is known). Gamma would be a reasonable choice if one or
both relations were measured on an ordinal scale. The simple matching and Jaccard coefficients are
considered to be standard measures when dealing with binary relations for both matrices. Finally,
Hamming distance is a measure of dissimilarity or distance between the score in one matrix and scores in
the other matrix (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).
7

Academics were treated as officials from nonprofit/nongovernmental organizations. Attorneys and media
persons were treated as officials from private firms.

8

This measure is consistent with the social networks literature.
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CHAPTER VI
Epistemic Communities and Regional Governance
Without the convergence of interests and the diffusion of ideas between the
specialist network and the leaderships, there would be no story at all (Mendelson,
1993: 328).

In recent times, the US has undergone significant changes in how regional
governance is conceptualized and the focus has shifted from government to governance
and from governmental consolidation to problem solving (Barnes and Foster, 2011).
Policy makers’ quest for interjurisdictional responses to the financial crisis and the
recession has rekindled interest in the topic of regional governance (Barnes and Foster,
2011). However, the economic, social and technical changes of the recent decades, which
have now assimilated in US urban regions, fundamentally challenge existing dominant
ways of thinking about regional governance and call for more useful analytic frameworks
(Bollens, 1997; Barnes and Foster, 2011). This dissertation is essentially an answer to
such calls for newer approaches to regional governance. Its prime purpose is to examine
the use of epistemic communities as a means to confront the wicked problems of urban
America.

Contributions of the Study
Development of the Epistemic Communities Framework (ECF)
The chief contribution of this dissertation is to expose the field of urban politics to
the utility of the epistemic communities framework for tackling wicked regional

211
problems. Though Holden (1964) and Frederickson (1999) initiated this dialogue, their
efforts were very minimal. Subsequent to Frederickson’s 1999 Gaus Lecture, no
significant attempts were undertaken to revive the dialogue on the significance of ECs for
American regional governance. What could be the reason for this lack of scholarly
attention to this topic? In order to show the significance of epistemic communities for
dealing with complex and tough regional problems, it is necessary to develop a
framework for identifying and analyzing these communities. Such a framework is,
however, absent in the field of urban politics and this dissertation has taken the first effort
in developing it.
One of the greatest advantages of the three-part framework developed in this
dissertation is its flexibility/adaptability to various governance settings (transnational,
national and regional) and a wide variety of policy domains (from economic development
to public welfare). Additionally, the framework is significant for two other reasons. One,
existing information on the EC concept is dispersed across several single issue case
studies conducted in different policy domains. These case studies deal only with those
aspects of the framework that are important for the epistemic community/communities
analyzed in the particular study. Two, though Haas (1992a) and Adler and Haas (1992)
provide elaborate information on various aspects of the EC framework, their
presentations, consisting of numerous examples and elaborate case by case discussions,
make the EC framework less accessible, in particular, to scholars outside of international
relations. This dissertation overcomes these two serious limitations. First, it brings
together the scattered theoretical pieces of the EC concept and organizes them such that
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they address three important questions about epistemic communities. These questions
are:
1. What is an epistemic community?
2. What factors or conditions encourage the emergence/proliferation of epistemic
communities?
3. In what ways do epistemic communities affect public policy making
processes?
Next, it systematically presents the information on these three questions such that it is
fairly easy to generate testable hypotheses on the EC concept.
Absent this framework, it is impossible to move forward the dialogue on the
application of ECs in urban policy making processes. If the most fundamental questions
about ECs, such as their potential existence in urban regions, their chief characteristics,
their causal logic, and their functionality are not dealt with, then how is it possible to
address the more difficult and bigger questions in the dialogue on ECF utility for regional
cooperation? Without an EC framework which can generate testable hypotheses, how
can we progress toward finding answers to critical questions such as:
•

What is the linkage between epistemic communities and significant policy
change?

•

How versatile is the EC concept?

•

Will it fit a wide set of regional problems and policy domains or does its
utility vary with specific features of the problem and the policy domain?

•

Does attacking wicked regional problems ultimately require the involvement
of epistemic communities in public policy making?

•

If so, how can epistemic communities be integrated into existing selforganizing regional solutions?

In this sense, this dissertation has made a very significant contribution by developing the
EC framework and opening the doors for scholarly discussion on this topic.
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Development of A Four-Step Process for Identifying Epistemic Communities
This dissertation has not just developed the EC framework, but has also tested
several elements of the framework it has built. For this, it has, for the first time,
developed a replicable four-step process for identifying the existence of epistemic
communities. This process involves:
•

mapping the communication network of policy actors in the issue area of
interest;

•

identifying actors with epistemic characteristics within the communication
network;

•

examining of the policy agenda of actors with epistemic characteristics and
sorting them into advocacy networks based on their shared policy
agenda/episteme;

•

identifying knowledge transaction activities of actors within each advocacy
network and classifying the actors involved in knowledge transaction
activities along with their communication linkages within their advocacy
network as an epistemic community.

Previous efforts on identifying ECs work backward. Scholars typically identify a
successful policy situation such as signing an international treaty or passing a national
legislative bill, and then trace back the network of experts who have contributed toward
that situation. This backward mapping process has two significant limitations. First, it is
inefficient as it permits the examination of only one or two communities at a time.
Second, communities identified are typically the ones that successfully impacted policy
decisions or at least came close to impacting policy decisions. This skewed focus on ECs
has hindered the development of a comprehensive understanding of EC effectiveness; in
particular, it has stalled the identification of factors that contribute toward EC
effectiveness. That is, absent comparative analysis of multiple ECs which vary in their
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policy performance, it is rather difficult to analyze conditions and factors that contribute
to EC success/failure in influencing decision makers and decision making. Without this
information, EC utility in different governance settings and policy domains will continue
to remain unclear. Exclusive reliance on the case study method for identifying and
analyzing ECs will prevent generalization of findings to a wider universe of cases;
applicability will remain limited to a small number of cases in which similar variables
exist. The four-step process developed in this dissertation overcomes these serious
drawbacks that mar existing EC research. With this process, it is possible to
simultaneously identify multiple ECs that exist within an entire policy domain;
essentially, a more efficient and comprehensive approach to identifying ECs. Next,
unlike in prior efforts, wherein there has been a skewed focus on successful ECs, my
approach permits identification of all ECs, regardless of their policy contributions, and
the assessment of the differences in their policy performances and the reasons for those
differences. The four-step process can capture ECs that have succeeded, ECs that have
impacted policy making processes in small, incremental ways, ECs that have failed, and
even ECs that are just emerging. Without the process developed in this study, progress
toward efficient and effective comparative analysis of ECs is rather unlikely.
A major criticism that surrounds the EC approach is the difficulty in finding a
community of experts who sufficiently fulfill Haas‘s (1992a) definitions and
characteristics of epistemic communities (Kutchesfahani, 2010). This dissertation
addresses this concern by developing a process that has the ability to systematically
identify communities of experts that satisfy Haas’ stringent assumptions. The four-step
process identifies shared policy agenda among experts. It, however, does not identify if
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these actors also share causal beliefs of public problems. But this component can be
added to the existing process. For example, I could ask interviewees to identify the
factors they think that might have contributed to the current financial crisis in Michigan’s
municipalities. It is important to note here that the process developed here is only an
initial effort and it has to be refined through additional efforts from me and from other
scholars. But despite the requirement for improvements, the identification process
developed here is a significant contribution; absent this process, there is no systematic
way of identifying ECs.

Development of A New Research Strategy which Conceptualizes ECs as Networks
This dissertation has developed an entirely new research strategy for identifying
and analyzing ECs. It has, for the first time, created a replicable approach that facilitates
ECs to be conceptualized as networks, both theoretically and empirically. Up until now,
scholars studying epistemic communities have not moved past a metaphorical conception
of ECs as networks.
Conceiving ECs as networks, both theoretically and empirically, facilitates
sophisticated analysis of ECs as dependent variables. Existing EC studies, typically,
analyze ECs as independent variables that explain policy behaviors and choices. The
farthest these studies have gone in terms of examining ECs as dependent variables is
identifying the composition of these communities, and to some extent, explaining the
causes for their emergence. In contrast, the network-based research strategy developed
here helps unravel intricate and important features of ECs such as EC organizational
characteristics, structure, and functional strategies. The list of all the EC dimensions that
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can be analyzed through the use of a network-based strategy is long and can be further
extended through the creativity and efforts of other scholars. Conception of ECs as
networks is significant for another important reason as well; it allows us to address one of
the major criticisms against the EC framework. Described as a model of elites by elites
and for elites (Jacobsen, 1995), the epistemic communities framework has been criticized
for assigning too much influence to experts at the expense of other actors (Toke, 1999,
Dunlop, 2000). The framework in its current form fails to take into account the multitude
of actors, including interest groups and social movements, who, at various times, shape
the norms of decision makers (Kutchesfahani, 2010). By conceptualizing ECs as
networks, it is possible to develop models which account for EC influence while
simultaneously accounting for the effects of other factors. Research on networks has
sufficiently advanced and scholars employ network level variables in regular regression
models (Andrew and Carr, Forthcoming).
Absent this research strategy, which examines ECs as networks, progress on
sophisticated analysis of EC networks is impossible. Further, the method of process
tracing will remain the only avenue available for researchers to trace an epistemic
community‘s activities and demonstrate its influence on decision makers at various points
in time. This method will allow identification of alternative credible outcomes that were
foreclosed as a result of EC influence, and can explore alternative explanations for the
actions of decision makers (Haas, 1992a). However, relative to the network-based
strategy developed here, the process tracing method is likely to be less rigorous and
efficient.
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Directions for Future Research
This dissertation is only an early effort toward its intended objective of showing
the significance and utility of the EC concept for solving “wicked” regional problems;
more work needs to be done.

Refining ECF and Improving Measures Used
First, the framework developed here needs to be improved and enhanced through
the efforts of other scholars as well. For this, it has to be widely-tested in other
governance settings and policy domains. Based on these tests, the three-part framework
could either be extended by including additional elements, or else, existing elements
could be better explained.
Next, measures developed and used in identifying ECs have to be improved. For
instance, more robust measures for capturing the policy knowledge of actors and their
knowledge transaction activities have to be developed. In case of policy knowledge, I
used a policy knowledge scale and asked respondents to rank themselves on that scale.
This measure could be supplemented by asking respondents to rank not just themselves,
but also their communication contacts on the policy knowledge scale. In this way, we can
get more than one value for each respondent’s level of policy knowledge--one given by
the respondent and the other by the individual(s) communicating with that respondent.
The average of these values could be used as a measure of the respondent’s policy
knowledge. The measure could be further enhanced by supplementing it with years of
professional experience the respondent has had in the particular policy domain. In case of
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knowledge transaction activities, I use the presence of communication ties or
participation in professional/subregional organizations as an indicator of a respondent’s
involvement in these activities. This measure could be replaced and respondents can be
asked to indicate if they participated in the development/discussion of potential solutions
to public problems in the particular issue area by directly or indirectly communicating
with other policy actors in the field or by participating in workshops, conferences, and/or
meetings of professional/subregional organizations. Further, in his study, I focus only on
consensus among EC actors in developing policy solutions to municipal finance
problems. However, I do not identify if these actors share consensus on the causal logic
of these problems. This limitation could be overcome by asking respondents to list the
factors they think have led to the tough problems in the issue area they specialize in.

Understanding the Emergence and the Longevity of EC Networks
In this study, I do not identify when exactly the ECs emerged. This could be
assessed by asking respondents to not just name their communication contacts, but also to
indicate since when these actors became their communication contacts. Using this
information, along with the information on the factors that motivated respondents to
develop communication linkages, the emergence of ECs can be explained. Knowledge on
EC emergence is vital for policy makers to understand how to mobilize epistemic
communities for the purpose of using them in policy making activities.
Knowledge on what holds the EC actors together is a vital piece in understanding
how to mobilize ECs. This knowledge is essential to identify ways and means of
nurturing and maintaining these communities over long periods of time. Previous studies
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do not specifically assess why EC actors choose to interact with each other; they stop
with analyzing why policy makers’ choose to consult with EC actors. EC networks are
self-organizing structures and self-organizing network structures, typically, have the
tendency to mutate (Monge and Contractor. 2002). Mutation could have both positive and
negative implications. For instance, addition of elected officials to an EC network may
imply enhanced access for the EC to decision makers. On the other hand, loosing
participants may imply loss of consensus among EC members. An EC network may not
just mutate, but also disband entirely, especially after achieving policy success on a
particular issue it had been interested in (Adler and Haas, 1992). An EC network may
also disband for other reasons such as failure to achieve consensus among its members or
inability to sustain in the wake of emergence of rivaling EC networks. Longevity is
critical for an epistemic community to achieve policy consensus among its members, to
gain legitimacy in the policy community in which it is embedded, and to be able to
institutionalize the epistemes it has promoted (Adler and Haas, 1992). All of these factors
allow the community to become a significant player in consensus development across
difficult public policy issues. Hence, EC scholars have to focus on explaining EC
longevity.

Understanding Policy Effects of ECs
Next, regional EC networks have to be studied as independent variables in order
to understand if they contribute toward policy choices and behaviors. Scholars should
identify if regional ECs play critical roles in policy development and implementation, and
if so, do they do so in a variety of policy domains such as economic development,
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environmental protection, land use and planning, public safety, public health,
transportation, social and welfare services, urban sprawl, etc. For this, it is necessary to
explore different policy domains and identify and analyze the ECs present in these
domains. In which policy domains are ECs present? Among these domains, in which
ones have ECs impacted policy behaviors/choices? In which policy domains have ECs
failed to make an impact? If ECs have failed to contribute toward policy change in some
domains, what could be the potential causes for this failure?

Understanding and Predicting EC Effectiveness
The most logical progression of the analysis of EC influences on policy outcomes
is the analysis of factors which contribute toward EC effectiveness. These factors are: EC
network structures, operational strategies of EC networks, and the interactions between
EC network structures and the operational strategies of EC networks.

Exploring EC Network Structures
Specific behavioral tendencies of EC members result in specific network
structures as revealed by the ERGM analysis in this study. Given this, do structural
differences in EC networks have implications for EC effectiveness in influencing policy
behaviors and choices? That is, do EC network structures matter?
•

Do ECs in housing policy generate network structures that are different from
network structures generated by ECs in economic development?

•

If so, what do these differences mean for EC policy successes/failures?

•

Are there differences in the network structures of ECs that have successfully
impacted policy decisions and the network structures of ECs that have failed to
impact policy decisions?
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•

Does the existence of transitivity within an epistemic community, which indicates
cohesiveness among members, translate into effective policy performance of that
community?

•

Does the existence of network activity/expansiveness within an epistemic
community, which indicates distrust among members, adversely affect the policy
performance of that community?

Questions such as these are critical for explaining the potential implications of EC
organizational structures for EC policy performance.

Exploring Operational Strategies of EC Networks
Besides EC network structures, it is also useful to conceive network operational
strategies as independent variables that can help explain EC policy performance.
•

Do the operational strategies of EC networks matter for EC policy success?

•

Do the operational strategies of ECs in housing policy differ from the operational
strategies of ECs in economic development?

•

If so, what do these differences mean for EC policy successes/failures?

•

Are there differences in the operational strategies of ECs that have successfully
impacted policy decisions and the operational strategies of ECs that have failed to
impact policy decisions?

•

Does developing communication ties with elected officials translate into effective
policy performance of an epistemic community?

•

Does not making direct recommendations to policy makers adversely affect the
policy performance of an epistemic community?

Exploring Interactions between EC Network Structures and Operational Strategies of
EC Networks
Research on ECs should also focus on understanding the implications of
connections between specific network structures and the specific operational strategies of
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these network structures. In particular, it should analyze the implication of these features
as an interacting group for EC effectiveness in influencing policy decisions.
•

Do the interactions of specific EC network structures and specific EC operational
strategies translate into EC policy success?

•

What is the implication of a combination of a network structure with reciprocal
ties and the operational strategy of developing communication ties with elected
officials for EC effectiveness?

•

What is the implication of a combination of a hierarchical network structure
consisting of popular actors and the operational strategy of making direct
recommendations to policy makers for EC effectiveness?
Knowledge obtained on EC effectiveness from comparative EC studies, especially

with longitudinal data collection and analysis would allow scholars to make
predictions/generalizations about how to successfully apply ECs to achieve policy
consensus on tough problems. Only when this knowledge is attained can we address
questions such as:
•

How can we integrate ECs with existing self-organizing prescriptions such as
regional partnerships, interlocal cooperation, services contracting, etc?

•

How can we make such integrations useful resources for initiating and sustaining
dialogues on tough regional problems?

•

In which areas do we need to carry out such integrations?

Finding answers to these questions will provide a comprehensive understanding of
what regional ECs are, how they work, when they work, and when they do not work.
After achieving such knowledge, scholars should seek to formally introduce these
resources to policy makers and explore the extent to which they are aware of the
existence of these resources, and the extent to which they have already used or are willing
to utilize these resources in policy making processes.
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To sum up, the objective of using the epistemic communities framework to
facilitate better regional governance in urban America is very ambitious. This dissertation
has made only a small step toward this lofty objective. But this small step has helped
unlock the doors to better research on epistemic communities. It has also paved the path
for other scholars to tread on. In this sense, this small step is a significant one.

APPENDIX A
Figure 1A: Communication Linkages among Actors with Epistemic Characteristics (LGR)
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=63.

Figure 1B: Policy Agenda of Actors with Epistemic Characteristics (LGR)

Episteme A
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Episteme B

Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=63. Twenty-seven actors who do not share policy interests represented by Epistemes A or B are depicted as isolates in the
network.

Figure 1C: Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities A and B within the Communication Linkages of Interviewees (LGR)
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. This communication network includes only the linkages among the 100 interviewees. N of non-EC members=65, and N of all EC members=35. Green
circles indicate actors who are non-EC members, red circles indicate actors who are members in both municipal finance epistemic community A as well as municipal finance epistemic community B
(N=17), blue circles indicate actors who only members in municipal finance epistemic community A (N=4), and yellow circles indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic
community B (N=14).

Figure 2A: Communication Linkages among Actors with Epistemic Characteristics (EME)
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=60.

Figure 2B: Policy Agenda of Actors with Epistemic Characteristics (EME)

Episteme D
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Episteme C

Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. N=60. Thirty actors who do not share policy interests represented by Epistemes C or D are depicted as isolates in the network.

Figure 2C: Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities C and D within the Communication Linkages of Interviewees (EME)
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. This communication network includes only the linkages among the 100 interviewees. N of non-EC members=74, and N of all EC members=26. Blue
circles indicate actors who are non-EC members, pink circles indicate actors who are members in both municipal finance epistemic community C as well as municipal finance epistemic community D
(N=9), green circles indicate actors who only members in municipal finance epistemic community C (N=13), and yellow circles indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic
community D (N=4).

Figure 3A: Communication Linkages among Actors with Epistemic Characteristics (PSP)
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek Software. N=60.

Figure 3B: Policy Agenda of Actors with Epistemic Characteristics (PSP)
Episteme G
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Episteme F

Episteme E
Note: Network generated using the Pajek Software. N=60. Eight actors who do not share policy interests represented by Epistemes E, F or G are depicted as isolates in the
network.

Figure 3C: Municipal Finance Epistemic Communities E, F and G within the Communication Linkages of Interviewees (PSP)
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Note: Network generated using the Pajek software. This communication network includes only the linkages among the 100 interviewees. N of non-EC members=53, and N of all EC members=47. Green
circles indicate actors who are non-EC members, dark pink circles indicate actors who are members in all three municipal finance epistemic communities--E, F and G (N=18), blue circle indicates actor
who is member of both municipal finance epistemic community E as well as municipal finance epistemic community F (N=1), teal circles indicate actors who are members in both municipal finance
epistemic community F as well as municipal finance epistemic community G (N=9), black circles indicate actors who only members in municipal finance epistemic community E (N=3), yellow circles
indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic community F (N=11) and light pink circles indicate actors who are only members in municipal finance epistemic community G
(N=5).
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APPENDIX B
Cover Letter
Subject: 2011 Epistemic Communities and Urban Governance Survey
Dear [Full Name]:
We are examining the role played by networks of experts in developing public policies to
deal with highly complex problems and hope you will be willing to participate in our
study. We are asking you to participate in this study because our review of the 248
articles published in the Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News between November
2010 and April 2011 on Michigan’s crisis in municipal finance revealed you as an
advocate of one or more popular strategies intended to improve the fiscal condition of
municipal governments in Michigan or as an expert in some facet of this topic.
If you agree to participate, we will ask you a few questions about your support for several
specific strategies for confronting fiscal stress in municipal governments (such as revenue
increases, downsizing, service consolidations, etc.). We will also ask you to identify six
individuals with whom you most frequently discuss your ideas for how state and local
officials should respond to the fiscal crisis that is currently affecting Michigan local
governments. We will contact the six individuals you identify and request them to
participate in this study. However, we will neither reveal your responses to these
individuals nor say that you identified them. The questionnaire takes approximately 20
minutes to complete.
This research is not an examination of the fiscal crisis in Michigan local governments,
but is instead an effort to understand the role of knowledge-based networks of policy
experts (aka epistemic communities) in policy development. Epistemic communities are
believed to play a critical role in developing consensus on: (1) policies that will impact
multiple autonomous communities (e.g., nations, states, municipalities) and (2) policies
that are highly technical or extremely complex in nature. Epistemic communities are also
thought to be important for developing solutions to public problems arising at least in part
from a serious system-wide shock or crisis of some form. The current debate over the
best way to improve the fiscal condition of municipal governments in Michigan is an
excellent case study for examining the role epistemic communities play in policy making.
We know you have many demands on your time, but we hope you will choose to
participate in this study. An important objective of this research is to map the networks of
policy advocates and experts that have emerged to promote solutions to the municipal
finance crisis. You are an important actor in one or more of these networks and your
exclusion from this study will prevent the full scale and structure of these important
networks from being understood. We believe that a better understanding of the structure
of these self-organizing, knowledge-based networks will permit the development of
strategies designed to encourage the emergence of these networks, and consequently, the
creation of better public policies.

234

We would be pleased if you will respond to this email and suggest a time that would be
good for us to call you to do a short phone interview to complete the questionnaire. We
can also send you a link that will permit you to answer the questionnaire online without
talking to us directly. Either way, your participation is entirely voluntary. Your responses
will remain confidential and the findings of this study will be reported in a form that does
not reveal the identities of the participants.
If you have any questions or concerns about this research study, please contact Shanthi
Karuppusamy at shanu@wayne.edu or by calling 313-806-9759.
Shanthi Karuppusamy
Doctoral Candidate
Department of Political Science
Wayne State University
2040, Faculty/Administration Building
656, West Kirby
Detroit, MI-48202
USA
Ph-313/806-9759
shanu@wayne.edu
Jered B. Carr, Ph.D.,
Director, Graduate Program in Public Administration
Department of Political Science
Wayne State University
2049 Faculty/Administration Building
656, West Kirby
Detroit, MI 48202
USA
Ph-313/310-3632
jcarr@wayne.edu
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APPENDIX C
Epistemic Communities and Urban Governance
Research Information Sheet
Title of Study:

Epistemic Communities and Urban Governance

Principal Investigator:

Shanthi Karuppusamy
Department of Political Science
Wayne State University
(313)806-9759

Co-Investigator:

Jered B. Carr
Department of Political Science
Wayne State University
(313)310-3632

Purpose:
You are being asked to be in a research study examining the role played by networks of
experts in developing public policies because our review of the 248 articles published in
the Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News between November 2010 and April 2011 on
Michigan’s crisis in municipal finance revealed you as an advocate of one or more
popular strategies intended to improve the fiscal condition of municipal governments in
Michigan or as an expert in some facet of this topic. This study is being conducted at
Wayne State University in Detroit.
Study Procedures:
 If you take part in the study, you will be asked a few questions about your support for
several specific strategies for confronting fiscal stress in municipal governments. You
will also be asked to identify six individuals with whom you most frequently discuss
your ideas for how state and local officials should respond to the fiscal crisis that is
currently affecting Michigan local governments.
 You can answer the questionnaire either through a phone interview or by taking an
online survey.
 We will contact the six individuals you identify and ask them to participate in this
study. However, we will neither reveal your responses to these individuals nor say
that you identified them.
 Participation is completely voluntary and you have the option of not answering some
of the questions and still remain in the study.
 It will take approximately 20 minutes to complete this survey.
Submission/Revision Date: July 7th, 2011
Protocol Version #: [9/30/2010]

HIC Date: 5/08
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Epistemic Communities and Urban Governance
Benefits
• As a participant in this research study, there will be no direct benefit for you;
however, information from this study may benefit other people now or in the
future.
Risks
• Research does not involve greater than minimal risk in that procedures are like
those participants encounter in daily life.
Costs
• There will be no costs to you for participation in this research study.
Compensation
• You will not be paid for taking part in this study.
Confidentiality:
• You will be identified in the research records by a code name or number.
• This master file with respondent names will be kept separate from the list
containing the coded identifiers. This file is a hard copy and can be
accessed only by key research personnel. The file will only be kept for the
length of time necessary to conduct the research project. It will not be
distributed to any individual outside of the research project and, upon
completion of the research project, will be destroyed.
Voluntary Participation /Withdrawal:
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You are free to not answer any questions or
withdraw at any time.
Questions:
If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Shanthi
Karuppusamy at shanu@wayne.edu or by calling (313)806-9759. If you have questions
or concerns about your rights as a research participant, the Chair of the Human
Investigation Committee can be contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact
the research staff, or if you want to talk to someone other than the research staff, you may
also call (313) 577-1628 to ask questions or voice concerns or complaints.
Participation:
By completing the interview/questionnaire you are agreeing to participate in this study.
Submission/Revision Date: July 7th, 2011
Protocol Version #: [9/30/2010]

HIC Date: 5/08

237

REFERENCES
Aberbach, Joel, Putnam, Robert and Rockman, Bert. 1981. Bureaucrats and Politicians
in Western Democracies. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Adler, Emanuel. 1992. The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities
and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control.
International Organization 46(1): 101-45.
Adler, Emanuel and Haas, Peter. 1992. Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World
Order, and the Creation of a Reflexive Research Program. International
Organization 46(1): 367-90.
Agranoff, Robert and McGuire, Michael. 2003. Collaborative Public Management: New
Strategies for Local Governments. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press.
Anderson Economic Group, LLC. 2011. Multiple Reports.
Andrew, Simon and Carr, Jered. Forthcoming. Mitigating Uncertainty and Risk in
Planning for Regional Preparedness: The Role of Bonding and Bridging
Relationships. Urban Studies.
Antoniades, Andreas. 2003. Epistemic Communities, Epistemes and the Construction of
World Politics. Global Society 17(1): 21-38.
Atkinson, Michael and Coleman, William. 1989. Strong States and Weak States: Sectoral
Policy Networks in Advanced Capitalist Economies. British Journal of Political
Science 14(1): 46-67.
Axelrod, Robert. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
Ayres, Robert. 1983. Banking on the Poor. MIT Press.

238
Barnes, William and Ledebur, Larry. 1992. City Distress, Metropolitan Disparities and
Economic Growth. Washington, D.C.: National League of Cities.
Barnes, William and Ledebur, Larry. 1994a. All In It Together: Cities, Suburbs And
Economic Regions. Washington, D.C.: National League of Cities.
Barnes, William and Ledebur, Larry. 1994b. Local Economies: The U.S. Common
Market of Local Economic Regions. Washington, D.C.: National League of Cities.
Barnes, William and Ledebur, Larry. 1998. The New Regional Economics. Thousand
Oaks: Sage Publishing.
Benson, Kenneth. 1982. A Framework for Policy Analysis. In Interorganizational
Co-ordination: Theory, Research and Implementation, edited by David Rogers,
David Whitten, and Associates. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press. pp:
137-76.
Benz, Arthur. 1992. Mehrebenen-Verflechtung: Verhandlungsprozesse in verbundenen
Entscheidungsarenen. In Horizontale Politikverflechtung. Zur Theorie von
Verhandlungssystemen, edited by Arthur Benz, Fritz W. Scharpf, and Reinhard
Zintl. Frankfurt a.M./New York: Campus. pp: 147-97.
Berardo, Ramiro, and Scholz, John. 2010. Self-Organizing Policy Networks: Risk,
Partner Selection, and Cooperation in Estuaries. American Journal of Political
Science 54(3): 632-49.
Blom-Hansen, Jordan. 1997. A “New Institutional” Perspective on Policy Networks.
Public Administration 75: 669-93.
Bollens, Scott. 1997. Concentrated Poverty and Metropolitan Equity Strategies. Stanford
Law and Policy Review 8(2): 11-23.

239
Börzel, Tanja. 1997. What's So Special About Policy Networks? An Exploration of The
Concept and of Its Usefulness. In Studying European Governance. European
Integration Online Papers, EloP, 1(16). http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/1997-016.pdf
Accessed 12 January, 2010.
Börzel, Tanja. 1998. Organising Babylon. On the Different Conceptions of Policy
Networks. Public Administration 76(2): 253-73.
Briffault, Richard. 2000. Localism and Regionalism. Buffalo Law Review 48(1): 1-30.
Burley, Anne-Marie and Mattli, Walter. 1993. Europe before the Court: A Political
Theory of Legal Integration. International Organization 47(1): 41-77.
Carr, Jered and Karuppusamy, Shanthi. 2009. Beyond Ideal Types of Municipal
Structure: Adapted Cities in Michigan. The American Review of Public
Administration 39(3): 304-21.
Citizens Research Council. 2005. Multiple Reports.
Coleman, James S. 1988. Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. Supplement,
American Journal of Sociology 94: 95-120.
Colorado State University. 2012. An Introduction to Content Analysis.
http://writing.colostate.edu/guides/research/content/pop2a.cfm Accessed 12
January, 2012.
Cowhey, Peter. 1990. The International Telecommunications Regime. International
Organization 44: 169-200.
Detroit Free Press. 2010. Multiple articles published from November 2010 to December
2010.
Detroit Free Press. 2011. Multiple articles published from January 2011 to December

240
2011.
Detroit News. 2009. Multiple articles published throughout the year 2009.
Detroit News. 2010. Multiple articles published from November 2010 to December
2010.
Detroit News. 2011. Multiple articles published from January 2011 to December
2011.
Dotterweich, Lisa. 2009. Who Knows What?: A Study of the Role of Epistemic
Communities in the Making of the No Child Left Behind Act. Unpublished
Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Kent State University, Kent.
Dougherty, Conor and Merrick, Amy. 2009. Localities Facing Merger Push.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123621767221336073.html. Accessed 12 January,
2012.
Douglas, Mary. 1975. Environments at Risk. In Implicit Meanings: Essays in
Anthropology. Vol. 247.
Downs, Anthony. 1994. New Visions for Metropolitan America. Washington D.C.: The
Brookings Institution.
Drake, William and Nicolaïdis, Kalypso. 1992. Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization:
“Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round. International Organization 46(1):
37-100.
Dunlop, Claire. 2000. Epistemic Communities: A Reply to Toke. Politics 20(3): 137-44.
DeHoog, Ruth, Lowery, David and Lyons, William. 1990. Citizen Satisfaction and
Local Government: A Test of Individual, Jurisdictional, and City Specific
Explanations. Journal of Politics 52: 807-37.

241
DeSantis, Victor. 1989. County Government: A Century of Change. In The Municipal
Year Book 1989. Washington, D.C.: International City Management Association.
pp. 55-65.
DeSantis, Victor and Renner, Tari. 1994. The Impact of Political Structures on Public
Policies in American Counties. Public Administration Review 54(3): 291-95.
Feiock, Richard. 2004. Regionalism and Institutional Collective Action. In Metropolitan
Governance: Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation, edited by Richard Feiock.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Feiock, Richard, Lee, In-Won, Park, Hyung Jun and Lee, Keon Hyung. 2010.
Collaboration Networks among Local Elected Officials: Information,
Commitment, and Risk Aversion. Urban Affairs Review 46(2): 241-62.
Foster, Kathyrn. 1997. The Political Economy of Special-Purpose Government.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Foster, Kathyrn and Barnes, William. 2011. Reframing Regional Governance for
Research and Practice. Urban Affairs Review Online First, DOI:
10.1177/1078087411428121.
Foucault, Michel. 1970. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences.
New York: Vintage Books.
Frederickson, George. 1999. The Repositioning of American Public Administration.
PS: Political Science and Politics 32(4): 701-11.
Frederickson, H. George, Johnson, Gary and Wood, Curtis. 2004. The Changing
Structure of American Cities: A Study of the Diffusion of Innovation. Public
Administration Review 64(3): 320-30.

242
Frederickson, George and Smith, Kevin. 2003. The Public Administration Theory Primer.
Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.
Friedkin, Noah. 1984. Information Flow Through Strong and Weak Ties in
Interorganizational Social Networks. Social Networks 3: 273-85.
Frisken, Frances and Norris, Donald. 2001. Regionalism Reconsidered. Journal of Urban
Affairs 23(5): 467-78.
Frug, Gerald. 2000. Against Centralization. Buffalo Law Review 48(1): 31-38.
Gainsborough, Juliet. 2001. Fenced Off: The Suburbanization of American Politics.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
George, Alexander. 1980. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective
Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Goldstein, Judith. 1989. The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy. International Organization
43: 31-71.
Gough, Clair and Shackley, Simon. 2001. The Respectable Politics of Climate Change:
The Epistemic Communities and NGOs. International Affairs 77(2): 329-46.
Gran, Guy. 1986. Beyond African Famines. Alternatives 11: 275-96.
Granovetter, Mark. 1973. The Strength of Weak Ties. American Journal of Sociology 83:
1444-65.
Granovetter, Mark. 1985. Economic Action and Social Structure. The American Journal
of Sociology 91(3): 481-510.
Gulati, Ranjay. 1995. Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties
for Contractual Choice in Alliances. The Academy of Management Journal 38 (1):
85-112.

243
Gulati, Ranjan and Gargiulo, Martin. 1999. Where Do Interorganizational Networks
Come From? The American Journal of Sociology 104 (5): 1439-93.
Haas, Ernst. 1980. Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes. World
Politics 32(3): 357-405.
Haas, Peter. 1989. Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean
Pollution Control. International Organization 43(3): 377-403.
Haas, Peter. 1990. Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International
Environmental Cooperation. New York: Columbia University Press.
Haas, Peter. 1992a. Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination. International Organization 46(1): 1-35.
Haas, Peter. 1992b. Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to
Protect Stratospheric Ozone International Organization 46(1): 187-224.
Hanneman, Robert and Riddle, Mark. 2005. Introduction to Social Network Analysis.
Riverside: University of California, Riverside.
http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/ Accessed 30 November, 2011.
Håkanson, Lars. 2010. The Firm as an Epistemic Community: The Knowledge Based
View Revisited. Paper presented at the 2010 Summer Conference on “Opening
Up Innovation: Strategy, Organization and Technology,” at Imperial College
London Business School, Jun 16-18.
Hechter, Michael. 1987. Principles of Group Solidarity. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Henion, Andy. 2011. Study: Crucial Information Lacking on Local Government Debt.
http://news.msu.edu/story/8884/ Accessed 14 February, 2011.

244
Holden, Mathew, Jr. 1964. The Governance of the Metropolis as a Problem in
Diplomacy. The Journal of Politics 26(3): 627-47.
Holzner, Burkart. 1972. Reality Construction in Society. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.
Holzner, Burkart and Marx, John. 1979. Knowledge Application: The Knowledge System
in Society. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Hopkins, Raymond. 1992. Reform in the International Food Aid Regime: The Role of
Consensual Knowledge. In Knowledge, Power, and International Policy
Coordination, edited by Peter Haas. Columbia: University of South Carolina
Press.
Ikenberry, John. 1992. A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the AngloAmerican Postwar Settlement. International Organization 46(1): 289-321.
Irvine, Helen, Cooper, Kathie and Moerman, Lee. 2011. An Epistemic Community as
Influencer and Implementer in Local Government Accounting in Australia.
Financial Accountability & Management 27(3): 249-71.
Jacobsen, John. 1995. Much Ado About Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy.
World Politics 47(2): 283-310.
Jordan, Grant and Schubert, Klaus. 1992. A Preliminary Ordering of Policy Network
Labelling. European Journal of Political Research (Special Issue) 21: 7-28.
Keating, Michael. 1995. Size, Efficiency, and Democracy: Consolidation, Fragmentation,
and Public Choice. In Theories of Urban Politics, edited by David Judge, Gerry
Stoker, and Harold Wolman. London: Sage.
Kendra, James, and Wachtendorf, Tricia. 2004. Creativity and Coordination in Disaster

245
Response. In Proceedings of the 4th Workshop for Comparative Study on Urban
Earthquake Disaster Management, Kobe, Japan. January 29-30, 2004, pp. 73-86.
Krackhardt, David. 1987. Cognitive Social Structures. Social Networks 9: 109-34.
Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1994. Les démocraties occidentales. Una approche comparée, Paris:
Economica.
Kutchesfahani, Sara. 2010. Politics and The Bomb: Exploring the Role of Epistemic
Communities in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Outcomes. Unpublished Dissertation.
Department of Political Science, University College London.
Laswell, Harold. 1950. Politics: Who Gets What, When and How. New York: McGrawHill Book Company, Inc.
Lee, In Won, Feiock, Richard and Lee, Youngmi. 2011. Competitors and Cooperators: A
Micro-Level Analysis of Regional Economic Development Collaboration
Networks. Public Administration Review Online First, DOI: 10.1111/j.15406210.2011.02501.x.
Lee, Youngmi. 2011. Economic Development Networks among Local Governments:
The Structure of Collaboration Networks in The Tampa Bay Metropolitan Area.
International Review of Public Administration 16(1): 113-34.
Leonard, Madeleine. 2004. Bonding and Bridging Social Capital: Reflections from
Belfast. Sociology 38(5): 927-44.
Lincoln, Yvonna and Guba, Egon. 1985. Naturalistic Inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications.
Lowery, David. 2000. A Transactions Costs Model of Metropolitan Governance:

246
Allocation Versus Redistribution in Urban America. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 10(1): 49-78.
Lubell, Mark. 2007. Familiarity Breeds Trust: Collective Action in a Policy Domain.
Journal of Politics 69: 237-50.
Lubell, Mark, Scholz, John, Berardo, Ramiro and Robins, Gary. 2011. Testing Policy
Theory with Statistical Models of Networks. Policy Studies Journal.
Lusher, Dean, Robins, Gary, Pattison, Philippa and Lomi, Alessandro. 2012. "Trust Me":
Differences in Expressed and Perceived Trust Relations in an Organization.
Social Networks. In press.
LeRoux, Kelly and Carr, Jered. 2010. Prospects for Centralizing Services in an Urban
County: Evidence from Eight Self-Organized Networks of Local Public Services.
Journal of Urban Affairs 32(4): 49-70.
LGSA. 2006, Are Councils Sustainable? Final Report: Findings and Recommendations
Local Government and Shires Associations of NSW, May.
http://www.northsydney.nsw.gov.au/resources/documents/LGI_FinalReport_2006
05.pdf Accessed 1 December, 2008).
Maldonado-Maldonado, Alma. 2004. An Epistemic Community and Its Intellectual
Networks: The Field of Higher Education in Mexico. Unpublished Dissertation,
Boston College.
Mani, Sunil. 2006. Epistemic Communities and Informed Policy Making for Promoting
Innovations: The Case of Singapore. In Science and Technology Policy for
Development, Dialogues at the Interface, edited by Louk Box and Rutger
Engelhard. London, UK: Anthem Press.

247
Marsden, Peter and Campbell, Karen. 1984. Measuring Tie Strength. Social Forces
63:482-501.
Matkin, David and Frederickson, George. 2009. Metropolitan Governance: Institutional
Roles and Interjurisdictional Cooperation. Journal of Urban Affairs 31(1): 45-66.
Mendelson, Sarah. 1993. Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the
Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan. World Politics 45(3): 327-360.
Michigan Legislature 2011. Michigan Taxpayers Guide.
http://docs.housedems.com/publications/2011_Taxpayer_Guide.pdf Accessed 14
March, 2011.
Monge, Peter and Contractor, Noshir. 2002. Theories of Communication Networks. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Neiman, Max. 1976. Social Stratification and Government Inequality. American Political
Science Review 53: 474-93.
Norris, Donald. 2001. Prospects for Regional Governance under New Regionalism:
Economic Imperatives versus Political Impediments. Journal of Urban Affairs
23(5): 557-71.
Norris, Donald and Stenberg, Carl. 2001. Governing Metropolitan Baltimore. In
Baltimore and its Region in National Perspective, edited by Donald Norris and
Harold Wolman. Baltimore, MD: Maryland Institute for Policy Analysis and
Research, University of Maryland, Baltimore County. Unpublished manuscript.
Ohren, Joe. 2004. Local Government Budgeting; Short Term and Long Term Responses
to the Fiscal Crisis. Prepared for a Meeting of the Board of the Metropolitan
Affairs Coalition.

248
Olberding, Julie. 2002. Diving into the ‘Third Waves’ of Regional Governance
Strategies: A Study of Regional Partnerships for Economic Development in U.S.
Metropolitan Areas. Economic Development Quarterly 16: 251-72.
Oliver, Eric. 2001. Democracy in Suburbia. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Paquet, Gilles. 2005. The New Geo-Governance: A Baroque Approach. Ottawa, Canada:
University of Ottawa.
Peirce, Neal, Johnson, Curtis, and Hall, John 1993. Citistates: How Urban America Can
Prosper in a Competitive World. Washington, D.C.: Seven Locks Press.
Perlman, Ellen. 1993. Secretive Governing: Authorities Proliferate; So Does Possible
Misconduct. City and State. March 1, pp. 9-11.
Peterson, John. 2003. Policy Networks. IHS Political Science Series: 2003, No. 90.
Peterson, John and Bomberg, Elizabeth. 1999. Decision-making in the European Union.
London and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press.
Public Act 4, 2011. The Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability
Act. Passed March 21, 2011.
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/treasury/FAQs_Act_4_348233_7.pdf
Accessed 25 March, 2011.
Rhodes, Rod. 1986. European Policy-Making, Implementation and Sub-central
Governments. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration.
Rhodes, Rod. 1988. Beyond Westminster and Whitehall. London: Unwin Hyman.
Rhodes, Rod. 1997. Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance,
Reflexivity and Accountability. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Rittel, Horst and Webber, Melvin. 1973. Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning.

249
Policy Sciences 4: 155-69. Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Inc.:
Amsterdam.
Robins, Gary, Pattison, Pip, Kalish, Yuval and Lusher, Dean. 2007. An Introduction to
Exponential Random Graph (p*) Models for Social Networks. Social Networks
29(2): 173-91.
Robins, Garry, Pattison, Philippa and Wang, Peng. 2009. Closure, Connectivity, and
Degree Distributions: Exponential Random Graph (p*) Models for Directed
Social Networks. Social Networks 31: 105-17.
Ross, Bernard and Levine, Myron. 2006. Urban Politics: Power in Metropolitan
America. Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
Ruggie, John. 1975. International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends.
International Organization 29(3): 557-83.
Rusk, David. 1995. Cities without Suburbs. Baltimore, MD: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press.
Salvador, Miquel and Ramio, Carles. 2011. Institutionalizing Participatory Democracy
and The Emergence of an Epistemic Community in Spanish Local Government.
Journal of Urban Affairs 33(5): 491-510.
Sauvé, Raphaël and Watts, Jamie. 2003. An analysis of IPGRI‘s Influence on the
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture.
Agricultural Systems 78(2): 307-27.
Savitch, H.V. and Vogel, Ronald. 2000. Introduction: Paths to New Regionalism. In
Symposium on the New Regionalism and Its Policy Agenda, edited by H.
V. Savitch and R. K.Vogel, State and Local Government Review 32(3): 158-168.

250
Schattschneider, Elmer, E. 1975. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of
Democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Shrestha, Manoj. 2008. Decentralized Governments, Networks and Interlocal
Cooperation in Public Goods Supply. Unpublished Dissertation, Reubin O’D.
Askew School of Public Administration and Policy, Florida State University,
Tallahassee.
Shrestha, Manoj and Feiock, Richard. 2009. Governing U.S. Metropolitan Areas: SelfOrganizing and Multiplex Service Networks. American Politics Research 37(5):
801-23.
Sikkink, Kathryn. 1993. Human Rights, Principle Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in
Latin America. International Organisation 47(3): 411-41.
Simon, Herbert. 1983. Reason in Human Affairs. Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press.
Skidmore, Mark and Scorsone, Eric. 2009. Causes and Consequences of Fiscal
Stress in Michigan Municipalities. State Tax Notes September 7.
Snijders, Tom, van de Bunt, Gerhard and Steglich, Christian. 2010. Introduction to
Stochastic Actor-Based Models for Network Dynamics. Social Networks 32(1):
44-60.
Snyder, Rick. 2011. Dollars and Sense: How State and Local Governments in Michigan
Spend Your Money. 2011 Citizen’s Guide to Michigan’s Financial Health.
Socolow, Robert. 1989, US-Soviet Collaboration in Energy Conservation, Research and

251
Development. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the Conference on
Technology-Based Confidence Building: Energy and Environment. St. Johns
College, Santa Fe, New Mexico, July 9-14.
Speth, James. 2004. Global Environmental Challenges: Transitions to A Sustainable
World. New Delhi, India: Orient Longman Private Ltd.
State of Michigan. 2011. http://www.michigan.gov/taxes/0,1607,7-238-43529-154427-,00.html Accessed 15 June, 2011.
Strange, Susan. 1996. The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World
Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sundström, Mikael. 2000. A Brief Introduction: What is an Epistemic Community?
Available at: http://www.svet.lu.se/joluschema/epistcomm.pdf Accessed 13 July,
2010.
Thomas, Craig. 1997. Public Management as Interagency Cooperation: Testing Epistemic
Community Theory at the Domestic Level. Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory 7(2): 221-46.
Toke, Dave. 1999. Epistemic Communities and Environmental Groups. Politics 19(2):
97-102.
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, New York, 2012.
http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/treaty_ratification_status.php Accessed 12
January, 2012.
US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2009. Regional Economic Information System Data
for 2009.
Van Daele, Jasmin. 2005. Engineering Social Peace: Networks, Ideas, and the Founding

252
of the International Labour Organization. International Review of Social History
435-66.
Verdun, Amy. 1999. The Role of the Delors Committee and EMU. Journal of European
Public Policy 6(3): 308-29.
Visser, James. 2002. Understanding Local Government Cooperation in Urban Regions:
Toward a Cultural Model of Interlocal Relations. American Review of Public
Administration 32(1): 40-65.
Waarden, Frans van. 1992. Dimensions and Types of Policy Networks. In “Policy
Networks,” European Journal of Political Research (Special Issue) 21, edited by
Grant Jordan and Klaus Schubert. pp. 29-52.
Walker, David. 1987. Snow White and The 17 Dwarfs: From Metro Cooperation to
Governance. National Civic Review 76(1): 14-28.
Wasserman, Stanley and Faust, Katherine. 2004. Social Network Analysis: Methods and
Applications. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Weiher, Gregory. 1991. The Fractured Metropolis: Political Fragmentation and
Metropolitan Segregation. Albany: SUNY Press.
Wikipedia. 2012a. “General Agreement on Trade in Services,” Wikipedia, The Free
Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Agreement_on_Trade_in_Services
(accessed Jan 20, 2012).
Wikipedia. 2012b. “Detroit,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Detroit (accessed Jan 27, 2012).
Williams, Oliver. 1971. Metropolitan Political Analysis: A Social Access Approach. NY:

253
The Free Press.
Williamson, Oliver. 1996. The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Yu, Hyon Seog. 2008. The Role of Epistemic Community in Regional Security
Institution Building: ASEAN-ISIS and the Establishment of ARF. Paper prepared
for the WISC Conference, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. July 23-26.
http://www.wiscnetwork.org/ljubljana2008/papers/WISC_2008-403.doc Accessed
14 August, 2011.

254
ABSTRACT
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE:
POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE REFORM
by
SHANTHI KARUPPUSAMY
August 2012
Advisor: Dr. Jered B. Carr
Major: Political Science
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
In recent times, the US has undergone significant changes in how regional
governance is conceptualized and the focus has shifted from government to governance
and from governmental consolidation to problem solving (Barnes and Foster, 2011).
Policy makers’ quest for interjurisdictional responses to the financial crisis and the
recession has rekindled interest in the topic of regional governance. However, the
economic, social and technical changes of the recent decades, which have now
assimilated in US urban regions, fundamentally challenge existing dominant ways of
thinking about regional governance and call for more useful analytic frameworks
(Bollens, 1997; Barnes and Foster, 2011). This dissertation is essentially an answer to
such calls for newer approaches to regional governance. Its prime purpose is to examine
the use of epistemic communities (ECs) as a means to confront the wicked problems of
urban America.
In this context, I have developed a framework for identifying and analyzing
epistemic communities. The three-part framework developed in this dissertation is
flexible/adaptable to various governance settings (transnational, national and regional)
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and a wide variety of policy domains (from economic development to public welfare);
the framework also helps generate testable hypotheses on the EC concept. This
dissertation has not just developed the EC framework, but has also tested several
elements of the framework it has built. For this, it has, for the first time, developed a
replicable, network-based, four-step process for identifying the existence of epistemic
communities. With this process, it is possible to simultaneously identify multiple ECs
that exist within a policy domain, regardless of their policy contributions; essentially, a
more systematic, efficient and comprehensive approach to identifying ECs than single
issue case studies.
Using archival document analysis, the snowball sampling technique, data
collected from 100 structured interviews, a four-step EC identification process, and social
network methods such as network mapping, exponential random graph models and
quadratic assignment procedures analysis, I identify and analyze the municipal finance
ECs that exist in Michigan. I examine the composition, interaction patterns, motivations
for interactions, and functional performance of these communities which are involved in
Michigan’s municipal finance reform efforts.
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